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Abstract 
 
The Government of Ontario set out to restructure Ontario’s electricity industry in the late 
1990s. Through the enactment of the Energy Competition Act, 1998 and the 
subsequent Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004, Ontario’s electricity sector changed from 
a traditional “public utility” model (i.e. a state-owned vertically-integrated utility) to a 
“hybrid model”, which includes both regulated and competitive aspects.  
This thesis paper seeks to answer the question: from an economic and environmental 
perspective, how have Ontario’s electricity consumers been impacted by changes 
resulting from the restructuring and post-restructuring policies of government? To 
answer this question, the prices paid for electricity service (commodity, transmission, 
and distribution) prior to the restructuring are compared to the prices paid for the same 
service after the restructuring. The analysis reveals that prices are rising more rapidly in 
the post-restructuring era. The question becomes what changes in the sector are driving 
the price increases and are consumers benefitting from these changes? This paper 
evaluates the changes to the sector resulting from the restructuring, and from other 
post-restructuring government policies, in a qualitative manner to determine whether 
consumers are receiving any benefit from these changes. The analysis highlights that 
some changes have impacted customers positively (i.e. shift to more environmentally-
friendly energy sources, conservation, distributor amalgamation, etc.) and other 
changes simply added costs with no real benefits to consumers (i.e. facilitation of a 
competitive market for electricity supply, retail electricity markets, etc.).  
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Disclaimer Statement  
 
The information contained in this paper represents the views of the author, and in no 
way reflects the Ontario Energy Board’s position or opinion. 
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Part A  
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
Traditionally, the electricity supply industry was regarded as a natural monopoly, where 
the high capital costs associated with constructing an electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution and system control infrastructure acted as a natural barrier to 
entry. There are certain aspects of an electricity supply system that are not inherently 
monopolistic (generation and retail supply). However, these two crucial functions in an 
electricity supply system have traditionally been bundled with the naturally monopolistic 
functions to create a single vertically-integrated, publicly-owned corporation that was 
responsible for effectively managing all the functions associated with the production, 
transmission and distribution of electricity.1 
Ontario’s electricity sector, prior to industry restructuring, followed the traditional model. 
Ontario Hydro, a crown corporation owned by the Ontario Government, was a vertically-
integrated electric utility responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution2 of 
electricity to Ontario’s electricity consumers. Ontario Hydro largely controlled its own 
business. It set its own rates, made decisions regarding capital expansion, and 
determined the best way forward for Ontario’s electricity sector. 
The restructuring of Ontario’s electricity supply industry began in 1998 with the 
introduction of the Energy Competition Act, 1998.  The Energy Competition Act 
unbundled Ontario Hydro into five companies. The five companies were: the 
Independent Market Operator (later renamed the Independent Electricity System 
Operator), Hydro One Networks Inc., Ontario Power Generation, the Electrical Safety 
                                                          
1 Yajima, 1997: 1-2. 
 
2 Ontario Hydro distributed electricity to a large number of retail customers that lived outside the service 
areas of municipal distributors.  
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Authority, and the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation. Each company had 
complete control over a certain aspect of the electricity sector.3  
Ontario’s electricity supply industry began operating competitively under a voluntary 
pool market on May 1st, 2002. This means that generators had the option to either sell 
their electricity into the pool (based on a competitive bidding process) or they could 
establish bilateral contracts with their customers and have power wheeled through the 
system directly to their customers (based on a contracted price). The functions of 
transmission and distribution were still regulated by the government.   
The competitive electricity market opening in May 2002 coincided with the hottest 
summer in 50 years and electricity demand hit record highs. In another unfortunate 
coincidence, the demand increase corresponded with a lack of supply as nuclear plants 
were still offline due to retrofitting programs and there were also unforeseen problems 
with some coal-fired generators. The outcome of high demand and low supply was 
massive rate shock. The public reacted immediately to the exploding energy costs and 
the government responded by setting a price cap of 4.3 cents / kilowatt hour (“kWh”) 
and also provided rebates for the period when the price was above the 4.3 cents / kWh 
level. The government also froze electricity distribution and transmission rates.4  
The Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 was developed and passed on the basis of the 
perceived failures in the first restructuring. The Electricity Restructuring Act was passed 
by McGuinty’s Liberals after the Liberal election win in late 2003.  
The Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 “instituted the hybrid model for Ontario’s 
electricity sector”.5 The act intended to take a balanced policy approach by 
amalgamating the features of both a competitive and regulated electricity sector. The 
competitive aspect of the model is the continued operation of a wholesale market 
system. The prices of the wholesale electricity are based on frequent auctions between 
                                                          
3 Winfield, 2012: 103.  
 
4 Treblicock and Hrab, 2006: 425-426.  
 
5 Electricity Market Investment Group, 2006: 2. 
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generators who wish to supply electricity into the pool. The regulated aspect of the 
electricity supply sector is the Regulated Price Plan, which establishes the price of 
electricity for consumers that purchase electricity from their local distribution company.  
The hybrid system established by the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 still exists 
today. Currently, the price paid for electricity by the end consumer is comprised of the 
following three components: commodity, transmission and distribution. For residential 
and commercial customers, the commodity price is based on the Regulated Price Plan6, 
and is either a two-tiered or time-of-use price both of which are set by the Ontario 
Energy Board (the “OEB”).7 Distribution and transmission prices are also regulated and 
set by the OEB. There are currently 77 electricity distribution companies in the province 
and 5 transmission companies.8  
 
1.2 Literature Review  
 
A number of researchers have studied the electricity sector reforms that have occurred 
in jurisdictions all across the world.  
In regard to Ontario's electricity sector, some researchers looked at the political context 
of the restructuring, seeking to understand why the restructuring happened. For 
example, Swift and Stewart (2004) provides a detailed account of the rationales for 
restructuring.9 Winfield (2012) also discusses some of the rationales for restructuring in 
his book setting out the process undertaken to implement the restructuring. Winfield 
(2012) also discusses the post-restructuring policy direction of government.10 These 
                                                          
6 The Regulated Price Plan price is set based on a forecast of actual costs and the price paid by 
consumers for electricity is meant to recover the actual costs of generation.  
 
7 The two-tiered price prevails in situations where the customer does not have a smart meter and the 
time-of-use price prevails when the customer does have a smart meter (and its service provider has 
implemented time-of-use pricing).  
 
8 Ontario Energy Board, 2012a: 1.  
 
9 Swift and Stewart, 2004. 
 
10 Winfield, 2012.  
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books provide a detailed account of the purpose and process of the restructuring (and 
some post-restructuring changes) in Ontario’s electricity sector but do not specifically 
analyze the results of the restructuring and post-restructuring government policies. In 
doing so, they contribute to the historical understanding of the reasons why the sector 
was restructured and how it was restructured.    
Other researchers looked at Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring itself and analyzed 
the problems and outcomes. For example, Trebilcock and Hrab (2006) provided an in-
depth analysis of the implementation problems associated with Ontario’s electricity 
restructuring. The paper largely focused on the problems that arose from the initial 
restructuring (prior to the release of the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004).11 Amongst 
other things, the paper concluded that Ontario’s electricity restructuring resulted in an 
increase in electricity-related debt, higher prices for consumers and halted long-term 
system planning (due to uncertainty related to the restructuring). In addition, the authors 
identify an important lesson: restructuring policies need to directly address political 
implications (i.e. public backlash) in order to ensure success (and avoid expensive 
policy reversals).12  
Zareipour, Canizares and Bhattacharya (2007) analyzed the operational aspects of 
Ontario’s electricity market and provide insights regarding the outcomes over the first 
four years of market operation. A main conclusion was that price volatility in Ontario’s 
market was higher than other restructured markets and that this volatility was caused by 
the real-time nature of Ontario’s market (as opposed to the day-ahead nature of the 
comparative markets used in the study). The authors also concluded that the physical 
electricity system is not sufficiently considered in the process of clearing the market 
price.13  
                                                          
11 The paper noted that, at the time of writing, it was too early to determine whether the new regulatory 
regime under the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 reflects an improvement over the initial restructuring 
regime (under the Energy Competition Act, 1998).  
 
12 Treblicock and Hrab, 2006. 
 
13 Zareipour, Canizares, and Bhattacharya, 2007. 
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The two papers discussed above were written shortly after the electricity sector 
restructuring occurred in Ontario. These papers look at issues related to the competitive 
market design (and surrounding political issues in the case of Trebilcock and Hrab) in 
the period immediately after restructuring. They contribute to knowledge base in terms 
of an understanding of the immediate issues and outcomes of the electricity sector 
restructuring in Ontario.  
In more recent papers, researchers looked at the impact of government policies on 
electricity prices in Ontario. Dewees (2012) explained the reasons that residential 
electricity prices in Ontario increased over the 2000-2010 period and forecasted price 
changes over the 2010-2015 period (and linked the forecast to specific price drivers and 
related government policies). The paper concluded that supply mix changes (new 
generation sources being more expensive than historical sources of generation), 
infrastructure renewal, costs associated with operating a competitive market for 
electricity, and taxes are the main reasons for the price increases experienced by 
residential customers from 2000-2010. The paper also concluded that the forecasted 
price increases over the 2010-2015 period will be largely caused by the addition of 
renewable generation capacity.14 
In another more current study, Sharp (2012) provided a forecast of electricity prices 
over the 2011-2016 period for a number of categories of electricity consumers. The 
report utilized a wide-range of price drivers (generation additions, existing generation, 
conservation, transmission, distribution, and wholesale market service charges) in 
developing the electricity price forecast. The paper concludes that the majority of 
forecasted price increases will be related to the commodity component of the electricity 
bill with smaller, although still substantial, increases on the other components of the 
bill.15  
The papers by Dewees and Sharp both provide an analysis of electricity prices in 
Ontario and discuss the reasons that prices have increased (and are expected to 
                                                          
14 Dewees, 2012.  
 
15 Sharp, 2012.  
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increase in the future). These papers contribute to the literature on Ontario’s electricity 
restructuring by providing a better understanding of the impact that different government 
policies have had (and are expected to have) on electricity prices in Ontario. These two 
papers are, in some ways, conceptually similar to my paper. However, there are some 
key differences. The time periods over which the studies were completed, the 
methodology used for creating the electricity pricing time series, and the granularity of 
the price driver analysis are notably different. As will be discussed in the next sub-
section, this paper provides information that is incremental to the analysis completed in 
the noted papers and fills certain gaps in the existing literature.  
A number of researchers have also studied the impact that restructuring policies have 
had on electricity prices in California and other US jurisdictions. For example, 
Borenstein (2002) discussed the issues that caused price volatility and price increases 
in the California electricity sector immediately after restructuring and provided some 
potential solutions to those problems. The paper concluded that, in the short-term, real-
time retail electricity pricing and contracting for generation capacity could help to control 
wholesale electricity prices in California. However, in the long-term, more significant 
structural changes would need to occur in order to improve the competitive electricity 
market.16 In a more recent study, Borenstein and Bushnell (2014) reviewed the reasons 
and objectives for restructuring in US jurisdictions, discussed the outcomes of the 
restructurings that occurred, and provided an analysis of future challenges facing the 
US electricity sector.17 These papers contribute to knowledge base on electricity sector 
restructuring in terms of a better understanding of the immediate problems that arose in 
California’s restructuring and the long-term outcomes of electricity sector restructuring in 
US jurisdictions. It is important to understand the outcomes of electricity sector reforms 
in other jurisdictions to better contextualize the issues that arose in Ontario’s own sector 
restructuring.    
                                                          
16 Borenstein, 2002.  
 
17 Borenstein and Bushnell, 2014.  
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Overall, there have been numerous studies that have analyzed electricity sector 
restructurings and the impact that these reforms (and other policy changes) have had 
on electricity prices.18 My paper falls within this broad base of literature and, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next sub-section, fills certain gaps in the existing 
knowledge base.   
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
The main research question that I answer in this paper is: 
From an economic and environmental perspective, how have Ontario’s electricity 
consumers been impacted by changes resulting from the restructuring and post-
restructuring policies of government? 
I will discuss a number of topics in order to answer this research question. First, I will 
provide an analysis of competition in electricity generation and customer choice in retail 
supply. Second, I will provide an analysis of the change in Ontario’s generation supply 
mix and conservation activities from before the restructuring to 2012. Finally, I will 
provide an analysis of Ontario’s electricity prices over the 1983-2012 period and 
individually analyze all of the major price drivers that have impacted electricity prices 
over the post-restructuring period.   
As discussed, some researchers have touched on topics similar to those that I 
examined as part of the analysis undertaken to answer my main research question. This 
paper does, however, provide incremental information that is not available in the 
existing literature. The incremental information and analysis provided in my paper is 
discussed below.  
I have generated a time series of pricing data that extends from the early 1980s to 2012 
(a 30-year period). The pricing information reflects the actual average price for 
                                                          
18 The above does not reflect an exhaustive list of all the research that has been completed on the topic. 
There are also numerous other jurisdictions that have been studied (the UK, Australia, New Zealand, 
Texas, Argentina, etc.), which are not discussed here.  
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electricity (and includes all costs associated with electricity service). This pricing dataset 
was developed for the purposes of this paper and is not available in the existing 
literature on the topic. I developed this new electricity pricing dataset, as opposed to 
using pricing data that was previously available, as I believe that using an average 
price, as opposed to a price applicable to a specific class of customers, is ideal as it 
avoids any pricing distortions that could potentially arise in the cost allocation process 
and allows for a more effective analysis of electricity pricing over time. In addition, by 
using an expanded timeframe for pricing analysis (30-years) a comprehensive 
understanding of the changes in Ontario’s electricity prices can be provided.  
This paper also includes statistical analysis which examines the correlation between the 
restructuring (and certain post-restructuring) policies of government and the changes in 
electricity prices over time. This type of statistical analysis has not been previously 
published in the literature as it relates to electricity prices in Ontario.  
My paper also identifies all of the major changes that arose from the restructuring and 
post-restructuring policies of government, which have impacted electricity prices. The 
changes that I identify to have impacted electricity prices are viewed through a financial 
and environmental lens (as applicable) to determine whether consumers are benefitting 
from the changes. In total, I identify and analyze, in detail, 17 price drivers that have 
impacted the price of electricity in Ontario over the post-restructuring period. While other 
researchers have studied a limited number of price drivers that have impacted electricity 
prices, the level of detail provided in this paper is not available elsewhere in the 
literature.  
Overall, the analysis undertaken to answer my main research question fills gaps in the 
existing body of literature on the electricity sector restructuring in Ontario.  
In order to provide sufficient context for my research, I begin the paper by providing a 
brief discussion of the rationales, the objectives, and the process of restructuring 
Ontario’s electricity supply industry. To this end, I will answer the following background 
research questions. 
What were the reasons for Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring?  
9 
 
To answer this question, I will analyze the rationale for the restructuring. The analysis in 
this section will review the work done by other researchers on the topic and the 
rationales set out in the Government’s white paper titled, “Direction for Change: 
Charting a Course for Competitive Electricity and Jobs in Ontario” (the “Government’s 
White Paper”). This analysis will canvass the following topics:  
(a) The Mike Harris government’s ideological beliefs  
(b) The perceived unsatisfactory performance of Ontario Hydro 
What were the objectives of the restructuring (as originally set out by the government)?  
The analysis in this section is based on the MacDonald Committee’s report and the 
Government’s White Paper. In both of those documents, the government set out the 
proposed objectives of the restructuring.  
How has the electricity sector evolved (1998-2012)?  
In response to this question, I will discuss the relevant legislation that led up to the 
restructuring. The discussion will also include a listing of all of the major milestones and 
policy changes that occurred prior to the restructuring, during the restructuring and in 
the post-restructuring period.  
For the most part, the information provided in this paper in response to the background 
research questions is available in the existing literature related to the electricity sector 
restructuring. Between Swift and Stewart (2002), Treblicock and Hrab (2006), Winfield 
(2012), and the primary source documents (i.e. the MacDonald Committee Report and 
the Government’s White Paper), the information discussed in this paper in relation to 
the background research questions is largely available in the existing literature.  
 
1.4 Summary of Principal Findings  
 
The following provides a brief summary of the principal findings that are set out in this 
paper.  
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• The “all-in” electricity price and the distribution price increased more rapidly in the 
post-restructuring period (post-1998) when compared to the pre-restructuring 
period (pre-1998). This finding is supported by the statistical analysis undertaken 
and discussed in the paper.  
• The pricing analysis performed in this paper was hindered by a lack of available 
data for the 1998-2005 period. This made the pricing evaluation more difficult. 
Data gathering and recording functions should be maintained during transition 
periods after policy implementation (and were not in the case of Ontario’s 
electricity sector restructuring).  
• There were a large number of factors (price drivers) that impacted the price for 
electricity (commodity, transmission, and distribution) over the post-restructuring 
period. The price increases experienced during the post-restructuring period can 
be linked to three main causes: (1) restructuring-related government policies; (2) 
post-restructuring government policies; and (3) real cost pressure.  
• The restructuring-related government policies were largely designed to facilitate a 
competitive market for electricity supply and to offer customers choice in retail 
electricity supply. Consumers were, generally, impacted negatively by the 
restructuring-related policies of government. Electricity consumers continue to 
pay incremental costs associated with the competitive market design even after 
the government essentially abandoned competition for electricity supply. In 
addition, facilitating retail supply options for consumers applied pressure on 
electricity prices during the post-restructuring period and consumers derive little 
benefit from the retail option.  
• The post-restructuring government policies were largely designed to make 
Ontario’s electricity sector more environmentally-friendly. Significant costs were 
incurred to “green” Ontario’s electricity sector. However, the implementation of 
these policies has largely resulted in a significant improvement in the 
environmental performance of Ontario’s electricity sector which benefits all of 
Ontario’s citizens.  
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• The price drivers that arose from the post-restructuring environmental policies of 
government should be considered, analytically, separate from the price drivers 
associated with the restructuring-related government policies as the 
government’s environmental policies would likely have been implemented 
irrespective of the sector restructuring. 
• Overall, both the restructuring-related and the post-restructuring policies of 
government applied significant pressure on electricity prices during the post-
restructuring period. Consumers were generally impacted negatively by the 
restructuring-related government policies and more positively by the post-
restructuring-related government policies.  
 
1.5 Interdisciplinarity of Thesis Topic  
 
My thesis topic falls within the broad academic discourse of policy analysis. Policy 
analysis is inherently an interdisciplinary area of study. Concepts from the academic 
disciplines of political science, public administration and economics are commonly 
involved in any study of the policy decisions of government.  
A single government policy could impact citizens in numerous ways (i.e. socially, 
economically, environmentally, etc.). In order to understand the full impact of policy 
decisions (and to understand why policy decisions were made) an integrated 
interdisciplinary approach must be utilized.  
In regard to the government policies studied in my thesis paper, citizens in Ontario were 
largely impacted economically and environmentally. Therefore, as is necessary in all 
studies of policy analysis, my paper uses an integrated interdisciplinary approach to 
understand the impact of the government’s electricity sector reforms. My analysis relies 
on concepts, techniques and perspectives from disciplines including: political science, 
public administration, economics, and environmental studies. 
While techniques and perspectives from each of the above disciplines were considered, 
they were not used in a delineated fashion where specific methodologies from each 
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were strictly followed. Instead, the approach that I use to study Ontario’s electricity 
sector restructuring is more holistic and integrated in nature. Using an integrated 
interdisciplinary approach allowed me to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
why the electricity sector restructuring occurred, how it was implemented, and how 
consumers were impacted both economically and environmentally from the sector 
restructuring.   
Overall, my thesis entails a case study on Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring 
through the lens of policy analysis. The thesis fulfills the requirements for the M.A. in 
Interdisciplinary Studies program at York University as it uses an integrated 
interdisciplinary approach for policy analysis (which touches on a number of disciplines 
as set out above). It also fills a void in the existing literature.  
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Part B  
 
2. Rationales for the Electricity Sector Restructuring  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
A number of researchers have looked at the rationales for Ontario’s electricity sector 
restructuring. In addition, the Government’s White Paper, which set out the high-level 
plan for restructuring, provides some insight on the government’s rationale for moving 
forward with its restructuring plan.  
The key rationales for restructuring include:  
(a) Harris government’s ideological beliefs  
The Harris Government believed that the private sector operates more efficiently 
and that by moving to a competitive electricity sector, market forces would apply 
downward pressure on electricity prices.  
(b) Perception that Ontario Hydro was inefficient 
The Harris Government also believed that Ontario Hydro was not operating 
efficiently. At the time, the government thought that by splitting up Ontario Hydro’s 
business and selling off its assets to the private sector, the electricity sector could 
be better managed.  
 
2.2 Harris Government’s Ideological Beliefs  
 
The Harris Government came to power at a time that jurisdictions all over the world 
were looking at ways to restructure their electricity sectors. As noted in the 
Government’s White Paper, “other jurisdictions are restructuring rapidly, setting 
examples, and positioning themselves to compete more effectively for investment and 
14 
 
jobs. Ontario risks falling behind.”19 Generally, the central argument leading 
governments to seek free-market reforms in electricity supply is that privatization results 
in lower purchasing costs for the consumer with a lower reliance on governmental 
regulation.20  
The Harris government ran on a platform known as the Common Sense Revolution 
(“CSR”), which advocated for reducing taxes, cutting programs, reducing red tape and 
government control in numerous areas. Specifically, the government stated that it was 
seeking to cut taxes by 30%, cut non-priority spending (which the government defined 
as all areas other than health, education and law enforcement) by 20%, reduce the 
workforce of the provincial government by 15% and reduce regulatory burden.  A key 
principle underlying the CSR platform was that the private sector could do things better 
and more cost effectively.21   
Interestingly, the CSR platform actually said very little about the electricity sector. 
However, given the government’s ideological views that the private sector could do 
things more efficiently and cost-effectively than the public sector, and the fact that other 
jurisdictions were seeking electricity sector reforms, Ontario’s electricity sector 
eventually became a target for reform.22 The government believed that unbundling the 
Ontario Hydro monopoly and selling off its assets to the private sector would lead to 
efficiencies and lower electricity prices.23  
The ideological views of the Harris government would likely have been enough to cause 
the restructuring of the electricity sector, but the government also referred to the 
unsatisfactory performance of Ontario Hydro as a rationale for the restructuring.  
                                                          
19 Ontario Government, 1997: 1.  
 
20 Pollitt, 1995: 1.  
 
21 Winfield, 2012: 92-93.  
 
22 Ibid: 102-103.  
 
23 Swift and Stewart, 2004: 127.  
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2.3 Unsatisfactory Performance of Ontario Hydro  
 
In the Government’s White Paper on electricity restructuring, the government focused a 
lot of attention to Ontario Hydro’s unsatisfactory business record as a rationale for its 
proposed restructuring.  
Ontario Hydro played a prominent role in the economic development of Ontario. The 
government noted that historically Ontario Hydro was universally recognised as a well-
run and responsible organization. However, the government stated that in the 1990’s 
Ontario Hydro’s performance had faltered.  
The government pointed to increased electricity prices for Ontario consumers during the 
early 1990s, the poor performance of Ontario Hydro’s nuclear assets, high wages and 
excess staffing as some of the key concerns related to Ontario Hydro. The issue of 
Ontario Hydro’s debt was also raised. The government noted that Ontario Hydro was 
struggling with over $30 billion in debt and that interest payments on the debt amounted 
to over 30% of total revenues. The government also discussed the declining availability 
of Ontario Hydro’s nuclear capacity. The amount of nuclear capacity available at any 
given time had declined from the early 1980s to the early 1990s.24  
Daniels and Trebilcock, in their paper titled, “The Future of Ontario Hydro: A Review of 
Structural and Regulatory Options” provided a detailed analysis of the problems facing 
Ontario Hydro in the early 1990s.  
The authors noted in the early 1990s, electricity prices were rising rapidly at a time 
where the province was facing a severe recession. As a result of the public uproar 
arising from the electricity rate increases, Ontario Hydro implemented a price freeze on 
its rates.   
In 1993, Ontario Hydro was forced to incur restructuring charges of over $3.6 billion 
associated with employee severance costs, write-downs related to assets which were 
recorded at values in excess of market value, and plant closure costs. In the same year, 
                                                          
24 Ontario Government, 1997: 5-8. 
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Ontario Hydro reduced its full-time work force by approximately 24%. 
Another problem raised in their paper was Ontario Hydro’s debt level. In the absence of 
provincial government guarantees on the company’s debt, a Royal Bank of Canada 
Dominion Securities report concluded that Ontario Hydro would have difficulty meeting 
the requirements for a BB rating from Standards and Poors given its 1995 financial 
results.  
The authors also raised the issue of Ontario Hydro’s excess generation capacity. In 
1989, the difference between Ontario Hydro’s installed capacity and maximum peak 
demand was approximately 28.1%. By 1993, that difference grew to about 64.8%. This 
compares to an average Canadian installed capacity vs. maximum peak demand 
margin of 38%.  
Daniels and Trebilcock noted that the problems faced by Ontario Hydro in the early 
1990s were largely caused by the following factors: 
(a) Over-estimation of future demand;  
(b) Over-expansion (and related borrowings) related to its nuclear facilities in the 
1970s and 1980s;  
(c) Substantial cost over-runs and poor performance of its nuclear facilities;  
(d) Actual reduced demand due to: 
i. Adoption of conservation measures;  
ii. Severe recession in the early 1990s (which immediately reduced 
electricity demand);  
iii. Ontario’s move from a manufacturing and industrial based economy 
(which was energy intensive) to a more knowledge based economy (which 
is less energy intensive);  
iv. Reduced prices for substitute energy sources (mainly natural gas), which 
allows customers to more easily use substitute other energy sources for 
heating and some industrial purposes.25  
                                                          
25 Daniels and Trebilcock, 1996: 4-6.  
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Effectively, in the early 1990s, Ontario Hydro was holding a massive amount of debt 
due to the expansion of its generation capacity. It borrowed significant capital to finance 
its nuclear expansion and its nuclear assets did not perform as well as expected. In 
addition, electricity demand was falling across the province and Ontario Hydro could not 
recover any revenue shortfalls caused by declines in sales through increased rates (as 
it agreed to maintain rate increases to levels below the Consumer Price Index - or 
“CPI”). Therefore, Ontario Hydro’s debt levels continued to climb and the government’s 
perception of the company diminished over the 1990s.  
The Government’s White Paper largely linked Ontario Hydro’s poor performance in the 
early 1990s to the monopolistic operation of the electricity sector. The government 
noted that electricity monopolies cause higher prices, excessive debt, poor priority 
setting, and bureaucratic inefficiency. The government’s proposed solution was simple: 
open the market and introduce competition.26   
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
Historically, Ontario Hydro had a strong performance record. It owned and operated a 
relatively low-cost electricity system and was considered a well-managed company. 
However, in the early 1990s a number of factors came together which resulted in 
significant rate increases for Ontario electricity consumers, increased the debt carried 
by Ontario Hydro and tarnished Ontario Hydro’s reputation.  
All of these problems amounted to making Ontario’s electricity sector a target for reform. 
Ontario Hydro was no longer viewed by the government as a well-run company. This 
perception combined with the Harris’ government belief that the private sector could do 
things better, resulted in the Harris government undertaking a restructuring of Ontario’s 
electricity sector. It was the government’s goal to sell off Ontario Hydro’s generation and 
transmission assets to private corporations and create a more market-based electricity 
sector.  
  
                                                          
26 Ontario Government, 1997: 8. 
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3. Objectives of the Electricity Sector Restructuring  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In November 1995, the provincial government authorized the appointment of an 
advisory committee to study and assess options for establishing a competitive electricity 
sector in Ontario. This committee was known as the “MacDonald Committee.”  The 
MacDonald Committee released its report titled “A Framework for Competition: The 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Competition in Ontario’s Electricity System to the 
Ontario Minister of Environment and Energy” in May 1996, which set out the 
committee’s advice for restructuring Ontario’s electricity supply industry. Among other 
things, the report identified the Terms of Reference for the MacDonald Committee’s 
study and a number of objectives, established through public consultations that guided 
the committee in the development of its recommendations for restructuring Ontario’s 
electricity sector. The Government’s White Paper, released a year after the MacDonald 
report, set out the government’s objectives with regard to the electricity sector 
restructuring.  
It is important to understand the goals of a given policy in order to analyze whether the 
policy initiative was successful.  
 
3.2 Objectives of Restructuring: MacDonald Committee Report  
 
The MacDonald Committee was provided with a Terms of Reference by the government 
to guide its work on the development of recommendations for restructuring Ontario’s 
electricity sector.  
The Terms of Reference included the government’s objectives, with regard to the 
restructuring, that were to guide the MacDonald Committee. The government’s 
objectives were described as follows: “[t]he Government of Ontario is committed to 
upholding the objectives of sustainable affordable electricity rates, enhancing provincial 
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competitiveness, preserving financial soundness and safeguarding Ontario’s quality of 
life.”27  
In adhering to these objectives, the Terms of Reference outlined the issues to be 
considered by the MacDonald Committee in making its recommendations. These issues 
included:  
• Affordable electricity rates for all classes of customers; 
• Achievement of greater economic efficiency;  
• Power system reliability;  
• Economic competitiveness and regional economic impacts; 
• Implications for public finance including public sector indebtedness and 
provincial/municipal government revenues; 
• First Nation and aboriginal issues;  
• Electricity trade and security;  
• Arrangements for nuclear power; 
• Local accountability; and 
• Sustainable development.28  
As part of its mandate, the MacDonald Committee was to hold public consultations to 
hear the perspectives of interested citizens on the advisory work that it was doing for 
the provincial government. Through those consultations, the MacDonald Committee 
heard a wide range of views, which were summarized in its report.  
The report noted that a common theme arose in the submissions it heard from 
interested parties. While there was a great drive to reduce electricity rates, parties 
submitted that achieving that goal should not threaten a number of other important 
issues related to the electricity sector. For example, financial concerns should not 
overshadow the importance of maintaining the safety and reliability of Ontario’s 
electricity system. Other objectives raised by parties included the following: 
                                                          
27 MacDonald Committee, 1996: 34.  
 
28 Ibid: 135. 
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• Ensuring equitable sharing of the benefits of a restructured electricity sector 
across regions and rate classes;  
• Minimizing environmental impacts;  
• Establishing a set of market rules for parties accessing the competitive electricity 
market to ensure fairness; and  
• Preserving the financial soundness of the province. 
In developing its plan for Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring, the MacDonald 
Committee attempted to address the objectives of the government, as set out in the 
Terms of Reference, while addressing the concerns of the interested parties that 
provided comments to the committee in the course of its advisory work.  
The MacDonald Committee stated that any plan that it would propose for the 
restructuring of the electricity sector must somehow balance the objectives, which were 
sometimes competing, of a wide range of interested parties.29  
 
3.3 Objectives of Restructuring: Government White Paper  
 
Subsequent to the release of the MacDonald Committee’s report, the government 
released its White Paper on electricity restructuring. The Government’s White Paper 
noted that, in developing its proposal for Ontario’s electricity industry restructuring, the 
government took into consideration the recommendations of the MacDonald Committee 
and the positions provided by interested parties to the committee during the public 
consultation process. 
In the Government’s White Paper, the government set out its objectives for the 
electricity sector restructuring which did not vary significantly from those it provided to 
the MacDonald Committee in the initial Terms of Reference that launched the 
committee’s work. 
The following are the key objectives discussed by the government in the White Paper.  
                                                          
29 Ibid: 34-36. 
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The government was looking to reduce electricity prices through competition. The 
government stated that a competitive market, with fair rules and vigilant regulation, 
would ensure that prices are as low as possible. Competitive market forces would 
ensure that prices reflect both supply and demand conditions, and prices will be driven 
to the lowest possible level, while maintaining a high standard, of service, as customers 
shop for the cheapest available power.30  
This leads into the government's next objective for the restructuring. The government 
argued that a competitive market would give individuals and businesses greater choice. 
Customers would be able to choose their own electricity supplier and this would 
encourage greater product and service innovation and price discipline on electricity 
providers.31  
The government sought to enhance the reliability and safety of Ontario’s electricity 
sector. The government stated that it was committed to introducing competition in the 
electricity sector in a manner that does not compromise the safety or reliability of 
Ontario’s electrical power system.32  
Amalgamation of small municipal electricity utilities (“MEUs”) was another objective. The 
government believed that amalgamating the distributors in the province would lead to 
efficiencies in the distribution sector. At the time of restructuring, there were over 300 
MEUs operating in the province, some serving less than 100 customers.33  
The final objective of the restructuring was to reduce the outstanding debt of Ontario 
Hydro. A part of the restructuring was the establishment of certain mechanisms to 
reduce OH’s debt in a fair and equitable manner over a number of years.34  
                                                          
30 Ontario Government, 1997: 11. 
 
31 Ibid.  
 
32 Ibid: 11-12.  
 
33 Ibid: 12.  
 
34 Ibid: 13.  
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
The government’s objectives for the electricity sector restructuring, as set out in its 
White Paper, were to reduce electricity prices through competition; allow for customer 
choice in electricity supply; enhance the safety and reliability of the electrical power 
system; gain efficiencies in electricity distribution through the amalgamation of MEUs; 
and reduce the debt associated with Ontario’s electricity supply industry. The objectives 
did not evolve significantly from the initial Terms of Reference provided to the 
MacDonald Committee to the release of the Government’s White Paper.  
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4. The Process of Restructuring (and Post-Restructuring Changes)    
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the following section, I will provide the major milestone of Ontario’s electricity 
restructuring and post-restructuring changes. This section will provide the necessary 
context to understand the changes that occurred in Ontario’s electricity sector. 
  
4.2 Timeline of Important Events (1995-2012) 
 
The below figure sets out a timeline of important events (i.e. legislation, reports, 
milestones, etc.) that are relevant to Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring and post-
restructuring changes. These events are discussed in greater detail in the sub-sections 
that follow.  
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Figure 1 – Timeline of Important Events – Ontario’s Electricity Sector 
Restructuring (and Post-Restructuring Changes) 
Event Date 
Harris Progressive Conservative Government Elected 1995 
MacDonald Committee Report 1996 
Government White Paper on Electricity Restructuring  1997 
Energy Competition Act  1998 
Hydro One Networks Privatization Blocked April 2002 
Market Opening May 2002 
Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply Act December 2002 
McGuinty Liberal Government Elected  2003 
Electricity Restructuring Act 2004 
Ontario Power Authority Established 2004 
Green Energy and Green Economy Act  2009 
Energy Consumer Protection Act  May 2010 
Transition to Harmonized Sales Tax  July 2010 
Ontario Clean Energy Benefit 2011 
 
4.3 Ontario’s Electricity Sector - Pre-Restructuring  
 
Ontario Hydro, a crown corporation owned by the Ontario Government, was a vertically-
integrated electric utility responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution35 
of electricity to Ontario’s electricity consumers. It also had responsibility for the system 
operation and system planning functions. The Government of Ontario had guaranteed 
                                                          
35 Ontario Hydro distributed electricity to a large number of retail customers that lived outside the service 
areas of municipal distributors.  
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Ontario Hydro’s debt and was responsible for appointing its Board of Directors.36    
Ontario Hydro was responsible for procuring electricity supply for all customers in the 
Province. Ontario’s electricity demand was almost entirely supplied by assets owned 
and operated by Ontario Hydro. Prior to restructuring, Ontario Hydro had installed 
capacity of approximately 31,000 megawatts (“MW”).37 38 In the final full year of its 
operation as a vertically-integrated crown corporation, Ontario Hydro generated 
approximately 139 terawatt hours (“TWh”) of electricity.39 It also held long-term 
contracts with a number of non-utility generators (“NUGs”)40 which supplied a small 
portion of Ontario’s overall electricity demand. Ontario’s electricity system was, and still 
is, directly tied into the electricity systems of Quebec, New York State and other 
neighbouring jurisdictions. This allows for electricity imports and exports to these 
jurisdictions.41   
Ontario Hydro also had the responsibility for transmitting electricity across the province. 
In 1998, it owned and operated approximately 29,000 kilometres (“km”) of transmission 
lines and associated infrastructure.42 Transmission lines are high-voltage lines that are 
used to transport electricity from the generation stations to the local areas where the 
electricity is to be consumed. In the case of Ontario Hydro, it would transmit electricity 
directly to some large volume customers, to its own retail customers which were served 
by distribution assets owned and operated by Ontario Hydro, and to MEUs43 (which 
                                                          
36 Daniels and Trebilcock, 1996: 2.    
 
37 This generation capacity was comprised of 69 hydro-electric generation stations, 3 nuclear generation 
facilities, and 6 fossil-fueled stations.  
 
38 Ontario Hydro, 1999: 5. 
 
39 Ibid: 1. 
 
40 NUGs are privately-owned generation facilities. The NUGs referred to in this paper are located in 
Ontario.  
 
41 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013a.  
 
42 Ontario Hydro, 1999: 5.  
 
43 Prior to restructuring, there were over 300 MEUs operating in the province.  
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would then distribute the electricity to their own customers). In all cases, transformer 
stations, owned by Ontario Hydro, by large industrial customers, or by the MEUs would 
reduce the voltage of the electricity coming off transmission lines to levels that could be 
transported on distribution lines for the ultimate use by energy consumers.  
Ontario Hydro also operated a large retail distribution business. Customers that were 
not served by an MEU, mostly in rural areas, were served by Ontario Hydro. It owned 
and operated 174,700 km of distribution lines immediately prior to its demerger.44  
Ontario Hydro, under the Power Corporations Act, was required to provide “power at 
cost.” It was expected to pass on the costs of running its operations (generation, 
transmission and distribution) onto electricity customers with no markup. Ontario Hydro 
set electricity rates for the customers that it served directly, the wholesale price of 
electricity (including transmission) for the supply that was sold to the MEUs, and also 
regulated the rates charged for distribution services by the MEUs.45 46 In 1993, in 
response to public opposition to the rate increases that were implemented throughout 
the early 1990s, the government required Ontario Hydro to freeze its electricity rates.47  
The provincial government exerted control over Ontario Hydro through its ability to issue 
policy directives (which were developed in consultation with Ontario Hydro’s Board of 
Directors), to the corporation. Policy directives were considered binding on Ontario 
Hydro. In addition, every three years a Memorandum of Understanding between Ontario 
Hydro and the Ministry of Energy was developed. The Memorandum of Understanding 
established the accountability and reporting requirements which governed Ontario 
Hydro’s relationship with the Ministry and the Government. The OEB was responsible 
for reviewing the rates set by Ontario Hydro. However, the OEB’s powers were limited 
to making recommendations to Ontario Hydro and the Ministry of Energy. The OEB’s 
                                                          
44 Ibid.  
 
45 Daniels and Treblicock, 1996: 3-4.  
 
46 Prior to restructuring, customers paid a bundled rate for electricity. The rate included all the costs 
associated with the supply of electricity (commodity, transmission and distribution).  
 
47 Ibid: 4.  
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recommendations were not binding.48  
Ontario Hydro, nearing the end of 1990’s and prior to restructuring, was one of the 
largest electric utilities in North America. Until the unbundling of the corporation in early 
1999, Ontario Hydro directly served almost 1 million retail customers (largely in rural 
areas), over 100 large industrial customers, and 255 municipal distribution companies 
(who served approximately 3 million customers).49 
In summary, Ontario Hydro was a vertically-integrated, crown corporation responsible 
for serving Ontario’s electricity consumers. It was the producer, transmitter, distributor, 
system planner, and system operator of Ontario’s electricity sector. Ontario Hydro 
largely controlled its own business. It set its own rates, made decisions regarding capital 
expansion, and determined the best way forward for Ontario’s electricity sector. 
However, the government did have some mechanisms by which it could exert control 
over the corporation; most importantly the ability to appoint Ontario Hydro’s Board of 
Directors.  
 
4.4 Ontario’s Electricity Sector: Lead-up to Restructuring  
 
The beginning of Ontario’s electricity supply industry restructuring can be traced back to 
the Harris Government’s provincial election win in 1995. As noted previously, the Harris 
Government believed that the private sector could do things better and more cost 
effectively than the public sector. As such, the government eventually targeted the 
electricity sector for reform.  
In late 1995, the Harris Government established the MacDonald Committee to study the 
potentials for restructuring the electricity supply industry in Ontario. In May 1996, the 
MacDonald Committee released its report and made over 50 recommendations 
regarding the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity sector. Essentially, the MacDonald 
                                                          
48 Ibid: 3-4.  
 
49 Ontario Hydro, Final Annual Report (1999): 1.  
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Committee suggested to the government that wholesale and retail competition be 
implemented for electricity supply in Ontario.50  
In support of this goal, the MacDonald Committee recommended that Ontario’s Hydro 
monopoly on electricity generation should be eliminated and its generation assets 
should be separated and established as competing generators. Moreover, Ontario’s 
electricity generators must be sufficiently separated to prevent any one company from 
exercising market dominance. Private equity should be introduced in the ownership of 
generation assets in order to enhance the introduction of competitive forces in Ontario’s 
electricity sector. In addition, the MacDonald Committee recommended that all 
electricity generators should be able to compete, on equal terms, to supply electricity to 
Ontario consumers. To enable this, it was also suggested that non-discriminatory 
access to Ontario’s transmission grid be made available.51  
With regard to Ontario’s transmission system, the MacDonald Committee recommended 
that the existing transmission assets of Ontario Hydro should be transferred to an 
independent “Transmission Grid Company,” which would be responsible for managing 
and maintaining Ontario’s transmission grid.52  
The recommendations associated with the distribution function of Ontario’s electricity 
supply industry were based on two principles. First, Ontario Hydro’s distribution 
business should be absorbed into the local distribution systems; and second, there 
should be fewer distribution utilities operating in the province.53 
Finally, the MacDonald Committee made a number of recommendations with regard to 
the legislative and regulatory framework that should be applicable to Ontario’s electricity 
sector. Among other matters, the committee recommended new legislation should be 
enacted to replace the Power Corporations Act and that amendments be made to other 
                                                          
50 MacDonald Committee, 1996: iii, 37.  
 
51 Ibid: iv-v, 51, 56-64. 
  
52 Ibid: iv, 52-53.  
 
53 Ibid: v-vi, 72-73, 77.  
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existing acts as necessary. In addition, it was recommended that the Ontario Energy 
Board be tasked with the responsibility of regulating the electricity industry in Ontario.54  
The MacDonald Committee stated that implementing the recommendations it set out in 
its report would lead to electricity rates that are lower than those that could be expected 
under the existing monopoly system.55  
In November 1997, a year after the MacDonald Committee report was released, the 
government released its White Paper on electricity sector restructuring. The 
Government’s White Paper noted that in developing its plan for electricity sector 
restructuring it accepted the general direction recommended by the MacDonald 
Committee.56 
The Government determined that full wholesale and retail competition would be 
introduced to Ontario’s electricity sector. All electricity generators would be able to 
participate in the market and customers would be given the option of choosing their 
electricity supplier.57  
The government set out a plan for the full separation of monopoly operations from 
competitive businesses in the electricity sector. Having noted that the functions of 
transmission and distribution are naturally monopolistic, it was determined that those 
functions would be regulated by the Ontario Energy Board.58  
The government stated that the OEB would be granted, through legislation, the powers 
necessary to fulfill its new function as the regulator of the province’s electricity sector.59 
The government stated that the monopolistic functions must be regulated in a manner 
                                                          
54 Ibid: vii, 97, 100.  
 
55 Ibid: viii. 
 
56 Ontario Government, 1997: 15.  
 
57 Ibid: 16.  
 
58 Ibid: 18.  
 
59 The OEB was already responsible for the regulation of Ontario’s natural gas sector.  
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that ensures fair and equitable access and minimizes issues associated with cross-
subsidization.60  
In accordance with its plan for the separation of the monopoly functions (transmission 
and distribution – the “wires” functions) from the competitive functions (generation and 
retail supply) of the electricity sector, the government called for the demerger of Ontario 
Hydro into 3 separate companies:  
• The Independent Market Operator would run the electricity market exchange, 
dispatch power, and arrange financial settlements between buyers and sellers. 
In addition, it would also be responsible for forecasting supply requirements.  
• Ontario Electricity Generation Corporation would take ownership of Ontario 
Hydro’s generation assets and would have a mandate to maximize the value of 
those assets.  
• Ontario Electric Services Company would be granted ownership of Ontario 
Hydro’s transmission and distribution assets.61 
The Government’s White Paper also set out its expectations with regard to the 
electricity distribution sector. The government stated that it expects that mergers of the 
MEUs begin to occur on a voluntary basis in order to achieve economic efficiencies in 
the sector.62  
Finally, the government focused significant attention on methods for dealing with the 
“stranded debt” of Ontario Hydro.63  The government noted that stranded debt could be 
dealt with in three ways: (1) finding new efficiencies in savings through improved 
operations of the successor companies of Ontario Hydro; (2) using tax revenues 
collected from businesses operating in the electricity sector to pay down the stranded 
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debt; and (3) establishing a mechanism whereby electricity consumers would directly 
pay off the stranded debt overtime. The government, at the time of issuing the White 
Paper, had not determined how to best address the stranded debt; instead it stated that 
it is too early to take a position on a specific recovery mechanism.64  
Overall, the White Paper generally followed the recommendations set out by the 
MacDonald Committee. The government set out its high-level plan for restructuring 
Ontario’s electricity supply industry which was premised on introducing competition into 
electricity generation and offering customer choice in retail supply.  
After the release of the Government’s White Paper, the Market Design Committee 
(“MDC”) was established in early 1998 and issued its Final Report in early 1999.65 The 
MDC’s task was to develop, in accordance with the policy direction set out in the 
Government’s White Paper, the necessary rules and protocols for the implementation 
and operation of a competitive electricity market in Ontario.66   
The MDC provided its recommendations to government, which the government 
considered when developing the Energy Competition Act, 1998 and eventually when 
structuring the competitive electricity market in Ontario before market opening.  
The MDC’s Final Report included recommendations associated with: the governance 
structure for the Independent Market Operator, market power mitigation, wholesale 
market design, transmission and distribution related issues, and retail competition.67 
 
                                                          
64 Ibid: 23-25.   
 
65 The MDC also: issued four quarterly reports; issued wholesale market rules; provided advice to the 
OEB on issues associated with the design of a retail market; issued standalone Technical Reports; 
delivered to the government a proposed agreement with Ontario Power Generation on market power 
mitigation; and delivered to the government a proposed governance and structure by-law for the 
Independent Market Operator.  
 
66 Market Design Committee, 1999: 1-2.  
 
67 Ibid: 4-14. 
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4.5 Energy Competition Act, the Transition Period and the Market Power 
Mitigation Agreement  
 
After the release of the MacDonald Committee Report and the Government’s White 
Paper, the government passed Bill 35 - the Energy Competition Act in 1998. The 
Energy Competition Act launched the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity sector by 
enacting the Electricity Act, 1998 and revising the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998. The 
government relied on the recommendations made by the MDC in its early reports when 
drafting the Energy Competition Act, 1998.  
The Ontario Energy Board Act expanded the OEB’s mandate to include the regulation 
of the monopoly functions of the electricity sector (transmission and distribution). As 
such, the OEB was granted the necessary powers to set the rates for the transmission 
and distribution companies operating in the province.  
The main purpose of the Electricity Act, 1998 was to facilitate competition in the 
generation and sale of electricity and to facilitate a smooth transition to competition. It 
also intended to: 
• protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices and the reliability and 
quality of electricity service; 
• promote economic efficiency in the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity; and  
• ensure that Ontario Hydro's debt is repaid in a prudent manner and that the 
burden of debt repayment is fairly distributed.68 
The Energy Competition Act essentially unbundled Ontario Hydro into five successor 
companies:  
(1) Ontario Power Generation (“OPG”) was created to own and operate Ontario 
Hydro’s existing generation assets;  
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(2) Ontario Hydro Services Corporation (later renamed Hydro One Networks) 
was created to own and operate the transmission and retail distribution assets 
formerly owned by Ontario Hydro;  
(3) the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation was created to assume and 
manage the stranded debt of Ontario Hydro;69  
(4) the Electrical Safety Authority was established to assume Ontario Hydro’s 
safety inspection functions; and  
(5) the Independent Market Operator was established to oversee the wholesale 
market and the dispatch function necessary for the functioning of Ontario’s 
electricity system.70  
During the transition period, between the time that the Energy Competition Act was 
passed and market opening in 2002, the electricity sector operated similarly to how it 
operated under Ontario Hydro from the consumers’ perspective. Electricity consumers 
were still charged on a bundled basis (generation, transmission, distribution and other 
charges) for electricity service. The difference was, after the restructuring, the 
successor companies of Ontario Hydro operated their businesses separately. OPG 
received the bundled payments and streamed the funds to the relevant service 
providers. The charges applied to consumers during this transition period were 
designed to provide OPG with planned revenues of 4 cents / kWh (based on a forecast 
of energy demand) and maintain OPG’s revenue (on a per kWh basis) at the same level 
over the transition period.71  
Prior to market opening, OPG and the provincial government signed the Market Power 
Mitigation Agreement. The purpose of the agreement was to ensure that OPG did not 
use its substantial market power to influence the wholesale market for electricity. As a 
result of the Market Power Mitigation Agreement OPG sold off some of its generation 
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assets (including some of its nuclear portfolio and some of its price-setting hydroelectric 
assets). The agreement also effectively established a partial prize freeze on the amount 
that OPG could charge for its generated electricity after market opening.72 The “price 
cap” remained in effect from 2002 to April 2005.73  
MEUs could be viewed as departments within municipalities. In the same way that the 
municipality would provide water and garbage services, it would also provide electricity 
service to its residents.  The Electricity Act, 1998 required all municipalities to transform 
their electric utilities into for-profit companies under the Business Corporations Act, 
1990. This meant that the MEUs became eligible to earn rates of return on capital (as 
set by the OEB). The Electricity Act, 1998 also required the newly corporatized 
distribution companies to make payments in lieu of taxes to the government.74  At this 
time, the MEUs became known as Local Distribution Companies (“LDCs”) to reflect their 
new corporate structure. 
It was understood by government that the introduction of competition would mean that 
Ontario Hydro’s successor companies would no longer have the assurance that they 
can recover all costs, and previously incurred debt, through competitive electricity rates. 
In April 1999, the Ministry of Finance determined that Ontario Hydro’s stranded debt 
was approximately $20.9 billion (i.e. debt that the successor companies could not 
service in a competitive market). The Electricity Act, 1998 provided for revenue streams 
to service the existing debt with the goal of ultimately retiring Ontario Hydro’s debt.  
The government determined that Ontario Hydro’s stranded debt would be repaid 
through the following mechanisms. The electricity companies (OPG, Hydro One 
Networks, and the LDCs) would make payments in lieu of taxes to the government 
which would be streamed to the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation.75 The 
                                                          
72 Under the Market Power Mitigation Agreement, OPG was required to pay a rebate to consumers on 
90% of its domestic output when the wholesale market price exceeded 3.8 cent / kWh.  
 
73 Ontario Energy Board, 2008a: 2, and Treblicock and Hrab, 2006: 424. 
 
74 Electricity Distributors Association, 2006: 22.  
 
75 Payments in lieu of taxes are equivalent to the corporate income, property, and capital taxes paid by 
private corporations. 
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cumulative annual combined profits of OPG and Hydro One Networks in excess of the 
government’s $520-million annual interest cost of its investments in the companies 
would go toward repaying stranded debt.  
The estimated present value of the above revenues streams was $13.1 billion. 
Therefore, the estimated balance remaining on the $20.9-billion stranded debt was $7.8 
billion. This amount was called the “residual stranded debt.” The Electricity Act, 1998 
established the Debt Retirement Charge, which was to be paid by electricity consumers 
until the residual stranded debt was eliminated.76  
Although the details had not been established in the 1998-1999 period when the Energy 
Competition Act was enacted, it eventually resulted in the establishment of a 
competitive market for electricity in Ontario. In the wholesale electricity market, 
electricity spot prices were set by the Independent Market Operator every five minutes 
in response to changing supply / demand dynamics. Consumers choosing to participate 
in the wholesale market paid the associated spot prices for electricity. Consumers who 
did not wish to participate in the wholesale market now had the option of signing a 
contract with an electricity retailer. It is important to note that the electricity market 
resulting from the Energy Competition Act did not have an automatic fixed-price option. 
If a consumer did not engage with a retailer, the consumer would purchase their 
electricity through their LDC and the LDC would charge the consumer the wholesale 
price for electricity. Therefore, default electricity supply was priced based on the spot 
prices arising from the competitive electricity market.77 
 
4.6 Privatization of Publically-Owned Companies  
 
A fundamental goal of the Harris government regarding the restructuring was the sale of 
Ontario Hydro’s legacy assets to private investors. The Market Power Mitigation Act 
speaks directly to this goal. By limiting the share of electricity generation capacity held 
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by OPG, the government was signaling its intent to sell off OPG’s generation assets to 
the private sector.  
The government did manage to sell and lease some of OPG’s generation assets to the 
private sector. In May 2001, OPG leased its Bruce nuclear generation stations to British 
Energy (who partnered with some Canadian companies and union groups).78  The 
Bruce nuclear stations had a combined generation capacity of 3,140MW and the lease 
was valued at $3.2 billion.79  In March 2002, OPG sold 4 hydroelectric generation 
stations on the Mississagi River with combined generation capacity of 490MW to 
Brascan Corporation for $340 million.80 These two ownership transfers reflect all of the 
generation assets that the government sold and leased to the private sector over the 
restructuring period. 
In December 2001, the government announced its intention to sell Hydro One (which 
held Ontario Hydro’s transmission and distribution assets). There were numerous 
opponents to the sale of Hydro One including: union’s representing public employees, 
environmental advocacy groups (most notably the Ontario Electricity Coalition), the 
NDP party and some municipal governments. The Ontario Superior Court in 2002 made 
a decision, in response to a challenge brought forward by the Ontario Electricity 
Coalition, which stated that the legislature had not provided the government with the 
authority to sell Hydro One. This effectively blocked the sale of the provincially-owned 
transmission / distribution company to the private sector.81  
As noted previously, the Electricity Act, 1998 required all municipalities to transform 
their electric utilities into for-profit companies under the Business Corporations Act, 
1990. This was a prelude to privatization. After the MEUs were transformed into 
corporations (now called LDCs), they became eligible to be sold by the municipality to 
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private interests.82 Very few Ontario municipalities elected to sell their distribution 
businesses to private interests.83 84 
Overall, the government was not very successful at privatizing publically-owned assets 
in Ontario’s electricity supply industry. Due to the Market Power Mitigation Agreement, 
OPG did sell off a modest portion of its generating assets to private interests. Hydro 
One continues to be owned by the provincial government and the vast majority of LDCs 
in the province are owned by municipal governments.  
 
4.7 Competitive Market Opening and Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply 
Act  
 
After a number of delays, Ontario’s competitive electricity market finally opened on May 
1, 2002. To facilitate the operation of the competitive market, whereby consumers could 
purchase the electricity commodity separately from the transmission and distribution 
services, electricity rates were unbundled. This means that consumers would now have 
separate line items on their bills reflecting the prices for the electricity commodity, 
transmission service and distribution service.  
At market opening, retailers also entered the market and began offering fixed-price 
contracts to electricity consumers who did not wish to participate in the wholesale 
market for electricity.85  
The competitive electricity market opening in May 2002 coincided with hottest summer 
in 50 years, which resulted in electricity demand hitting record highs. The demand 
increase corresponded with a lack of supply (caused by nuclear plant refurbishment and 
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83 FortisOntario Inc., 2014.  
 
84 Currently, FortisOntario Inc. is the only investor-owned distribution utility in the province. It owns and 
operates distribution systems in Algoma District, Fort Erie and Port Colbourne. 
   
85 Treblicock and Hrab (2006: 425) estimated that, after market opening, approximately 1 million 
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unanticipated issues with coal-fired plants). Increased electricity demand, combined 
with a lack of generating capacity and a newly-operating competitive market led to 
substantial increases in the price of electricity. The weighted average of the wholesale 
electricity price during the first year of the competitive market was 6.2 cents / kWh.86 
Energy consumers began to communicate their extreme dissatisfaction with the 
restructuring and resulting rate shock.87 The political repercussions of the price increase 
were quite severe.  
In response to the rate shock and the subsequent criticism targeted at the electricity 
market by consumers, the provincial government decided to freeze retail electricity 
rates. In December 2002, the government enacted the Electricity Pricing, Conservation 
and Supply Act, 2002. The legislation froze retail electricity rates at 4.3 cents / kWh for 
small volume customers (e.g. residential, small commercial) and other designated 
customers. The legislation also offered refunds, retroactive to market opening (May 
2002), to compensate for electricity rates paid by consumers that were in excess of the 
4.3 cents / kWh cap. In addition, the government froze all transmission and distribution 
rates at their existing levels until May 1, 2006.88 The retail price freeze resulting from the 
Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply Act was later expanded to include larger 
volume consumers (those consuming less than 250,000 kWhs / year, such as large 
commercial and small industrial customers). The provincial government was responsible 
for paying the difference between the market price and the frozen retail price to 
suppliers.89  
 
                                                          
86 The Independent Market Operator analyzed the wholesale market to determine whether it was truly the 
dynamics of supply and demand that caused the high wholesale price for electricity. It determined that no 
market manipulation by generators occurred during the 2002 summer. The Independent Market Operator 
also noted that the wholesale electricity market prices in Ontario, while high, were similar to those 
experienced in neighbouring jurisdictions during the summer of 2002. 
87 Swift and Stewart, 2004: 176, and Treblicock and Hrab, 2006: 425-431. 
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4.8 2003 Provincial Election: Electricity Sector Impacts  
 
During the 2003 provincial election campaign, all three main political parties made 
promises that they would maintain government ownership of electricity assets. 
McGuinty’s Liberal party was eventually elected. During the campaign, the Liberal’s 
promised to maintain the existing 4.3 cent / kWh price freeze until 2006, retire all coal-
fired generation by 2007 and begin installing smart meters for all customers in the 
province.90  
The Liberal government inherited the responsibility of dealing with the reality that the 
price freeze resulting from the Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply Act, 2002 
was a significant burden on the province’s finances. The revenue arising from the frozen 
retail price was not sufficient to the cover the actual cost of electricity generation. This 
difference was being covered by taxpayers.91 As such, the government abandoned the 
retail price freeze previously established and, in 2003, introduced the Ontario Energy 
Board Amendment Act (Electricity Pricing), 2003. This established an interim electricity 
pricing structure, replacing the existing price cap beginning April 1, 2004, until a more 
permanent solution could be developed. Under the interim pricing structure, residential, 
low-volume and other designated consumers paid 4.7 cents / kWh for the first 750 kWh 
consumed per month and 5.5 cents / kWh for consumption above that level. The 
government tasked the Ontario Energy Board with creating a new pricing mechanism. In 
order to maintain the financial viability of the distribution companies, the Ontario Energy 
Board Amendment Act (Electricity Pricing), 2003 also required the OEB to allow the 
LDCs to recoup certain costs, which under the Electricity Pricing, Conservation and 
Supply Act, 2002 had been put on hold.92  
At the same time, the government established what is known as the “Electricity 
Conservation and Supply Task Force” (or the “Task Force”). In its final report, the Task 
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Force concluded that Ontario was facing an impending shortfall of electricity supply (as 
a number of generation plants were nearing the end of their expected operational lives) 
and that the competitive market structure designed for the electricity through the Energy 
Competition Act would not result in sufficient investment to meet the province’s supply 
requirements in the future. As such, the Task Force recommended abandoning the 
existing competitive market structure.  
As an alternative, the Task Force recommended that the Independent Market Operator 
develop an integrated system plan, which would provide direction with regard to the 
development of the supply and demand assets needed to meet the provincial electricity 
requirements. The Task Force also recommended the establishment of a government 
agency that would be responsible for developing a conservation culture in Ontario.93  
 
4.9 Electricity Restructuring Act 
 
In response to the Task Force’s report, the government enacted the Electricity 
Restructuring Act, 200494 which was said to have “instituted the hybrid model for 
Ontario’s electricity sector”.95 The hybrid system has distinctly competitive 
characteristics and also clearly regulated qualities.   
The competitive aspect of the model is the continued operation of a pool market system, 
operated by the Independent Market Operator, which, under the Electricity 
Restructuring Act was renamed the Independent Electricity System Operator (“IESO”). 
The prices for wholesale electricity are based on frequent auctions between generators 
who wish to supply electricity into the pool.96  
The regulated aspect is the Regulated Price Plan (“RPP”), which set two separate 
prices for electricity. Under the RPP, one price is set for customers who use less than a 
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prescribed monthly quantity of electricity and another price is set for customers who use 
more than the prescribed monthly amount of electricity. The prescribed monthly 
quantities depend upon the season.97 
The RPP price, set by the Ontario Energy Board, is adjusted twice each year (May 1 
and November 1). The RPP is intended to provide stable prices in the short-run that 
reflect the actual cost of electricity generation over the long-run. The difference between 
the actual costs of electricity generation and the revenues generated through the RPP 
are captured in a variance account, which is trued-up when the RPP price is reset in the 
next period. This ensures that, over the long-term, customers that pay the RPP price 
are paying the actual cost for the electricity commodity. The OEB sets the RPP rate on 
an estimate of how much it will cost to supply electricity to consumers over the next 
year.98  
The Electricity Restructuring Act also created the Ontario Power Authority (“OPA”). The 
OPA was tasked with developing a 20-year integrated power system plan (“IPSP”) for 
the electricity system and entering into contracts for the procurement of supply and 
conservation services.99 Effectively, the OPA was established to take responsibility over 
the system planning function previously held by the IESO. The OEB is tasked with 
reviewing the IPSP to ensure that it complies with any directives issued by the Ministry 
of Energy and is economically prudent and costs effective.100  
While the Electricity Restructuring Act was said to have implemented a “hybrid model” 
for Ontario’s electricity sector101, which includes both competitive and regulated 
aspects, the competitive aspect of the “hybrid model” has been significantly diluted by 
government policies. It is true that after the Electricity Restructuring Act a pool market 
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system for electricity continued to exist in Ontario (where generators bid to supply 
electricity to the market). However, the OPA was mandated to procure electricity 
generation (and conservation services) for the province under long-term fixed-price 
contracts. In addition, the OEB was mandated to regulate the price paid to OPG for 
electricity generated from its “prescribed assets” (i.e. nuclear and baseload 
hydroelectric generation assets). As I will discuss, in detail, later in this paper, nearly all 
of Ontario’s generators are paid at a regulated or fixed price (under contract). This 
means that there is very little generation in the province that is entirely paid for at the 
wholesale market price. To address this disconnect between the wholesale price for 
electricity and the actual price paid to generators for their output, the global adjustment 
was created.  
The global adjustment is designed to capture the difference between the revenues 
generated through the wholesale market price and the actual amount paid to contracted 
and / or regulated generators for their output. The global adjustment is calculated based 
on the difference between the Hourly Ontario Electricity Price and the regulated rates 
paid to OPG for its prescribed assets, the contracted rates paid by the OPA to its 
contracted generation stations (new gas-fired facilities, renewable generators, and new 
nuclear capacity), and the contracted rates paid by the Ontario Electricity Financial 
Corporation to the NUGs that were previously under contract with Ontario Hydro. The 
global adjustment ensures that the revenues collected from ratepayers for the electricity 
commodity cover the actual cost of generation.102 103  
The government’s generation procurement framework (as managed by the OPA), and 
the payment of regulated prices for OPG’s prescribed assets, has nearly eliminated the 
competitive aspect that remained in the “hybrid model” as was established through the 
Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. 
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4.10 The Role of the OPA, the IPSP, and the Green Energy and Green Economy 
Act  
 
The OPA was established to take responsibility over the system planning function for 
Ontario’s electricity sector. It was mandated to ensure an adequate, reliable and secure 
supply of electricity in Ontario. As such, the government directed the OPA to develop a 
20-year plan called the “Integrated Power System Plan”.  
In December 2005, the OPA released its advice regarding Ontario’s electricity supply 
mix that would allow the province to meet its energy demands for the period 2005 - 
2025. The supply mix advice provided in 2005, which was a precursor to the first IPSP 
filed with the OEB in 2007, is summarized in the following chart.  
Figure 2 - OPA 2005 Supply Mix Advice104 
 
In June 2006, the Minister of Energy issued a directive to the OPA (“June 2006 Minister 
Directive”) that, among other matters, set out its expectations regarding the IPSP (i.e. 
peak demand reduction through conservation activities, reliance on renewables, limits 
on nuclear capacity, and use of gas-fired generation). It also set out the government’s 
direction with regard to the planned phase out of coal generation. On the coal 
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generation issue, the government stated: “Plan for coal-fired generation in Ontario to be 
replaced by cleaner sources in the earliest practical timeframe that ensures adequate 
generating capacity and electricity system reliability in Ontario.”105   
On the basis of the June 2006 Minister Directive, the OPA went about developing the 
20-year IPSP. On August 29, 2007, the OPA filed the IPSP with the OEB which was 
responsible for reviewing the plan with regard to cost effectiveness and prudence. 
Shortly after receiving the application, the OEB established a plan for the hearing 
process (including procedural steps for serving notice, discovery, etc.).  
The OEB had already gone through several procedural steps and dealt with some 
Motions on the application from interested parties when, on September 17, 2008, the 
Minister of Energy issued another directive to the OPA requiring it to make certain 
revisions to the IPSP that had been submitted for regulatory approval.106 The Minister 
asked the OPA to reconsider the amount and diversity of renewable energy in the 
supply mix, possible conversions of coal plants to biomass, specific improvements to 
transmission planning, amongst a number of other items. As a result, on October 2, 
2008, the OEB decided that it would put its proceeding on hold until the revised plan 
was filed.107 
In the fall of 2008, the global financial crisis caused massive problems for individuals, 
corporations and governments all across the world. It caused great harm to the North 
American auto manufacturing industry which was central to Ontario’s manufacturing 
sector. Ontario’s economy lost nearly 250,000 jobs between the fall of 2008 and the 
spring of 2009. McGuinty’s Liberal government made an effort to link the province’s 
economic recovery to environmental sustainability. It did so largely through the passing 
of the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 (“Green Energy Act”).108 The 
Green Energy Act largely focused on promoting renewable generation (through the 
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creation of a generous feed-in tariff program), promoting conservation and demand-side 
management, and the implementation of a smart grid in Ontario.109 110 The Green 
Energy Act also required the OPA to revise the IPSP to reflect the inclusion of a greater 
reliance on renewable generation sources.111 
In November 2010, the government of Ontario released its Long-Term Energy Plan 
titled, “Building Our Clean Future Together”. A few months later, the government issued 
an updated Supply Mix Directive to the OPA. The combined direction of the Long-Term 
Energy Plan and the 2011 Supply Mix Directive set out the goals that the government 
expected the OPA to meet in a new updated IPSP. The government, in 2011, directed 
the OPA to develop and submit a new IPSP (which the OPA termed IPSP II) with the 
OEB.112 As of 2014, no updated IPSP has ever been filed. However, the Long-Term 
Energy Plan does provide the forecasted electricity needs of the province until 2030 and 
sets out what the government believes is the most effective way to meet those 
requirements.113  It also provides information and policy direction that is similar to what 
would be expected to be found in an updated IPSP. However, it is important to note that 
a significant difference between the government’s Long-Term Energy Plan and the 
OPA’s IPSP is that there was no prudence, or cost-effectiveness, review of the Long-
Term Energy Plan which would have occurred if an updated IPSP was filed with the 
OEB.  
 
4.11 Energy Consumer Protection Act  
 
The Energy Consumer Protection Act received Royal Assent on May 18, 2010 and 
came into force on January 1, 2011. It effectively required the OEB to establish a new 
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framework for the regulation of licensed electricity retailers and natural gas marketers. 
This legislation was enacted by the government in response to concerns regarding the 
business practices of retailers operating in the electricity and natural gas markets in 
Ontario.   
The Energy Consumer Protection Act caused the OEB to issue revised Retailer Codes 
of Conduct; required retailers to release contract verification / renewal / extension call 
scripts; provide mandatory disclosure statements; and launch price comparison 
templates that must be used by electricity and natural gas retailers when offering their 
products to consumers.114  
Overall, this legislation significantly tightened the rules and regulations surrounding the 
provision of retail electricity and natural gas services in the province.  
 
4.12 Changes to Ontario’s Tax System  
 
In July 2010, the Goods and Services Tax and Provincial Sales Tax was replaced by 
the Harmonized Sales Tax (“HST”). Prior to the transition to the HST, electricity 
consumers were paying an effective tax of approximately 7% on their electricity bills. 
After the transition, the 13% HST was applied to electricity bills.115 The change to tax 
system resulted in higher taxes being paid for electricity services.  
 
4.13 Ontario Clean Energy Benefit Act  
 
The Ontario Clean Energy Benefit came into force on January 1, 2011. It provides 
financial assistance to small volume electricity consumers (i.e. residential and small 
commercial). Specifically, the Ontario Clean Energy Benefit provides a 10% rebate off 
the total electricity bill (including commodity, distribution, regulatory, debt retirement and 
HST) for the first 3,000 kWhs of monthly consumption.116 The rebate is paid for by the 
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province using general tax revenue. This discount was implemented by the Liberal 
government in order to mitigate rising energy costs that were being attributed to the 
Green Energy Act in an attempt to please voters prior to the provincial election.  
 
4.14 Distributor Mergers  
 
Prior to the electricity sector restructuring there were over 300 MEUs operating in the 
province. As noted previously, the Government’s White Paper recommended that 
efficiencies could be gained through the amalgamation of these distribution companies 
(now known as LDCs). It is important to note that throughout the post-restructuring 
period, the amalgamation of distributors has been a voluntary activity.117 Over the 
years, a number of distributor amalgamations have occurred. Currently, there are 77 
LDCs operating in Ontario.118  
For the most part, the amalgamations that occurred in Ontario did not happen due to 
provincial government policy or legislation. It was, in fact, municipal policy that led to the 
largest number of distributor mergers. As municipalities amalgamated so did their 
respective distribution companies. Hydro One also drove a large number of mergers by 
acquiring a number of distribution companies that Ontario Hydro operated under 
contract. Essentially, these were distributors that were owned by a municipality but had 
always been operated by Ontario Hydro. After the restructuring, Hydro One purchased 
these small local distributors and folded them into their overall distribution business.  
These two reasons (i.e. municipal amalgamations and Hydro One acquiring distribution 
companies that Ontario Hydro previously operated under contract) reduced the number 
of distributors operating in Ontario from over 300 to about 120. The remainder of the 
mergers, which reduced the total number of distributors in the province from 120 to 77, 
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largely occurred due to managerial decisions made by the LDCs during the mid to late 
2000s.119 120 
The following map shows the location of all of the LDCs in the province as of 2010. 
Figure 3 - LDC Service Area Map121 
 
 
4.15 Smart Grid Implementation  
 
Over the post-restructuring period, the electricity distributors and the IESO (which 
operates the Smart Metering Entity) have worked towards the implementation of a smart 
grid in Ontario. As noted previously, the government’s formal plan for a smart grid in 
                                                          
119 C.D. Howe Institute, 2013a: 5-6.  
 
120 It is important to note that the distributor mergers and acquisitions that occurred in Ontario were almost 
entirely between municipalities. Very few distribution businesses were purchased by private interests.  
 
121 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2010a.  
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Ontario was set out in the Green Energy Act. However, the installation of smart meters 
actually began prior to the enactment of the Green Energy Act. 
The primary purposes of developing a smart grid are to facilitate the implementation of 
time-of-use (“ToU”) pricing (by deploying smart meters) and facilitate the connection of 
distributed generation (the intermittent nature of distributed generation necessitates 
greater operational control of the distribution network which is achieved by using ‘smart 
grid’ technologies).  
ToU pricing applies the lowest price for electricity consumed in periods of the lowest 
demand and the highest price for electricity consumed in periods of the highest 
demand.122 The purpose of ToU pricing is to shift consumption from periods of peak 
demand to periods that experience lower demand levels. The benefits of reducing peak 
demand are avoidance of building additional capacity (either generation, transmission, 
or distribution) and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (since generation 
supplies used to meet peak demand tend to be less environmentally-friendly in Ontario). 
In addition, ToU prices better reflect the actual cost of electricity generation as 
generators used to meet peak demand tend to also be more costly sources of 
electricity.  
ToU implementation occurred relatively quickly. In August 2010, nearly 92% of all 
eligible customers123 had smart meters installed and approximately 20% of eligible 
customers were subject to ToU pricing.124 Two years later, by August 2012, nearly 
100% of eligible customers in Ontario had smart meters installed and approximately 
91% of eligible customers were subject to ToU pricing.125  
 
                                                          
122 Ontario Energy Board, 2014e.  
 
123 Eligible customers refer to those customers that are eligible for regulated price plan pricing. This 
includes all small volume customers (<250,000kWh of annual consumption) and certain other designated 
customers.  
 
124 Ontario Energy Board, 2010a: 3.  
 
125 Ontario Energy Board, 2012c: 4.  
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 4.16 Ontario’s Electricity Sector: Today  
 
Ontario’s electricity sector continues to follow the framework established by the 
Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. The pool market system continues to operate and 
the OEB still sets the RPP price for small volume customers. The OEB also continues to 
regulate the prices for transmission and distribution services in Ontario.  
With regard to pricing for the electricity commodity, small volume customers, which 
include all residential and small commercial customers, have the option of paying the 
RPP based price for electricity or to sign a contract with an electricity retailer. ToU 
prices are applied to almost all RPP customers. Large volume customers (with 
consumption greater than 250,000 kWhs a year) can either pay the wholesale market 
price for electricity or sign a contract with an electricity retailer. If a customer elects to 
pay the market price, depending on their metering situation, the customer will either pay 
the Hourly Ontario Electricity Price or a weighted wholesale price (which is based on the 
consumption pattern of their local distributor).126  
It is important to note that all large and small volume customers on a retail contract pay 
the global adjustment directly (as a separate line item on their respective bills); the 
global adjustment is not included in the commodity price offered by retailers. 
Conversely, small volume customers subject to the RPP pay the global adjustment 
indirectly since the RPP price is set at level that is designed to recover the total cost of 
generation; in other words, the global adjustment is included in the RPP price.127  
These are the primary companies and organizations involved in Ontario’s electricity 
industry today: 
• OPG continues to be the dominant generator in the province. In 2012, nearly 
60% of Ontario’s generated output was sourced from OPG.128  
                                                          
126 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014b.  
 
127 Ontario Energy Board, 2014e.  
 
128 Independent Electricity Operator, 2014c.  
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• Hydro One is the main transmitter in the province. Currently, Hydro One owns 
and operates almost 30,000 km of high-voltage transmission lines in the 
province. This represents nearly 97% of Ontario’s transmission assets.129  
• There are 77 LDCs operating distribution systems in the province. This is a large 
decrease in the number of distributors when compared to the number operating 
in the province prior to restructuring.  
• The IESO continues to be the system operator, managing the system on a 
minute-to-minute basis in order to balance supply and demand.  
• The OPA continues to be the system planner. The OPA is responsible for 
developing long term plans for the electricity sector and is also responsible for 
signing and managing long-term contracts with generators.  
• The OEB is the regulator for the sector. It sets the RPP price for the electricity 
commodity, sets transmission and distribution rates, licences market participants, 
adjudicates leave to construct applications (for the development of transmission 
and distribution capital projects), and also has a policy development function.  
• The Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation continues to manage the debts of 
the former Ontario Hydro. It also manages the contracts with the NUGs that were 
previously managed by Ontario Hydro.   
The supply mix in Ontario has changed over the years. Renewable generation is 
beginning to play a greater role. The OPA, under various programs designed to 
incentivize the installation of renewable capacity, has been signing long-term contracts 
for renewable generation. Some of these renewable generators are already online and 
more will be coming online in the future. For 2012, Ontario’s generation output by 
source is set out in Figure 4. A full discussion of the shift in Ontario’s supply mix will be 
provided later in this paper. 
  
                                                          
129 Hydro One Networks, 2013.  
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Figure 4 - Ontario Generation Output by Source (2012)130 
 
 
Over the restructuring period, projects have been underway to modernize the grid. 
Smart meters have been installed all across the province and the Smart Metering Entity 
has been established which allowed for the implementation of ToU billing structures. 
Other grid modernizing investments have been made to enable connection of the 
renewable generation for which the OPA has been contracting.  
In summary, the electricity sector continues to follow the framework established by the 
Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. There has been progress made with regard to 
implementing renewable energy sources as part of Ontario’s supply mix and 
modernizing the electricity grid.  
 
4.17 Conclusion   
 
Major changes have occurred in Ontario’s electricity sector over the years. The sector 
transitioned from a traditional monopoly model characterized by a state-owned 
vertically-integrated utility (Ontario Hydro) to what has been called a “hybrid model”, 
                                                          
130 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013c.   
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which includes both regulated and competitive aspects. This transition occurred in two 
phases:  
(1) A fully competitive electricity market opened in May 2002 (based on the 
framework established by the Energy Competition Act, 1998). The competitive 
market, in its original form, only operated until December 2002. Due to the price 
shock experienced by consumers immediately after market opening, in 
December 2002, the government froze electricity rates in order to address the 
concerns of customers regarding increasingly expensive electricity bills.  
(2) After a change in government, the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 introduced 
a “hybrid model” for Ontario’s electricity sector. This model is still in operation 
today.  
A number of other changes occurred in Ontario’s electricity sector after the restructuring 
was complete. Most significant was the enactment of the Green Energy Act in 2008.  
This legislation set out an ambitious plan for promoting electricity conservation, 
implementing renewable generation as part of Ontario’s supply mix, and modernizing 
the grid.  
The remainder of the paper will focus on the impact that the restructuring, and the post-
restructuring policies of government, had on consumers. The impacts will be analyzed 
from both an economic and environmental perspective.  
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5. Methodology  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this paper is to answer the research question: from an economic and 
environmental perspective, how have Ontario’s electricity consumers been impacted by 
changes resulting from the restructuring and post-restructuring policies of government? 
In order to answer this question a number of related analyses are performed.  
First, I provide a comprehensive analysis of both the “all-in” electricity prices (which is 
described, in detail, in sub-section 5.3.1) and distribution prices in the pre- and post-
restructuring periods. In order to perform this analysis, I utilize two comparative analysis 
frameworks (1983-1997 vs. 1998-2012 and 1991-1997 vs. 2006-2012).  
I then use statistical analysis techniques to determine whether the restructuring, and 
certain post-restructuring, policies of government are correlated to changes in electricity 
prices over time.  
Once an understanding of the electricity prices (and their correlation to the policies of 
government) is established, I look at all of the major price drivers that impacted 
electricity prices over the post-restructuring period.  
I then, individually, analyze each of the price drivers that caused electricity prices to 
increase over the post-restructuring period, through both an economic and 
environmental lens, to determine the impact that they had on consumers.  
Overall, there are three core areas, related to Ontario’s electricity sector, that I analyze 
for the purpose of this paper: 
(1) Electricity Prices & Cost Drivers;  
(2) Competition in Generation & Retail Supply; and 
(3) Supply Mix & Conservation. 
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This section provides an understanding of the underlying data which forms the 
foundation for each area of analysis in this paper. Specifically, this section includes a 
discussion of the rationale for the selected timeframe over which changes to Ontario’s 
electricity prices are analyzed; the inflation adjustment methodology utilized and the 
rationale for selecting the methodology; the statistical methodology used to analyze the 
price data; and the limitations associated with the analysis undertaken in this paper.   
 
5.2 Electricity Prices: Time-Series Analysis 
 
There are many factors that impact the price of electricity, which makes it difficult to find 
two time periods (one before and one after the sector restructuring) which would provide 
for an equitable analysis of pricing.  
The ideal manner in which an analysis and comparison of electricity prices over two 
periods of time would be undertaken involves maintaining a consistent sector design 
and framework. In the case of Ontario’s electricity sector, this would require information 
for the post-restructuring period (1998-2012) which reflects hypothetical prices that 
would be charged to consumers had the sector never been restructured. However, 
given that this type of hypothetical information is not available and cannot, with any level 
of accuracy, be estimated, the analysis undertaken in this paper utilizes two 
comparative frameworks to analyze actual changes in electricity prices over time. 
Knowledge of internal and external changes (i.e. political decisions, economic factors, 
etc.) that have impacted Ontario’s electricity sector was used to develop appropriate 
comparative frameworks under which the impacts of the restructuring and post-
restructuring changes can be isolated and analyzed.      
The two comparative analysis frameworks selected for analyzing the changes in 
electricity prices before and after restructuring are discussed below.  
The first comparative analysis framework uses the period from 1983-1997 to reflect the 
pre-restructuring era and 1998-2012 to reflect the post-restructuring era. These 
timeframes reflect the 15 years before and after restructuring. Given the capital intensity 
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of the electricity sector, generally, longer timeframes for analysis are better as they offer 
a better reflection of the capital stock cycle.  
This time period, however, includes 8 years where there is no actual electricity pricing 
data available (1998-2005). Prior to 1998, Ontario Hydro maintained the records for 
electricity pricing data. However, after the restructuring, Ontario Hydro stopped 
reporting electricity prices (as the employees were largely moving to the new 
organizations established by the restructuring). The responsibility for maintaining the 
pricing data records was passed onto the OEB but it did not begin reporting electricity 
prices until 2006. In the period immediately after the restructuring, a transition 
information team was established. However, membership of the transition information 
team was voluntary and the team had no power to compel the disclosure of information. 
The transition information team was focused on gathering data to assist market 
participants prepare for market opening and was not collecting the same electricity 
pricing information that was available under Ontario Hydro. In addition, the information 
provided by the transition team is only available from 1999 until the end of 2000.131 
Therefore, the information collected and reported by the transition information team is 
not useful for the analysis that is undertaken in this paper. In short, there is no pricing 
data available for the period 1998-2005 leaving an 8 year gap in the electricity pricing 
data.  
The lack of publically-available electricity pricing information for an 8 year period is a 
major concern as it makes policy analysis significantly more difficult. The government 
should have appointed a team responsible for gathering and reporting the same 
information that was reported by Ontario Hydro prior to the restructuring. This would 
have ensured that important pricing information was available after the electricity sector 
restructuring, which would have maintained public transparency and provided the 
government with the necessary information to allow it to evaluate whether its policy 
decisions were producing the intended outcomes. In the future, if the government were 
to undertake a further sector restructuring, provisions should be made to ensure 
reporting functions are maintained.  
                                                          
131 Transition Information Team, 2000: 3-7.  
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As such, in the comparative analysis that utilizes the period from 1983-1997 to reflect 
the pre-restructuring era and 1998-2012 to reflect the post-restructuring era, year-to-
year volatility is ignored for the period 1998-2005.  
Another issue with the 1983-2012 time series is that generation capacity increased 
significantly during the 1983-1998 period (the Bruce B and Darlington nuclear stations 
were put online) while during the 1998-2012 period installed capacity increased to a 
much lesser extent. From 1983 to 1998, dependable installed capacity increased from 
21,600MW to 31,000MW.132 This reflects an increase of 9,400MW. In contrast, from 
1998 to 2012, dependable installed capacity increased from 31,000MW to 
35,000MW.133 This reflects an increase of 4,000MW. Therefore, dependable installed 
capacity increased by 5,400MW more in the pre-restructuring period than the post-
restructuring period in this comparative analysis framework.134 This introduces some 
uncertainty regarding the results of an electricity pricing comparison between the pre- 
and post- restructuring periods when using the first comparative analysis framework.135 
                                                          
132 Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1992 & Ontario Hydro Annual Reports, 1995, 1996, 1998. 
 
133 Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports, 2003-2008 & 
Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013b.   
 
134 In both time periods, plant retirements / long-term shutdowns occurred. In the pre-restructuring period, 
plants were taken offline largely because they were at the end of their useful lives (and were either retired 
completely or refurbished over extended periods of time). Ontario Hydro did not provide information about 
capacity retirements in the publically-available information that has been used for this paper. However, 
looking at the full list of generators provided in some annual editions of Ontario Hydro’s Statistical 
Handbooks it is possible to estimate that approximately 2,000MW of capacity was either retired or taken 
offline for long-term repairs between the 1980s and the 1990s.  In the post-restructuring period, a number 
of Ontario’s coal plants were retired due to government policy. The IESO reports approximately 4,300MW 
of capacity retirements between 2003 and 2012. Therefore, more capacity retirements occurred in the 
post-restructuring period then in the pre-restructuring period. This narrows the difference, to some extent, 
in dependable capacity development between the pre- and post- restructuring periods. However, even 
with the retirements / long-term refurbishments taken into account, there was still more dependable 
capacity brought online during the 1983-1997 period than in the 1998-2013 period.  
 
135 This uncertainty arises as it is not known to what extent the cost of the incremental generation capital 
investment that occurred during pre-restructuring period was included in the electricity prices that 
prevailed during pre-restructuring period. It is likely that some portion of this investment was passed onto 
consumers in the pre-restructuring period as the costs came online. However, it is likely that some other 
portion of these capital investment costs accumulated as additional long-term debt held by Ontario Hydro. 
If some portion of the incremental pre-restructuring capital investment in generation capacity did 
accumulate as long-term debt, this would impact the electricity prices in the post-restructuring period as 
the debt costs of Ontario Hydro are being paid by electricity consumers in the post-restructuring period in 
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The second comparative analysis framework uses the period from 1991-1997 to reflect 
the pre-restructuring era and 2006-2012 to reflect the post-restructuring era. This 
reflects the 7 years before restructuring and a 7 year period after restructuring (where 
actual electricity pricing data is available). The benefit of this analysis period is that 
there is no gap in the dataset and concerns around capacity investment differences 
between time periods are mitigated (as the differential in dependable capacity additions 
is narrowed to 2,500 MW between the pre- and post- restructuring period).136 However, 
a drawback of this analysis framework is that it has less pricing data points, which 
renders the results of the analysis less reliable.   
In both comparative analysis frameworks, the pricing information reflects the price 
freezes that were in place over the 1993- April 2005 period. The pricing information is 
impacted by the following price restrictions: (a) the price freeze on Ontario Hydro’s retail 
rates during the pre-restructuring period from 1993-1998; (b) the transition period 
pricing limitations placed on OPG’s generated output from 1998-May 2002; (c) the 
partial freeze on the amounts that OPG was paid for its generated output during the 
2002- April 2005 period under the Market Power Mitigation Agreement; and (d) the 
freeze on all components of the electricity price that was applied retroactively to May 
2002 (market opening) and was in effect until 2004.    
Each comparative analysis framework has inherent strengths and weakness as 
discussed above. It is not possible to find two periods of time (one before and one after 
the sector restructuring) that would provide for a perfectly equitable comparison as there 
are a great number of factors that impact the price of electricity. However, by utilizing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their electricity rates (and these costs are captured in the “all-in” electricity prices which is discuss later in 
this paper).  
 
136 Derived from Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1992, Ontario Hydro Annual Reports, 1995, 
1996, 1998, Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports, 2003-2008, 
and Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013b.  
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two distinct comparative analysis frameworks to study electricity prices in Ontario a 
more comprehensive analysis can be provided.137 
It is important to note that 1998 is the year that the electricity sector restructuring 
actually began. Throughout the paper, when the post-restructuring period is mentioned, 
it is the post-1998 period that is being discussed.  
 
5.3 Data Collected  
 
5.3.1 “All-in” Electricity Price  
 
I have developed a dataset which provides the total price of electricity for consumers in 
Ontario on a per kWh basis. This pricing dataset covers the periods 1983-1997 and 
2006-2012. The “all-in” electricity pricing information can be found at section 8.2.  As 
noted previously, there is no electricity pricing data available for the period 1998-2005. 
This pricing data reflects the total cost of providing electricity service including the 
commodity, distribution, transmission and regulatory costs.138  
This dataset effectively provides the average “all-in” price for electricity service for 
consumers in Ontario (in $/kWh). In practice, electricity rates vary between rate classes. 
Rate classes are comprised of customers that have similar profiles and needs. For 
example, small volume residential customers pay different rates for electricity services 
than large volume industrial customers. These pricing differences reflect the underlying 
differences in the costs to serve customers that have different needs and consumption 
patterns.139 However, for the purposes of the analysis completed in this paper, an 
average electricity price for all customers in the province is utilized.  
                                                          
137 In regard to the statistical analysis of Ontario’s electricity prices, only the 1983-2012 time series has 
been used as the 1991-2012 data series has very few observations. This makes the results of the 
statistical analysis less meaningful as there is not sufficient data input for the regression.  
 
138 Note that taxes are not accounted for in the electricity pricing data presented in this paper.  
 
139 Costs are allocated to different rate classes on the basis of the principle of “cost causality.” Essentially, 
the principle of cost causality assigns (or allocates) the costs of providing electricity services to groups of 
customers (or rate classes) on the basis of which customers cause the costs to arise. 
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I developed the “all-in” price data using two different methodologies: 
a) Prior to restructuring (i.e. 1983-1997) a top-down approach was utilized. For the 
pricing information associated with the 1983-1997 period, Ontario Hydro’s 
primary revenues and the revenues of the MEUs were divided by total sale 
volumes to determine the average price ($/kWh) for electricity service during the 
noted period.   
b) Post-restructuring (i.e. 2006-2012) a bottom-up approach was used. For the 
pricing information associated with the 2006-2012 period, the rates charged for 
all components of electricity service (with the exception of distribution service) 
were summed to develop an all-in electricity price. To derive distribution prices 
during the post-restructuring period, total distributor revenues were divided by 
total distributor sales volumes to determine the average price ($/kWh) for 
distribution service.  
The pricing information for the pre-restructuring period was sourced from Ontario 
Hydro’s Statistical Yearbooks and Ontario Hydro’s Annual Reports (1983-1999).140 For 
the post-restructuring period, the pricing information was sourced from both the IESO141 
and the OEB.142  
I calculated the pricing information for the period 1983-1992 and from 2006-2012 based 
on sales volumes that include transmission losses. However, during the 1993-1997 
period, Ontario Hydro’s statistical yearbooks did not include sales volume information. 
As such, sales volume information was sourced from Ontario Hydro’s annual reports for 
that period. The sales volumes provided in the annual reports did not include 
transmission losses. Therefore, in order to ensure that the volumes are comparable on 
a like-for-like basis, the volumes reported by Ontario Hydro for the 1993-1997 period 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
140 Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1997 & Ontario Hydro Annual Reports, 1990-1999.  
 
141 Independent Electricity System Operator, 18-month Outlook Tables, May 2013 & February 2014, & 
Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Market Reports, 2006-2012. 
 
142 Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012.  
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were grossed-up to include transmission losses. Essentially, the average transmission 
losses for the 11 years prior to 1993 were used as proxy for transmission losses for the 
1993-1997 period. The average transmission losses for the period 1982-1992 was 
4.29%. Therefore, the volumes associated with the 1993-1997 period were grossed up 
by 4.29% to reflect an estimate of transmission losses for those years. This was the 
only adjustment that I made to the actual data sourced from the above noted reports.  
Overall, the information that I provided in this dataset is meant to be reflective of the 
total price paid for electricity service (on a $/kWh) basis for all consumers in Ontario 
over the 1983-2012 period.   
 
5.3.2 Distribution Price 
 
This dataset provides the price for distribution services for Ontario electricity consumers 
on a per kWh basis. It also covers the periods 1983-1997 and 2006-2012. The 
distribution pricing information can be found at section 8.3.  As noted previously, there is 
no electricity pricing data (including distribution pricing) available for the period 1998-
2005.  
Similar to the “all-in” pricing information, discussed above, the pricing information 
included in this dataset reflects an average price for all consumers in the province. As 
such, actual pricing differences by rate class have been ignored.  
The pricing information related to the pre-restructuring period (1983-1997) and the post-
restructuring period (2006-2012) were both developed using a top-down methodology. 
For all years, the total distribution revenues received by the distributors were divided by 
distribution volumes to derive an average distribution price ($/kWh).  
The distribution pricing information for the pre-restructuring period was sourced from 
Ontario Hydro’s Statistical Yearbooks.143 For the post-restructuring period, the pricing 
                                                          
143 Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1997. 
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information was sourced from the Ontario Energy Board’s Yearbook of Electricity 
Distributors.144  
There is a slight difference in the distribution pricing information collected for the pre-
restructuring period and the post-restructuring. In the pre-restructuring period, the 
distribution related information provided in Ontario Hydro’s Statistical Yearbooks does 
not include Ontario Hydro’s retail business.145 Therefore, the average distribution price 
derived for that period does not include the distribution prices paid by retail customers of 
Ontario Hydro. In contrast, the average distribution price calculated for the post-
restructuring period includes Hydro One’s distribution business. Hydro One’s distribution 
business largely includes those customers that, prior to the restructuring, were served 
directly by Ontario Hydro. The distribution pricing information for the post-restructuring 
period is more comprehensive than the information for the pre-restructuring period as it 
covers all the customers in the province (with the exception of a very small number of 
customers served by three non-rate regulated utilities). This difference in the underlying 
distribution pricing data for before and after the restructuring means the distribution 
pricing comparison is not perfectly equitable. It is important to note that this problem is 
not present in the “all-in” electricity pricing dataset as the derivation of the all-in price 
utilizes the total revenues of Ontario Hydro (including its retail related revenues).  
 
5.3.3 “All-In” Electricity Price and Distribution Price - Inflation Adjustment  
 
I provided the all-in electricity prices and the distribution prices on both a nominal and 
inflation-adjusted basis. In order to analyze pricing information over extended periods of 
time, an inflation adjustment is made in order to isolate any changes on the prices being 
studied net of the impact that inflation has on the underlying costs.  
Both a CPI based inflation-adjustment and a gross domestic product implicit price index 
final domestic demand (“GDP IPI”) based inflation-adjustment were considered. I 
                                                          
144 Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012. 
 
145 The revenues received by Ontario Hydro related to its distribution business were included as part of its 
total revenues in its annual reports. However, there is no way to breakout the revenues received by the 
company as between commodity, transmission and distribution.  
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decided that the GDP IPI adjustment is preferable to a CPI-based adjustment. GDP IPI 
tracks a set of goods and services that are more relevant to the electricity sector. As 
noted by the OEB, which uses GDP-IPI as the inflation proxy for electricity distributors in 
incentive ratemaking periods, in a 2006 Report:  
“With regard to use of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rather than 
GDP-IPI, the Board agrees with Dr. Lowry that GDP-IPI is preferable 
to the CPI because it tracks a more relevant set of goods and services 
used as inputs for production by businesses, including electricity 
distributors. CPI tracks the prices of consumer goods and services, 
whereas GDP-IPI is a broader measure of inflation that covers other 
relevant sectors of the economy such as capital equipment. Therefore, 
the Board will use the GDP-IPI as the inflation proxy for the 2nd 
Generation IRM.”146 
Overall, studying electricity prices over time on both a nominal and inflation-adjusted 
basis will provide a more comprehensive picture of the changes in electricity prices that 
occurred before and after the sector restructuring.147  
    
5.3.4 Commodity Price  
 
As noted previously, prior to the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity sector, the price of 
electricity was bundled. Therefore, a stand-alone commodity price for the pre-
restructuring period is not available. However, after restructuring, electricity prices were 
unbundled and customers began paying for the electricity commodity separately.  
I compiled a number of different commodity price datasets have been compiled which 
will be used to highlight changes in the price of the electricity commodity over the post-
restructuring period. The commodity pricing information can be found at Figure 13 (sub-
section 6.2.2) and sub-section 9.2.1. 
                                                          
146 Ontario Energy Board, 2006: 28.  
 
147 As will be discussed later, nominal electricity prices have been used as the basis for the statistical 
analysis as this is consistent with other academic papers that analyze electricity prices over time. 
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The first commodity-related dataset provides the wholesale market price for the period 
2003-2012. The wholesale market price is based on a weighted average of the Hourly 
Ontario Electricity Price. This information was sourced from an IESO archive of 
historical wholesale market prices.148  
Another dataset compiled provides the global adjustment price for the 2005-2012 
period. This information was sourced directly from an IESO archive of historical global 
adjustment values (both prices and total amounts collected through the global 
adjustment).149  
An average annual commodity price was calculated by summing the monthly wholesale 
market price and the monthly global adjustment price and then averaging the monthly 
values over a given year.  
The next dataset provides the tiered RPP price, for the period 2003-2012, that would be 
applicable to small volume consumers in Ontario. This information was taken directly 
from the OEB’s archived RPP prices.150  
Finally, a dataset which provides the RPP ToU price, for the period 2006-2012, was 
developed. A weighted average ToU price was calculated by applying the average 
consumption for each of the daily consumption periods (i.e. off, mid, and on peak times) 
to the ToU prices. The ToU prices were sourced from the OEB’s RPP archive151 and the 
average consumption information was sourced from a ToU pricing backgrounder issued 
by the OEB in 2013.152  
 
 
                                                          
148 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014d. 
  
149 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014e. 
 
150 Ontario Energy Board, 2014c.  
 
151 Ibid.   
 
152 Ontario Energy Board, 2013a: 1.  
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5.3.5 Global Adjustment  
 
As discussed previously, the global adjustment is designed to capture the difference 
between the revenues generated through the wholesale market price and the actual 
amount paid to contracted and regulated generators (OPG prescribed assets, OPA 
contracted generation, and NUGs) for their output.153  
A dataset has been developed which sets out the total amount collected through the 
global adjustment charges over the period 2008-2012. It also highlights the proportion of 
the total costs that are associated with each generation category (OPG, OPA, and 
NUGs). This information can be found in Figure 12 (sub-section 6.2.2). 
I sourced the information for this dataset directly from an IESO archive of historical 
global adjustment values (both prices and total amounts collected through the global 
adjustment).154  
 
5.3.6 Transmission Price  
 
As noted previously, prior to the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity sector, the price of 
electricity was bundled. Therefore, a stand-alone transmission price for the pre-
restructuring period is not available. However, after restructuring, electricity prices were 
unbundled and customers began paying for the transmission services separately.  
I compiled a dataset which sets out Ontario’s uniform transmission rates for the period 
2002-2012. The information for this dataset was sourced from a number of Ontario 
Energy Board Decisions and Rate Orders.155 This information can be found at sub-
section 9.3.1.  
                                                          
153 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014a.  
 
154 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014e. 
 
155 Ontario Energy Board, Uniform Transmission Rate Decisions and Rate Orders, 2002-2012: 
 
(a) EB-1999-0055 
(b) EB-2005-0241 
(c) EB-2007-0759 
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5.3.7 Distributor - Return on Equity  
 
 I developed a dataset which highlights the average Return on Equity (“RoE”) for all the 
distributors in the province. The dataset covers the 2006-2012 period. The RoE 
information can be found at sub-section 9.4.2. 
The dataset was developed by dividing the total net income (of all the distributors 
combined) by the total equity of all the distributors in the province for each year that is 
included in the time series. This provides the RoE in percentage terms. The RoE 
information was sourced from the Ontario Energy Board’s Yearbook of Electricity 
Distributors.156 
It is important to note that prior to the restructuring all returns were treated as retained 
earnings. Essentially, any profits that a distributor earned in the years prior to the sector 
restructuring were held by the distributor to be used to fund utility requirements (i.e. 
expansion projects, reliability projects, etc.). However, after the restructuring, returns 
earned by distributors were paid to shareholders in the form of dividends. As will be 
discussed in sub-section 9.4.2, the differential treatment of returns, as between the pre- 
and post- restructuring periods, applies upwards pressure on distribution prices in the 
post-restructuring period.  
 
5.3.8 Distributor – Operations, Maintenance and Administrative Expenses  
 
This dataset provides the distribution-related Operations, Maintenance and 
Administrative (“OM&A”) costs per customer averaged across all the distributors in the 
province. The dataset covers the period 1990-1997 and 2006-2012. This information 
can be found at sub-section 9.4.4. The same issue, as discussed earlier, regarding a 
lack of data being available for the 1998-2005 period is applicable to this dataset.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(d) EB-2008-0113 
(e) EB-2008-0272 
(f)  EB-2010-0002 
(g) EB-2011-0268 
(h) EB-2012-0031 
 
156 Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012. 
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I developed the dataset by dividing the total OM&A expenses of all the distributors in the 
province by the total number of customers served. This provides the average OM&A 
expenses incurred by distributors on a per customer basis. Once again, the dataset 
ignores any differences between the costs incurred to serve customers that are in 
different rate classes.  
The OM&A information for the pre-restructuring period was sourced from Ontario 
Hydro’s Statistical Yearbooks.157 For the post-restructuring period, the OM&A 
information was sourced from the Ontario Energy Board’s Yearbooks of Electricity 
Distributors.158 
 
5.3.9 Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation Revenues  
 
I developed a dataset which sets out the revenues received by the Ontario Electricity 
Financial Corporation over the period 2000-2012. The information contained in this 
dataset can be found at sub-section 9.5.7.  As noted previously, after the restructuring, 
the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation was created to assume and manage the 
stranded debt of Ontario Hydro. It receives revenue to pay down Ontario Hydro’s 
stranded debt through the following: 
• Payments in lieu of taxes paid by OPG, Hydro One and the LDCs; 
• The profits of OPG and Hydro One, in excess of the government’s annual interest 
cost of its investment in the two companies; and 
• The debt retirement charge paid by electricity consumers.  
The dataset highlights the amount of money that was transferred to the Ontario 
Electricity Financial Corporation from each of the above revenue streams over the 
2000-2012 period. The information for this time-series was sourced from the 
corporation’s annual reports.159   
                                                          
157 Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1997. 
 
158 Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012. 
 
159 Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, Annual Reports, 1999-2012.  
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5.3.10 Debt Financing Costs  
 
This data set provides the deemed interest rates associated with long-term and short-
term debt, as established by the OEB, applicable to the LDCs. The information 
contained in the data set covers the period from 2000-2012 and can be found at sub-
section 9.5.8. 
The information was sourced from OEB Decisions and Cost of Capital Parameter 
updates issued by the OEB.160  
 
5.3.11 Installed Generation Capacity    
 
This dataset highlights the total installed generation capacity in Ontario from 1983-2013. 
The information contained in this dataset can be found at sub-section 6.2.1. However, 
there are however a number of years during that period where there is no installed 
capacity information available.  
From 1983-1992, the information is sourced from Ontario Hydro’s Statistical 
Yearbooks.161 After 1992, Ontario Hydro’s Statistical Yearbooks stopped reporting the 
installed capacity in Ontario. Total installed capacity in 1995, 1996, and 1998 data was 
sourced from Ontario Hydro’s annual reports.162 The information for the period up to 
1996 includes only capacity owned and operated by Ontario Hydro. For 1998, total 
installed capacity also includes non-utility generator capacity as some information 
regarding NUG generation is available for that year only.163  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
160 Ontario Energy Board, Cost of Capital Parameters Decisions (RP-1999-0034 / EB-2006-0088 / EB-
2009-0084) and Cost of Capital Parameter Update Letters. 
 
161 Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1992.  
 
162 Ontario Hydro Annual Reports, 1995, 1996 and 1998. 
 
163 The installed 1998 NUG capacity was cited as 2000MW in a gift given to staffers in Ontario Hydro’s 
NUG division. After the group managed to contract for 2000MWs of capacity, the group was disbanded.   
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For the period 2003-2008, I derived the total installed capacity information from the 
IESO’s Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports.164 165  
As the IESO stopped publishing the Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports in June 
2008, there was no publically-accessible installed generation capacity information 
available for the 2009-2012 period. However, for 2013 the IESO website did provide the 
installed capacity as of October of that year.166  
 
5.3.12 Installed Generation Capacity – Ownership 
 
This dataset provides the ownership of installed generation capacity for 1998 and 2002-
2008 (as between Ontario Hydro and the NUGs for 1998 and as between OPG, Bruce 
Power and other private generators for 2002-2008). This information can also be found 
at sub-section 6.2.1. 
Prior to 1998, effectively all generation capacity in the province was owned by Ontario 
Hydro (with the exception of some NUG capacity). As noted previously, the only NUG 
data that is available is for 1998. For 2002-2008, the ownership information was derived 
from the IESO’s Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports.167  
 
5.3.13 Generation Output  
 
This dataset was developed to provide the electricity output from generation facilities in 
Ontario during the period 1990-2012. The total electricity output for this period is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Above is sourced from: Ontario Hydro, Gift to staffers, Coaster inscribed with “2000MW Achievement – 
Non-Utility Generation.”  
 
164 For each year (with the exception of 2008), the installed capacity information included in December 
Generator Disclosure Report was considered representative of the installed capacity for the year. For 
2008, the June Generator Disclosure Report was considered representative of the installed capacity for 
that year (as this was final generator disclosure report issued by the IESO).  
 
165 Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports, 2003-2008.  
 
166 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013b.   
 
167 Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports, 2003-2008. 
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disaggregated by the source of the output.  However, there are a number of years 
during the noted period where there is no generation output information available. This 
information can be found at section 7.2. 
For 1990-1992, the generation output information was sourced directly from Ontario 
Hydro’s Statistical Handbooks.168 The dataset is meant to reflect only Ontario 
generation, however, for the 1990-1992 period, there is likely a small amount of 
imported electricity included in the total (as there was no way to disaggregate Ontario 
Hydro’s electricity purchases from other jurisdictions and purchases made from the 
NUGs). For the period 1993-1997, there is no generation output information available as 
Ontario Hydro stopped reporting this information in its Statistical Handbooks. For the 
1998-2000 period, generation output information was sourced from an IESO electricity 
sector transition archive.169 For the 2003-2012 period, the generation output information 
was provided by the IESO through email correspondence.170  
One of the categories in the generation output dataset is output sourced from oil / 
natural gas-fired generation facilities. For the pre-restructuring period, this category was 
dominated by oil-fired generation (as the only generation station in the category was the 
Lennox Generation Station, which was entirely fueled by oil until 1997).171 After the 
restructuring, the source fuel reflected in this category shifts to almost entirely natural 
gas as a number of new gas-fired generation stations came online and in 1997, Lennox 
was refurbished as a flex-fuel station, which means the station could use either oil or 
natural gas as a source fuel.172  
 
 
                                                          
168 Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1992. 
 
169 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2010b.  
 
170 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013c.  
 
171 Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1992. 
 
172 Ontario Power Generation, 2014.  
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5.3.14 Generation Output – Ownership  
 
The purpose of this dataset is to highlight the relative ownership of the electricity output 
in the province for the period 2003-2012 (as between OPG, Bruce Power, and other 
private generators). Prior to restructuring, nearly all of the electricity in Ontario was 
generated by Ontario Hydro (with a small amount being generated by the NUGs). The 
information contained in this dataset can be found at sub-section 6.2.1. 
The ownership of the installed capacity, on a source-by-source basis, was applied to the 
generated output data to calculate the relative percentage of generated output owned 
by each of OPG, Bruce Power and other private generators. After restructuring, from 
2003-2008, ownership information was derived from the IESO’s Monthly Generator 
Disclosure Reports.173 For the 2009-2012 period, ownership information was estimated 
(since the IESO stopped publishing its Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports). The 
methodology used to estimate the ownership of generation output over the 2009-2012 
period is as follows.  
For the nuclear and coal generation categories, ownership percentages have been held 
at the 2008 level and applied to the output from those generation sources for the years 
2009 to 2012. Maintaining the relative 2008 ownership levels for these categories is 
appropriate as no companies were building new capacity in these categories over the 
noted period.174  
For the oil / natural gas category, the amount of output deemed to be owned by OPG 
was held at the 2008 level in absolute terms (as OPG owns a single generation station 
– the Lennox Generation Station, which is a flex-fuel oil / natural gas generation facility). 
However, over this period, private generators were building new gas-fired generation 
capacity. Therefore, OPG’s relative ownership in this category declines as additional 
capacity was brought online.   
                                                          
173 Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Reports, 2003-2008. 
 
174 Note however, that Bruce Power’s Nuclear Units 1 & 2 did come online in October 2012 but this does 
not materially impact the nuclear output information as they were only operating for 3 months of the year.  
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In regard to the hydroelectric category, there has likely been a modest amount of 
hydroelectric capacity coming online that is owned by private generators over the 2009-
2012 period. However, the extent to which this is the case has been difficult to establish. 
Therefore, the relative ownership of hydroelectric generation has been held consistent 
after 2008. This likely does not materially impact the ownership analysis completed in 
this paper.  
Finally, regarding the wind and “other” generation sources categories, private 
generators owned 100% of the generated output from these sources until 2008 (when 
the actual ownership data was no longer reported by the IESO). Given that OPG and 
Bruce Power did not construct any capacity in these categories over the 2009-2012 
period, the private generators were assigned 100% of the generated output from these 
sources for the noted period.  
 
5.3.15 Average Use of Electricity  
 
I developed the average use datasets to highlight the change in average monthly 
electricity consumption of electricity on a per customer basis over the 1990 to 2012 
period. There are two distinct average use datasets which have been developed:  
(a) Residential customers only; and 
(b) All utility customers.  
The information contained in these datasets is discussed in section 7.3.  
The information for the 1990 to 1997 period was sourced from Ontario Hydro’s 
Statistical Handbooks.175 The 1990-1997 average use data excludes those customers 
that were directly served by Ontario Hydro (as average use information was not 
available for Ontario Hydro’s retail customers). The same issue, as discussed earlier, 
regarding a lack of data being available for the 1998-2005 period is applicable to this 
                                                          
175 Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1997. 
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dataset. The information for the 2006-2012 period was sourced from Ontario Energy 
Board’s Yearbooks of Electricity Distributors.176  
 
5.4 Statistical Analysis  
 
The underlying data used for the statistical analysis, described below, is the nominal 
“all-in” electricity price dataset, for the period 1983-2012, discussed above in sub-
section 5.3.1. As noted previously, there is a gap in actual data for the period 1998-
2005. In order to maintain a continuous dataset, electricity prices for the 1998-2005 
period have been derived by grossing up the 1997 “all-in” electricity price to reflect the 
average annual price increase for the period 1997 to 2006. I determined that it is best to 
use nominal prices for the statistical analysis because this is consistent with other 
academic papers that were focused on analyzing electricity prices over time.177  
To study the impact that the electricity sector restructuring had on electricity prices, I 
generated two restructuring related dummy indicator variables. First, a restructuring 
dummy indicator variable was created to come into effect after 2006. This variable 
reflects the start of the post-restructuring period (where actual data is available). As the 
restructuring dummy indicator variable is set to come into effect in the post-2006 period, 
the statistical models utilized understand the post-restructuring period to have begun in 
2006. As discussed, the post-restructuring period actually began in 1998. However, 
given the lack of data available for the 1998-2006 period, it would have been impossible 
to get useful results from a model which had the restructuring dummy indicator variables 
come into effect for the post-1998 period (as all the pricing information for the 1998-
2006 period are interpolated). This means that the restructuring dummy indicator 
variable, in practice, is capturing the impact of both the restructuring and certain post-
restructuring changes.  
                                                          
176 Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012. 
 
177 The following, all of which use nominal electricity prices as a basis for analysis, were reviewed: 
Misiorek et al.,(2006), Cartea and Figuoera (2005), and Gythrie and Videbeck (2007). 
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When looking at the results from a basic ordinary least squares regression on the 
restructuring dummy indicator variable, this variable shows whether a permanent shift in 
electricity prices occurred after the restructuring (i.e. a change in the intercept). When 
looking at the results from an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (“ARIMA”) (or 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average with Explanatory Variable – “ARIMAX”) 
regression on this variable (when the number of non-seasonal differences is set to 1), 
this variable shows a permanent shift in changes to electricity prices after the 
restructuring.  
Second, a restructuring / time interaction variable was generated. This variable 
multiplies the restructuring dummy indicator variable by the year. When looking at the 
results from a basic ordinary least squares regression on the restructuring / time 
interaction variable, this variable shows the changes to electricity price increases (i.e. a 
change in the slope) after the restructuring. When looking at the results from an ARIMA 
(or ARIMAX) regression on this variable (when the number of non-seasonal differences 
is set to 1), this variable highlights how the increases in electricity prices changes over 
time.   
I also created another set of dummy indicator variables for purposes of carrying out 
statistical analysis on electricity prices. A dummy indicator variable (the “gap dummy 
variable”) was generated to come into effect in 1998 and run until 2006 to reflect the 
pricing data that is not based on actual electricity prices (and rather has been 
interpolated for the purposes of building a continuous dataset of electricity prices which 
is required by both the ARIMA and ARIMAX regression models to function correctly). An 
interaction variable was also generated which multiplies the gap dummy variable by the 
year. This variable was generated largely to segregate the data that is not based on 
actual information from the rest of the post-restructuring data that is based on actual 
electricity prices for the relevant year. The restructuring dummy variable and its 
interaction variable with time, discussed above, is the focus of the statistical analysis.  
In addition to the above noted dummy variables, three additional independent variables 
were considered as part of the regression analysis in order to control for factors which 
may impact electricity prices and are not related to the restructuring.  
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The first independent variable which was added to the regression model was time (as it 
is generally expected that electricity prices will increase over time). The second 
independent variable which was added was designed to be reflective of changes to the 
economy (as represented by Canada’s GDP) (i.e. a GDP proxy variable).178 179  The 
third independent variable added is reflective of Ontario weather in each year of the 
time series (i.e. a weather proxy variable). Weather information was sourced from the 
Government of Canada’s Climate Database.180 Heating Degree Days (“HDDs”) were 
added to Cooling Degree Days (“CDDs”) to calculate Total Degree Days (“TDDs”).181 
Pearson weather station information was assumed to be representative of Ontario 
weather.  
I used a few different statistical techniques in the analysis of the “all-in” electricity prices 
over the 1983-2012 period.  First, a basic ordinary least square regression was used to 
estimate the significance that the restructuring had on electricity prices over the post-
restructuring period. The regression was run on a model that included the electricity 
price as the dependent variable and the restructuring dummy variables, the gap dummy 
variables, GDP and TDD as the independent variables.  
After the regression was run on the full model, I reviewed the correlation between the 
independent variables. That analysis highlighted that the GDP proxy variable is 
correlated to the time variable. Therefore, I ran the regression with the GDP proxy 
variable excluded from the model. This model, with the GDP proxy variable excluded, 
had the highest R-squared value. Considering the R-squared value explains the 
goodness of fit of the model182, I determined that the best model to use to analyze the 
impact that the restructuring had on electricity prices excluded GDP.  
                                                          
178 This information was sourced from CANSIM Table 380-0102 and reflects Canada’s GDP at market 
prices for the period 1983-2012.  
 
179 Statistics Canada, 2014. 
 
180 Government of Canada, 2014.  
 
181 The HDD and CDD balance point was set at 18 degrees Celsius.  
 
182 The adj. R-squared explains how well the model fits the data while penalizing adding independent 
variables which do not explain much of the dependent variable. 
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After I completed the regression analysis, the next issue that required attention was 
determining whether the time-series of electricity prices exhibited autocorrelation 
problems. Given that the “all-in” electricity price dataset underpinning the model is a 
time-series of electricity prices, it is likely that autocorrelation problems exist in the 
dataset as the variables that drive electricity prices, largely, the costs of generating, 
transmitting and distributing electricity, are correlated on a year-to-year basis.  
To check for autocorrelation problems in the model, I utilized the Durbin Watson Test. 
The Durbin Watson Test looks for autocorrelation problems in a time-series by checking 
for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. The 
Durbin Watson Test provided inconclusive results as to whether there were 
autocorrelation problems in the model. However, given the nature of the data being 
analyzed, regardless of the outcome of the Durbin Watson test, it is highly probable that 
an autocorrelation problem exists.  
Next, I utilized the Praise-Winsten estimator to try to overcome the expected 
autocorrelation problems in the dataset.  The Prais–Winsten estimator is a procedure 
designed to take care of the serial correlation of type AR(1) in a model.  
The Prais-Winsten estimator was not entirely successful at addressing the expected 
autocorrelation problems in the dataset. As the Praise-Winsten only addresses serial 
correlation problems of type AR(1), I determined that that the dataset was likely 
exhibiting higher-order auto-regressive problems.  
The ARIMA model allows more extensive parameters to be set in the model, which can 
potentially deal with higher-order auto-regressive problems. Therefore, I used the 
ARIMA model to possibly generate a more relevant regression model for the dataset. In 
the ARIMA model the following parameters can be set:  
• The number of autoregressive terms;  
• The number of nonseasonal differences; and  
• The number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation.  
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I ran a number of tests, based on the autocorrelation function and the partial 
autocorrelation functions, to determine the appropriate parameters to set for the ARIMA 
model. I determined that the number of autoregressive terms associated with the 
electricity price data underpinning the regression analysis was 3, the number of 
nonseasonal differences was 1, and the number of lagged forecast errors in the 
predication equation was 1. Overall, the ARIMA (3,1,1) model best fit the dataset.  
After I determined that the ARIMA (3,1,1) model best fit the dataset, the ARIMAX (3,1,1) 
model was run on the full dataset (i.e. all the dummy variables and TDD).183 The results 
of the ARIMAX model form the basis for the conclusions regarding the impact that the 
sector restructuring had on electricity prices, which are set out later in the paper.  
A full discussion of the results of the statistical analysis completed is set out at section 
8.4.   
 
5.5 Limitations  
 
This paper is entirely focused on the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity sector and the 
impacts that the restructuring, and post-restructuring changes, had on electricity 
consumers (from both an economic and environmental perspective). In other words, the 
paper essentially encompasses a case study of Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring.  
However, what my paper does not do, and in fact cannot do, is compare Ontario’s 
restructured electricity sector to a hypothetical Ontario electricity sector that was never 
restructured. Would electricity prices have been lower if the monopoly model continued? 
Would the coal phase out still have occurred if the sector was never restructured? 
These are the types of questions that will remain unanswered as it is not possible to 
know what the sector would have looked like today if it was never restructured. This is 
the “unsolvable counterfactual problem” that looms over the analysis undertaken in this 
paper.  
                                                          
183 The ARIMA model is known as an ARIMAX model when independent variables are included in the 
regression analysis.   
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The best way to address the unsolvable counterfactual problem is to complete a 
comparative analysis as between Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring and other 
jurisdictions that have, and have not, restructured their electricity sectors. This could 
provide answers to questions about whether the restructuring alone caused the 
changes that occurred in the sector (or whether they were likely to occur anyway). For 
example, as will be discussed later, Ontario’s supply mix has shifted away from coal 
and relies more heavily on natural gas-fired and renewable energy sources. It would be 
interesting to analyze the electricity sectors of a few other jurisdictions (both 
restructured in a manner similar to Ontario and traditional monopoly models) to 
determine whether those jurisdictions are also moving away from carbon-intensive 
generation sources. Another interesting comparison would be to look at a number of 
jurisdictions with restructured electricity sectors and try to determine whether all of these 
jurisdictions have experienced higher rate increases in the period after restructuring. An 
answer to this question would provide insight into whether restructuring, and the 
necessary changes that go along with restructuring, cause electricity prices to increase.  
Given the time constraints on completing the M.A in Interdisciplinary Studies program, 
and the difficulty of gathering, and analyzing, the information that was used in this 
paper, I did not attempt to compare Ontario’s electricity sector to electricity sectors in 
other jurisdictions. This is an intentional limitation of my paper. While a comparative 
analysis research project would be interesting to complete, it was never contemplated 
as part of the analysis set out here. However, the information and analysis that is 
provided by this paper provides a researcher with the necessary information to compare 
Ontario’s electricity sector with the electricity sectors of other jurisdictions.  
Another limitation of my paper is with regard to the comparison of environmental 
benefits to their associated financial costs. As I will discuss later, a number of sector 
changes that arose out of post-restructuring government policies have resulted in a 
greener electricity sector in Ontario. However, these environmental benefits have come 
at a cost in terms of increased electricity prices. I recognize that there are numerous 
pricing schemes for greenhouse gas equivalents (and the reduction of airborne health 
hazards). However, Ontario does not have carbon trading market and there is no 
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universally accepted formula for calculating the value of environmental benefits in 
financial terms. On that basis, any attempt to weigh the environmental benefits, 
quantitatively, against the financial costs would cause unnecessary debate in regard to 
the weighting of these benefits and costs. Therefore, I have not, on a quantitative basis, 
attempted to weigh the environmental benefits in terms of the financial costs. For the 
purposes of the conclusions set out in my paper, the environmental gains that arose out 
of post-restructuring policies of government are considered, on a qualitative basis, to be 
beneficial to consumers. However, a quantitative analysis of the environmental benefits 
(and costs) of that arose out of the post-restructuring policies of government would be 
an interesting project to complete. The information provided in my paper provides a 
strong basis to begin that analysis.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
The above section provided a detailed description of all of the datasets that were 
developed for use in the analysis undertaken later in this paper. The rationale for the 
timeframes selected over which changes to Ontario’s electricity prices are analyzed was 
provided.  The inflation adjustment methodology used in the electricity pricing analysis 
and the rationale for selecting the methodology was also discussed. The statistical 
methodology used to analyze the price data was described. Finally, the limitations of the 
analysis completed in my thesis paper were set out.  
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6. Competition Analysis  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
One of the objectives of restructuring, as set out in the Government’s White Paper, was 
to reduce electricity prices through the introduction of competition in generation. Another 
objective was to provide customer choice in retail electricity supply in order to 
encourage greater product and service innovation and price discipline on electricity 
providers. The first part of this chapter will examine competition in electricity supply 
followed by a similar evaluation of the retail market.    
 
6.2 Competition in Generation  
 
Prior to the electricity sector restructuring, Ontario Hydro owned and operated almost all 
of the generation capacity (and consequently generated almost all of the electricity) in 
Ontario. After the restructuring, OPG, a provincially owned entity, continued to own and 
operate the majority of the generation capacity (and generate most of the electricity) in 
the province, however, to a much lesser extent than Ontario Hydro. In the following 
section I will provide a breakdown of the ownership of Ontario’s generation capacity and 
generated output. I will also look at the pricing and contracting arrangements for 
Ontario’s generators in order to explain the operation of Ontario’s wholesale electricity 
market and provide a basis for analyzing whether there is true competition for electricity 
generation in Ontario. 
 
6.2.1 Ownership of Installed Capacity and Generated Output 
 
In the period immediately after the enactment of the Energy Competition Act, OPG and 
the provincial government signed the Market Power Mitigation Agreement. As discussed 
earlier, the agreement resulted in OPG selling / leasing some of its generation assets 
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(including some of its nuclear portfolio and some of its price-setting hydroelectric 
assets).184  
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the relative ownership of the province’s generation capacity in 
1998 (immediately before the restructuring), 2003 (the year after the wholesale 
electricity market opened), and 2008 (10 years after the sector restructuring began).  
Figure 5 - Installed Generation Capacity by Owner (1998)185 
 
Figure 6 - Installed Generation Capacity by Owner (2003)186 
 
                                                          
184 Treblicock and Hrab, 2006: 424. 
 
185 Ontario Hydro, 1998.   
 
186 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Report, 2003. 
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Figure 7 - Installed Generation Capacity by Owner (2008)187 
 
As can be seen in the charts above, the amount of installed capacity owned by Ontario 
Hydro immediately before the restructuring was 94%, the amount of installed capacity 
that was owned by OPG in 2003, after market opening, was 73%, and the amount of 
installed capacity owned by OPG in 2008 was 70%. This shows that the market 
dominance of OPG decreased after market opening (as a result of the Market Power 
Mitigation Agreement). However, OPG in 2008, still owned and operated the vast 
majority of installed generation capacity in the province.  
Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the relative ownership on a generated output basis for the 
years 2003, 2008 and 2012. There is no information available regarding the ownership 
of the generated output prior to the restructuring (i.e. between Ontario Hydro and the 
non-utility generators). However, given that the NUGs owned approximately 6% of the 
total installed generation capacity in 1998, it would be reasonable to estimate that they 
produced somewhere in the range of 3%-8% of Ontario’s electricity in that year.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Report, 2008. 
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Figure 8 - Generated Output by Owner (2003)188 
 
Figure 9 - Generated Output by Owner (2008)189 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
188 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013c & Independent Electricity System 
Operator, Monthly Generator Disclosure Report, 2003.  
 
189 Ibid.  
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Figure 10 - Generated Output by Owner (2012)190 
  
The charts above highlight that on an output basis, private generators (Bruce Power 
and other private owners) have started to produce more of the province’s electricity 
supply over the years (2003 to 2012). This is primarily due to the phase out of coal, the 
increased reliance on gas fired generation (which is largely being developed by private 
companies), and the refurbishment of the Bruce Nuclear facilities. A discussion of the 
shift in Ontario’s supply mix is set out later in this paper.  
While the market dominance of OPG has reduced over the post-restructuring years, on 
both an installed capacity and generation output basis, it still holds a dominant market 
share.  
 
6.2.2 Generation Payment Arrangements, the Role of the Global Adjustment and 
OPA Contracting Practices   
 
In order to understand the manner in which generators are paid for their output and how 
those payment arrangements impact the competitive nature of Ontario’s electricity 
sector, it is necessary to understand how Ontario’s wholesale electricity market 
operates and more specifically how the wholesale market price is set by the IESO. 
The first step in setting the wholesale market price is the IESO forecasting the amount 
of electricity that will be demanded the next day (the “day-ahead forecast”). The IESO 
                                                          
190 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013c.  
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publishes its demand forecast on its website so generators have an idea of how much 
electricity will likely be required by the IESO.    
Generators then review the forecasted demand and submit their offers to the IESO. The 
offers provided by the generators stipulate the amount of electricity they are willing to 
supply and the minimum price that they are willing to take for the offered supply.  
The IESO then reviews the offers made by the generators and matches supply with the 
forecasted demand. When setting the wholesale market price, the IESO first accepts 
the lowest-cost offers and then subsequently accepts higher-cost offers until sufficient 
supply has been acquired to meet the forecasted demand.  However, regardless of the 
actual offer submitted, all generators are paid the “market clearing price”, which is 
based on the last offer accepted (or, in other words, the highest cost offer that was 
accepted by the IESO). The generators whose offers were accepted are then 
dispatched by the IESO to begin supplying electricity to the grid.191 
The above explains how the IESO sets the wholesale market price for electricity and 
highlights that all generators receive the market clearing price for their output. However, 
the wholesale market price does not reflect the entire price paid to generators for their 
output. With the exception of OPG merchant generation capacity (which is a very small 
subset of OPG’s generation assets), all generators in the province are paid either a 
regulated or contracted price for their electricity.192 Typically, the market price only 
covers a portion of the regulated or contracted price owed to a generator; the remainder 
is covered through the global adjustment.  
Figure 11, which was published as part of the OEB’s November 2011 to October 2012 
Regulated Price Plan Report, shows that only about 8% of Ontario’s generated output 
was expected to be paid for entirely at the wholesale market price.193  
 
                                                          
191 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014f.  
 
192 C.D. Howe Institute, 2013b: 8-9.  
 
193 Ontario Energy Board, 2011a: 20.  
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Figure 11 - Ontario Generation Payment Arrangements (Oct. 2011 to Nov. 2012)194 
 
In practice, the fact that very little of Ontario’s generated output is paid for entirely based 
on the wholesale market price means that almost all of the generators in the province 
have an incentive to make supply offers to IESO at a very low price (or even at a 
negative price, known as a “negative bid”) in order to get dispatched by the IESO. When 
a generator is dispatched, it receives the revenues that arise from the market price and 
the remainder of the contracted or regulated price it is owed is covered by payments 
through the global adjustment.195 As such, the wholesale market price means very little 
to the vast majority of generators.   
Figure 12 sets out the total amount collected through the global adjustment charges for 
each year during the 2008 - 2012 period. It also highlights the proportion of the total 
costs that are associated with each generation category (OPG, OPA, and NUGs).  
 
 
 
                                                          
194 Ibid.  
 
195 As noted previously, the global adjustment is designed to capture the difference between the revenues 
generated through the wholesale market price and the actual amount paid to contracted / regulated 
generators for their output. 
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Figure 12 – Annual Global Adjustment Balance (2008 - 2012)196 
 
The above chart highlights that, on an aggregate basis, the amount collected through 
the global adjustment has been increasing steadily over the 2008-2012 period. Total 
revenues collected through the global adjustment have increased from approximately 
$900.9 million in 2008 to $6.4 billion in 2012. The difference between the amount 
collected through the wholesale market electricity price and the payments to the OPA 
contracted generators represents the largest contributor to the global adjustment 
balance in each year over the period. This chart shows that the wholesale market price 
is covering significantly less than the actual cost of generation each year.     
Figure 13 shows the electricity commodity price for the period 2005 – 2012 (in total and 
disaggregated into two parts, the wholesale market price and the global adjustment 
price). It shows that the total commodity price has been gradually increasing since 
2005. During the same time period, the wholesale market price has been declining and 
the global adjustment price has been increasing. The significance of this is discussed 
below.  
                                                          
196 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014e. 
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Figure 13 - Ontario Commodity Price (2005 - 2012)197   
 
In late 2010, a fundamental shift occurred whereby the global adjustment was 
recovering more of the actual commodity cost than the wholesale market price. This 
implies that the wholesale market price is recovering less than half of the actual 
commodity cost and that the contracted and regulated prices paid for generation are 
currently significantly higher than the amount recovered through the wholesale market 
rate. Therefore, the concept that generators are competing, on a price basis, to provide 
electricity to the grid is not accurate. The market price means very little when over 90% 
of generation is paid for based on contracted or regulated prices. 
Currently, competition, in the generation sector, is only seen to any real extent in terms 
of private generators competing for generation contracts from the OPA.  The OPA has a 
number of ongoing procurement programs, which are designed to attract generation 
projects for the province. At the time of drafting, the OPA was seeking to procure supply 
in the following areas198: 
                                                          
197 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014d and Independent Electricity System 
Operator, 2014e. 
 
198 Note that the types of generation sources that the OPA is seeking to develop, through its contracting 
practices, can change, at any time, based on government priorities (which are communicated to the OPA 
through Ministerial directives).  
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• Small-scale renewable generation (capacity of less than 500kW) - This 
generation is being procured under the Feed-in Tariff program (10kW – 500kW 
projects) and the MicroFIT program (<10kW). The Feed-in Tariff and MicroFIT 
programs offer a standardized price for a number of different sources of 
renewable generation. Prospective generators can apply for Feed-in Tariff 
contracts through standard applications, which are evaluated by the OPA to 
determine whether a contract should be awarded to the prospective generator. 
The OPA describes the selection process as open and fair.199 200  
• Large-scale renewable generation (>500kW) – This generation is being procured 
through a competitive request for proposal process. The current phase for large 
scale renewable generation is an early stage. But the OPA has set out some 
preliminary concepts that it may use for the evaluation of the proposals filed. The 
OPA stated that it expects that that the rating criteria will include: development 
experience, financial capability, community engagement, project due diligence, 
economic participation from other entities, and resource availability.201  
• Hydroelectric Supply (>500kW) – The OPA is currently in the process of 
developing a standard offer program for the contracting of new hydroelectric 
supply.202  
• Combined heat and power Supply (<20MW) – The OPA is currently in the 
process of developing a standard offer program for the contracting of new 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
199 Ontario Power Authority, 2014a.  
 
200 The OPA evaluates the Feed-in Tariff applications based a number of eligibility requirements which 
include: transmission / distribution connection availability, domestic content requirements (for some types 
of technologies), holding certain land rights, and other relevant requirements. Projects can also be 
granted priority points, which are used for ranking projects relative to other potential projects. Priority 
points can be granted by the OPA if the project is a community / aboriginal / public sector participatory 
project, has municipal or aboriginal support, and if the project provides certain system benefits.  
 
The above is sourced from: Ontario Power Authority, 2013a: 4-8, 21-27.  
 
201 Ontario Power Authority, 2014b and Ontario Power Authority, 2014c: 1.   
 
202 Ontario Power Authority, 2014d.  
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combined heat and power projects (also known as “cogeneration”).203 It is 
expected that the standard offer program for these types of projects will prioritize 
applications based on a bid-down relative to a standard price.204  
Previous sources of electricity supply that OPA procured through its contracting 
practices include: Bio-energy, solar, wind, hydroelectric, combined-cycle natural gas, 
combined heat and power natural gas, and nuclear.205  
The manner in which the OPA evaluates applications for supply contracts includes a 
framework whereby a prospective generator persuades the OPA, on the basis of the 
location, connection potential, domestic content, community support, price, and other 
project specific factors, that its proposed project should be approved for a long-term 
generation contract. It can be said that the contracting practices of the OPA applies 
some level of competition amongst prospective generators to Ontario’s electricity sector.  
However, after a prospective generator has signed a supply contract with the OPA, the 
generator really does not need to compete, in any real way, to provide electricity to 
consumers.  
Overall, given the amount of generation that is subject to contracted, or regulated, 
payments, the related fact that the wholesale market price means very little to 
generators and the continued dominance of OPG in the generation sector, it can be 
concluded that there is very little competition amongst existing generators. The only real 
competition in the generation sector occurs among companies that are competing for 
supply contracts from the OPA.  
This conclusion is not surprising. A true free market for wholesale electricity only 
operated from market opening on May 2002 until December 2002 when the government 
froze electricity rates. After this short market experiment, the “hybrid model” for 
Ontario’s electricity sector was introduced. The “hybrid model” included a wholesale 
                                                          
203 Combined Heat and Power projects utilize natural gas-fired generation plants to produce both 
electricity and heat.  
 
204 Ontario Power Authority, 2014e and Ontario Power Authority 2014f: 6.  
 
205 Ontario Power Authority, 2014g.  
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market system for electricity supply (where generators are required to make offers to 
the IESO to supply electricity to the market). However, over the years, the OPA was 
regularly directed by government to procure electricity supply for the province, from a 
number of different sources, under long-term fixed-price contracts. As noted above, by 
2012, over 90% of Ontario’s generated output was priced at contracted (or regulated) 
prices. So while any given generator is making bids to supply its generated output into 
the wholesale market, the bid price made by the generator is not meaningful because 
the generator is assured that it will be paid the full contracted, or regulated, price for its 
electricity supply. As such, the wholesale market largely operates as a dispatch tool for 
the IESO and generators are not competing on a price basis to supply electricity to 
consumers.  
Through its policies directed at procuring generation capacity under long-term contracts, 
the government effectively abandoned its original plan to have competition drive the 
wholesale electricity market.   
 
6.3 Customer Choice in Retail Supply  
 
Prior to restructuring, consumers could only purchase electricity from their local MEU.206 
Now customers have the option of purchasing electricity under the Regulated Price Plan 
from their LDC (known as standard supply or RPP) or from a retail electricity provider. 
The following section provides a breakdown of the number of customers that have 
elected to purchase their electricity from retailers. In addition, I will provide a 
comparison of the electricity prices paid by retail customers and standard supply 
customers. Finally, I will discuss the purpose and rationale for the enactment of the 
Energy Consumer Protection Act, which addresses issues associated with electricity 
retailers.  
 
  
                                                          
206 Note that the following customers purchased their electricity directly from Ontario Hydro: (a) customers 
of Ontario Hydro’s retail business (which provided service to certain areas of the province); and (b) large 
volume transmission connected customers.  
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6.3.1 Retail Options and Number of Retailers  
 
Retailers offer fixed-price and fixed-term contracts for the electricity commodity only. All 
of the other line items on the electricity bill, such as distribution and transmission 
services, are still purchased through the LDC. Typically, electricity retailers market their 
contracts as a way that consumers can ensure that their electricity prices remain stable 
over a fixed period of time.  
For example, Active Energy, on its website, states:  
…when you sign up with Active, your rates won't change from month to 
month… [Y]ou are locked into a fixed pricing agreement, which is a 
comforting thought in today's volatile energy market.207 
Direct Energy, on its website, states:  
Sign up for the Green Fixed Price Electricity Plan and avoid potential 
electricity price changes. Protecting your household against potential 
electricity price increases is always a good decision and it makes sense to 
secure a good plan for your home today.208 
 
In 2014, there were 15 low-volume electricity retailers operating in the province. All 
retailers are licenced by the OEB to serve customers that consume less than 150,000 
kWh of electricity annually.209  
 
6.3.2 Number of Customers on Retail Contracts  
 
There is no time series available regarding the number of customers that elected to sign 
retail contracts from market opening (2002) to the present day. However, there are 
number of sources that have indicated the number of retail customers in a given year.  
Treblicock and Hrab estimated that, after market opening, approximately 1 million 
customers, or 23% of the total number of electricity consumers in Ontario entered into 
                                                          
207 Active Energy, 2014.  
 
208 Direct Energy, 2014.  
 
209 Ontario Energy Board, 2014d.  
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fixed price contracts with retailers.210 The Auditor General of Ontario, in its 2011 Annual 
Report, estimated that in 2010 there were approximately 630,000 customers with fixed 
price contracts with retailers (this represents approximately 15% of the total number of 
energy consumers in the province).211 For 2013, the OEB’s website stated that 
approximately 10% of Ontario consumers purchased their electricity from retailers.212  
Together, those estimates provide strong evidence that the number of energy 
consumers on retail contracts is on a declining curve since there were significantly more 
customers on retail contracts after market opening then there were in 2013.  
 
6.3.3 Retail Supply - Price Comparison  
 
One of the main selling points used to encourage customers to sign retail contracts is 
the long-term price stability that these contracts are expected to provide.213  
In practice, however, retail contracts are designed to cover only the wholesale electricity 
market price. Customers on retail contracts pay the global adjustment portion of the 
commodity price separately. Therefore, retail customers pay the actual global 
adjustment price applicable to a given billing period. In contrast, the RPP charge which 
is paid by low-volume consumers that do not sign a retail contract, is a commodity price 
that includes both the wholesale electricity market price and the global adjustment. 
Therefore, retail customers are subject to the monthly variances in the global 
adjustment, while RPP customers have the impact of the global adjustment smoothed 
over time. This means that RPP customers actually experience less variance on their 
monthly bills.  Figure 14 illustrates that RPP customers experience less variance and 
also generally pay a lower aggregate price for the electricity commodity.  
                                                          
210 Treblicock,and Hrab, 2006: 425. 
 
211 Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 83. 
 
212 Ontario Energy Board, 2014e.  
 
213  Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 83. 
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Figure 14 - Electricity Price Comparison (RPP vs. Retail Contract) (2006-
2011)214 215 
 
As can be seen in the above graph, a customer that signed a contract at a price of 8 
cents / kWh in 2006, would have paid a higher aggregate price for the commodity and 
experienced more price variance than a consumer that was subject to the RPP charge 
established by the OEB. Interestingly, the 8 cents / kWh price used in the above chart 
for illustrative purposes is actually lower than any price that the Auditor General found in 
a sample of retailer prices (for the years 2006-2009).  
The Auditor General’s sample was produced as part of its 2011 Audit of Ontario’s 
electricity sector.  It showed that retailers, at the time, were offering fixed electricity rates 
in the range of 8.49 cents / kWh to 10.53 cents / kWh. During the same period, the 
average wholesale market rate ranged from 3.2 cents / kWh to 5.2 cents / kWh. The 
RPP price, which includes both the wholesale market rate and global adjustment rate, 
                                                          
214 Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 84. 
 
215 Figure 13 provides an illustrative example of a customer that committed to a five-year fixed-price 
electricity retail contract at a price of 8 cents / kWh.  
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was set at between 5.4 cents / kWh and 6.3 cents / kWh over the same period. 
Therefore, based on the auditors sample, retail customers paid anywhere from 35% to 
65% more for the electricity commodity than the highest RPP rate in effect over the 
sample term.216  
Technically, there is customer choice in retail electricity. After market opening 
customers have the option of either purchasing the electricity commodity directly from 
their LDC or electing to sign a fixed-term, fixed-price contract with a retailer. However, 
as demonstrated above, the commodity price paid under a retail contract is higher than 
the commodity price paid by RPP customers and RPP customers enjoy greater price 
stability than customers on retail contacts.  
 
6.3.4 Energy Consumer Protection Act  
 
As noted previously, the Energy Consumer Protection Act came into force on January 1, 
2011. The legislation was enacted by the government in response to public concerns 
regarding the business practices of retailers operating in Ontario.  Some of the concerns 
related to: retailer sales practices (i.e. improper identification, pressure to sign contracts 
at the door, signing contracts with people other than the proper account holder, 
confusing language in contracts, inadequate disclosure of price comparisons), unfair 
cancellation polices, automatic renewals, and a general lack of accountability by 
retailers.217 The majority of complaints received by the OEB are related to electricity and 
natural gas retailers.218 Overall, the retail market was not believed to be operating in a 
manner that benefitted energy consumers in the province. 
The Energy Consumer Protection Act caused the OEB to tighten the rules and 
regulations applied to electricity and natural gas retailers in the province.219 Time will tell 
                                                          
216 Ibid: 83.   
 
217 Andrews, 2010.  
  
218 Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 70. 
 
219 Ontario Energy Board, 2014a.  
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whether these changes have helped to mitigate some of the problems present in the 
retail market.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
One of the objectives of restructuring, as set out in the Government’s White Paper, was 
to reduce electricity prices through the introduction of competition in generation. The 
above analysis highlights that there is very little competition amongst existing 
generators in Ontario’s electricity sector. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
OPG still holds the dominant share of installed capacity (and generated output) in the 
province and the vast majority of electricity supply is paid for at either contracted or 
regulated rates which means that the wholesale market rate means very little to 
generators. The lack of competition in the electricity sector is a result of the 
government’s post-restructuring generation procurement policies.  
Another objective of the restructuring was to provide customer choice in retail electricity, 
which the government expected would put downward pressure on commodity prices. 
While customer choice for retail electricity was accomplished by allowing the entry of 
retailers into the market, customers are not benefitting from the ability to choose their 
electricity supplier. Customers pay lower commodity prices, and have greater price 
stability, by purchasing their electricity directly from their LDC (standard supply service). 
In addition, there were significant issues with the business practices of the retailers, 
which eventually caused the government to implement the Energy Consumer Protection 
Act.  Customers seem to be recognizing that they would be better off paying the RPP 
price as opposed to the price established under a fixed price contract as the number of 
customers on retail contracts has decreased from approximately 23% at market opening 
to 10% in 2013.    
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7. Supply Mix, Conservation and Smart Grid Analysis  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
After the electricity sector restructuring, the government, through policy directives and 
legislation, provided direction regarding its expectations for Ontario’s supply mix, 
conservation initiatives, and the development of a smart grid. Generally, the government 
sought to make Ontario’s electricity sector more environmentally sound. 
As described in sub-section 4.10, the Minister of Energy issued a Directive in June 2006 
which set out the government’s expectations for a reduction in peak demand to be 
achieved through conservation programs; an increased reliance on renewables; and the 
increased utilization of gas-fired generation. It also set out the government’s goal to 
phase out coal-fired generation as soon as practical.220   
The government later enacted the Green Energy Act. The act largely focused on 
promoting renewable generation (through the creation of a feed-in tariff program), 
promoting conservation and demand-side management, and the implementation of a 
smart grid in Ontario.221 
The following section discusses the changes to Ontario’s electricity sector resulting from 
the government’s policy directives and legislation which sought to enhance the 
environmental sustainability of Ontario’s electricity sector. As part of this analysis, the 
evolution of Ontario’s generation supply from the early 1990s to 2012 is discussed. I will 
also provide an analysis of the results of the conservation programs in effect during the 
post-restructuring period. In addition, I will set out an analysis of the decline in 
customers’ average use. Finally, I will discuss the impact that the implementation of a 
smart grid has had on energy consumption.  
 
                                                          
220 Dwight Duncan, 2006: 1-2.  
 
221 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013a.   
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7.2 Supply Mix Changes  
 
Ontario’s supply mix was historically dominated by nuclear, coal-fired and hydroelectric 
generation. While nuclear and hydroelectric still play a prominent role in Ontario’s 
supply mix, coal-fired generation has nearly been phased out completely.  
Figure 15, below, shows Ontario’s generated output, by generation source, for the 1990 
to 2012 period.222 223 
Figure 15 - Ontario Generated Output by Source (1990-2012)224 
 
The main observations that can be made regarding the changes to Ontario’s generated 
output are as follows:  
                                                          
222 Note that there is no information available for 1993-1997 and 2001.  
 
223 Also note that prior to 2002, the gas / oil category was entirely oil. Post 2003, the gas / oil category is 
almost entirely natural gas.  In addition, the “other” category is comprised of renewable generation 
sources.  
 
224 Derived from Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1992, Independent Electricity System 
Operator, 2010b, and Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013c.  
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• From 1990-1998, the mix of generation output remains relatively consistent. 
However, there is some fluctuation between nuclear and coal based output, 
which was largely a function of the amount of nuclear capacity that was offline for 
maintenance.  
• Beginning in 2004, the contribution of coal to the supply mix begins to diminish 
with nuclear and natural gas making larger contributions.   
• Beginning in 2006, new renewable generation starts contributing to Ontario’s 
generated output. Electricity output from renewable generation grew moderately 
through 2012. This trend is expected to accelerate in the future.  
• By 2012, coal makes an extremely small contribution to the overall generated 
output (2.8%) with natural gas-fired generation producing a significant amount of 
Ontario’s total generated output (14%).  
An outcome of the shift in Ontario’s supply mix and electricity conservation is that the 
total greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation in Ontario has 
declined since 2005. Figure 16 highlights the greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with electricity generation in Ontario.  
Figure 16 - Electricity Generation - Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2005-
2020)225 
 
                                                          
225 Ontario Power Authority, 2012: 9.  
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Changes to Ontario’s supply mix are consistent with a global trend over recent years to 
move towards more environmentally-friendly electricity supply industries that rely on 
cleaner generation technologies. Globally, there has been significant investment in 
renewable generation in recent years and renewable energy development is expected 
to accelerate in the future. Table 17 sets out the increase in global renewable based 
electricity production (disaggregated by technology type) over the 2006-2013 time 
period and a forecast of renewable energy production until 2020.  
Figure 17 - Global Renewable Electricity Production by Technology (2006-2020)226 
 
Overall, due to the post-restructuring policy direction taken by government to phase out 
coal and add renewables to the supply mix, Ontario’s generated supply has grown 
progressively more environmentally friendly over the last decade. In 1992, 
approximately 20% of generated electricity in Ontario was sourced from coal-fired 
generation stations. By 2012, only 2.8% of Ontario’s generated output was sourced 
from coal-fired plants and nearly 4% of Ontario’s electricity was sourced from renewable 
sources of supply. The greater reliance on renewable generation in Ontario, and an 
overall “greening” of the supply mix, follows the trend that is being experienced across 
the world. As such, the provincial government’s policies designed to make Ontario’s 
                                                          
226 International Energy Agency, 2013: 2.  
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electricity sector more environmentally-friendly would have likely been implemented 
irrespective of the sector restructuring.  
As will be discussed later, the shift that has occurred in Ontario’s supply mix, while 
beneficial to the environment, has applied pressure on commodity prices.  
 
7.3 Impact of Conservation Programs and the Decline in Electricity Average Use  
 
Over the post-restructuring period, a number of programs have been created which 
seek to reduce electricity consumption (and peak demand) in the province. Numerous 
conservation and demand management (“CDM”) programs were administered by 
various levels of government, the OPA, and the LDCs during the post-restructuring 
period. In addition, private companies and individuals have also been investing directly 
in energy conservation over the post-restructuring period. 
In 2004, the Minister of Energy granted approval for all electricity distributors in Ontario 
to apply for an increase in their 2005 rates contingent upon their investment of an 
equivalent amount in CDM. This is known as “Third-Tranche CDM”. These conservation 
activities occurred over the period 2005 – 2008. Overall, 85 distributors spent $163 
million on Third-Tranche CDM programs yielding approximately 1,350 GWh of energy 
savings and 220 MW of peak demand savings.227 
The Green Energy Act included a provision228 that allowed the Minister of Energy to 
issue directives which could require the OEB to specify, as a condition of licence, 
conservation and demand management targets (“CDM Targets”) for electricity 
distributors. The Minister of Energy exercised that power in 2010. Together, the CDM 
targets established for all the LDCs totaled 6,000 GWh of energy and 1,330 MW of 
demand savings.  The reductions were to be achieved through the delivery of CDM 
                                                          
227 Ontario Energy Board, 2009b: 1-2.  
 
228 Through an amendment to section 27.2 of the Ontario Energy Board Act. 
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Programs over a four-year period beginning January 1, 2011 and ending December 31, 
2014.229  
A total of $231 million was spent on conservation programs in 2011 and 2012. This 
resulted in 1,110 GWh of energy savings and 465 MW of peak demand savings on a 
net basis for those years.230 231  
It is important to note that electricity distributors may be paid a performance incentive 
associated with their CDM activities.232 233 LDCs are also made whole for their lost 
revenues due to the savings generated from their own conservation activities through 
the Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism.234 The spending amounts noted earlier only 
reflect direct costs of the conservation programs and do not include the Lost Revenue 
Adjustment Mechanism and incentive costs that are paid for by ratepayers.  
The direct spending and results of post-restructuring period conservation programs 
offered by LDCs has been described. The OPA, municipal government, and private 
companies / individuals also invested in CDM during the post-restructuring period. The 
Ministry of Energy, in a recent report setting out its future plan for conservation in the 
province, estimated that between 2006 and 2011, a total of $2 billion was invested in 
CDM.235  The report estimated that for every $1 spent on conservation, Ontario has 
                                                          
229 Ontario Energy Board, 2012d: 2.  
 
230 Note that the energy savings arising from the conservation programs are expected to persist for some 
time. If a conservation program manages to reduce consumption by 100 kWh a year, that same 100 kWh 
is expected to be saved in the next year. The savings cited reflect only the net savings from the programs 
with no assumptions made with regards to the persistence of the savings.   
231 Ontario Energy Board, 2012d: 5-6, 8, and Ontario Energy Board, 2013b: 6 and 8. 
 
232 The Board may approve performance incentive payments based on a distributor’s verified results in 
meeting its CDM Targets. The CDM Code states that “a distributor may accrue a performance incentive 
once it meets 80% of each of its CDM Targets.” 
 
233 Ontario Energy Board, 2010b: 14-15. 
 
234 Ontario Energy Board, 2012e: 11.  
 
235 Note that the government’s report does not describe how the $2 billion investment amount was 
calculated. However, the amount likely reflects a high-level estimate of all government, LDC, and private 
investment in conservation.  
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avoided $2 in costs to the electricity system.236 Figure 18 sets out the cost in $ / 
megawatt hours (“MWh”) of different electricity resources (including conservation).  
Figure 18 - Relative Cost of Electricity Resources (2013)237  
 
The table highlights that conservation investment is significantly less expensive than 
building new generation capacity. The government has made it clear that it will continue 
to invest heavily in conservation as it is the cleanest and least costly energy 
resource.238 
As noted above, the LDC-led conservation programs alone resulted in energy savings, 
on a net basis (i.e. no assumptions regarding persistence have made), of over 2,300 
GWhs and 685 MW of peak demand savings over the 2005-2012 period. These are 
significant savings that have provided environmental benefits to the province through 
reduced emissions associated with electricity generation.  
The investment in conservation is partially responsible for the decline in the average 
use of electricity that Ontario has experienced from 1990 to 2012.  
                                                          
236 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013c: 1-2. 
 
237 Ibid: 2. 
 
238 Ibid: 2-3. 
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For residential customers only, average electricity use associated with the pre-
restructuring period (1990-1997) was 882 kWh / month. The average electricity use 
associated with the post-restructuring period (2006-2012) was 782 kWh / month. This 
reflects a decline of 100 kWh / month (or approximately 11%). From 2006-2012, 
average use declined from 795 kWh / month to 755 kWh / month. This reflects a 
reduction in average use of 40 kWh / month (or approximately 5%).239  
It is likely that conservation programs and general residential construction practices (i.e. 
adoption of higher energy efficiency standards) account for the majority of the reduction 
in residential average use as between the pre-restructuring and post-restructuring 
periods.  
When all utility customer classes are taken into account, the average electricity use 
associated with the pre-restructuring period (1990-1997) was 2,635 kWh / month. The 
average use associated with the post-restructuring period (2006-2012) was 2,231 kWh / 
month. This reflects a decline of 404 kWh / month (or approximately 15%). From 2006-
2012, average use declined from 2,306 kWh / month to 2,231 kWh / month. This reflects 
a reduction in average use of 75 kWh / month (or approximately 3%).240   
The decline in utility wide average use (i.e. across all customer classes) can be partly 
explained by conservation programs and general construction practices. However, 
economic factors also play a large role in the utility wide average use since the dataset 
includes commercial and industrial customers. When large volume customers (i.e. large 
commercial and industrial businesses) reduce their electricity consumption or close 
down altogether due to market factors (for example, a recession), the utility wide 
average use also declines because total consumption reduces by a relatively larger 
proportion than the reduction in the number of customers (in other words, the loss of 
only one large volume customer can account for a significant reduction in consumption 
and therefore cause a decline in the total average use of all customers). In short, the 
                                                          
239 Derived from Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1997 and Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook 
of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012.  
 
240 Ibid. 
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decline of the manufacturing sector in Ontario is partially responsible for reduced utility 
wide average use.  
The impact of conservation is more prominent in the residential average use information 
because market factors play a less prominent role in that dataset in contrast to the utility 
wide average use information. For both the residential average use and the utility wide 
average use it is not possible to definitively determine the extent to which conservation 
programs are reducing average use since there are other factors that also impact 
consumption.  However, conservation programs are having some unquantifiable impact 
on reducing the average electricity use of consumers as demonstrated by the aggregate 
electricity savings arising from the conservation programs led by the LDCs.   
Overall, conservation efforts are resulting in significant energy and demand savings in 
the province in a cost-effective manner. Conservation investment results in the 
deferment and / or avoidance of capital spending on generation capacity development. 
Reduced electricity consumption also provides environmental benefits in terms of 
reduced emissions associated with electricity generation.  
 
7.4 Smart Grid Implementation, Time-of-Use Pricing, and the Impact on Peak 
Demand  
 
As noted previously, one of the goals of the Green Energy Act was to promote the 
development of a smart grid in Ontario.241 Among other goals, a main purpose of a 
smart grid is to facilitate the adoption of a ToU-based pricing mechanism through the 
deployment of smart meters. ToU pricing is designed to reflect the costs associated with 
electricity production as it changes throughout the day. During off-peak times, demand 
is lowest and less costly sources of generation (i.e. baseload nuclear and hydroelectric) 
are used to meet the demand. In contrast, on-peak hours reflect when demand is 
highest and more expensive (and higher emission) sources of electricity (i.e. gas-fired 
peaking generation) are called upon to meet the incremental demand. The purpose of 
ToU pricing is to spread consumption from capacity constrained times more evenly 
                                                          
241 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013a.   
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throughout the day in order to avoid generation and transmission capacity 
investments.242  
The government aggressively pursued the implementation of smart meters in Ontario. 
By August 2012, nearly 100% of eligible customers in Ontario had smart meters 
installed and approximately 91% of eligible customers were subject to ToU pricing.243  
The most recent data available regarding the spending associated with the installation 
of smart meters was found in the Auditor General’s 2014 Annual Report.244 The Report 
was released in December 2014 and includes all smart grid investment up to the end of 
2014.   
The following table sets out both the direct and indirect smart grid-related costs 
disaggregated by entity and spending category.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
242 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2014.  
 
243 Ontario Energy Board, 2012c: 4.  
 
244 Auditor General of Ontario, 2014: 362-406. 
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Figure 19 – Smart Grid Spending by Entity and Cost Category (up to 2014)245 
Smart Grid Spending by Entity and Cost Category 
Entity Cost Category Approximate Cost (millions) 
 
 
 
Ministry of Energy 
Consultant fees - development 
of an implementation strategy 
for smart grid 
$0.16 
Consultant and legal fees - initial 
implementation stage of smart 
grid 
$0.4 
Communication Costs – raising 
public awareness of smart grid 
$0.64 
 
 
 
Ontario Energy Board 
Developing smart grid 
implementation plan for Ministry 
of Energy   
$0.42 
Consultant fees – ToU rate 
setting 
$0.41 
Consultant fees – impact analysis 
of ToU rates 
$0.18 
Independent Electricity System 
Operator 
Developing, implementing and 
operating the Smart Metering 
Entity and Data Centre 
$160 
Local Distribution Companies Implementing smart meters and 
other smart grid related costs 
$1,400 
Stranded costs related to analog 
meters 
$400 
Total  $1,962 
 
The above table shows that almost $2 billion was spent on implementing a smart grid in 
Ontario (as of 2014). The majority of the costs incurred are associated with the 
installation of smart meters (and related smart grid enabling improvements) by the 
LDCs and the stranding of existing analog meters.  
It is important to note that not all of the $2 billion in smart grid-related spending are 
included in the electricity prices discussed later in the paper as some of these costs 
were incurred after 2012. For example, regarding the IESO costs associated with the 
development and operation of the Smart Metering Entity, approximately $100 million 
                                                          
245 Ibid: 376.  
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was spent on the Smart Meter Entity at the end of 2012 (in contrast to the $160 million 
set out in the table).246  
In regard to the costs associated with the stranding of analog meters, some portion of 
these costs ($400 million) could have been avoided had the government allowed for a 
longer timeframe for smart grid implementation. Due to the aggressive implementation 
targets set by government, LDCs were required to replace customers’ existing analog 
meters well before the end of their useful lives. The 2014 Auditor General’s Annual 
Report noted that, on average, the analog meters that were replaced could have been 
used for another 5 to 16 years.247  
The OEB, in 2013, retained Navigant Consulting Limited (“Navigant”) to analyze the 
impact of ToU prices in Ontario. A principal goal of Navigant’s study was to estimate the 
historical impact that ToU rates had on the consumption patterns of a sample of 
customers.248 249 In order to do this, Navigant utilized two independent econometric 
models noting that “if two wholly independent approaches, with only the underlying data 
in common, deliver a similar result, we may have a very high level of confidence in the 
result.”250  
The primary conclusions of Navigant’s report are as follows:  
• Residential consumers reduced their on-peak consumption and increased their 
off-peak consumption in response to ToU prices in the summer pricing period. On 
                                                          
246 Ontario Energy Board, 2013c: Appendix A, 2. 
 
247 Auditor General of Ontario, 2014: 390. 
 
248 Navigant Consulting Limited, 2013: i. 
 
249 The underlying data used in Navigant’s study was based on a database of hourly load data from 16 
LDCs developed by the OEB. The database included hourly load data for about 200 RPP customers per 
LDC and consisted of information for both residential and small general service customers (less than 50 
kW demand). The information included in the database included at least 1 year of pre-ToU information 
and 1 year of post-ToU pricing information. Navigant added another 13,500 customers to the database 
using information that it received from Toronto Hydro, Hydro Ottawa, Hydro One and Newmarket-Tay 
Hydro.   
 
250 Ibid. 
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average, residential consumers reduced summer on-peak consumption by 3.3% 
and mid-peak consumption by an average 2.2%. Off-peak weekday consumption 
increased, on average, by 1.2% and off-peak weekend consumption increased, 
on average by 1.9%. 
• In the winter pricing period, residential demand decreased at all times of day, 
every day of the week. On average, mid-peak consumption reduced by 3.9%, on-
peak consumption reduced by 3.4%, off-peak weekday consumption reduced by 
2.5% and off-peak weekend consumption reduced by 1.2%. Some of the load 
reduction, over the winter period, could be attributed to conservation in response 
to ToU rates. 
• Total residential on-peak demand was estimated to be reduced by 179 MW in the 
summer and 204 MW in the winter due to ToU pricing.  
• The findings for general service customers were largely inconclusive.251  
Overall, Navigant’s report highlights that the peak demand savings associated with ToU 
pricing have been quite modest. The reason that ToU pricing has not caused a more 
significant reduction in peak demand could be that the ToU rates have not been 
designed effectively.   
Firstly, the difference between the on-peak and off-peak ToU price has narrowed 
significantly since ToU prices were first offered. In 2006, when ToU rates were first 
offered, the on-peak ToU rate was almost 300% higher than the off-peak rate. By 2014, 
the on-peak rate was only 180% larger than the off-peak rate. This narrowing of the 
price differential for electricity between on-peak and off-peak times reduces the pricing 
incentive for customers to shift their consumption away from periods of high demand, 
which could be partially responsible for the only modest change in consumption 
patterns.252  
                                                          
251 Ontario Energy Board, 2013d: 2. 
  
252 Auditor General of Ontario, 2014: 381. 
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Secondly, the pricing blocks for the different times of the day (on-peak, mid-peak, and 
off-peak) do not accurately reflect actual patterns of electricity consumption. For 
example, the off-peak period, on weekdays, begins at 7 pm, which, on an actual basis, 
is a period of high demand. Consumers are paying off-peak prices after 7 pm and are 
therefore not incentivized to shift consumption at that time of the day even though it is a 
period of high demand in Ontario.253 
In the future, if the above noted ToU rate design issues are addressed, it is possible that 
more substantive demand shifting could occur. This would provide more value to 
consumers for their investment in smart grid infrastructure.  
Overall, a very significant amount has been invested in smart grid implementation 
(almost $2 billion by 2014). Certain smart-grid related costs (i.e. stranded meter costs) 
could have been avoided if the government had been less aggressive with its timelines 
for implementation.  
The investment appears, at this early stage, to result in a modest reduction in peak 
demand. However, given the $2 billion investment in smart grid infrastructure more 
substantial peak demand reductions will need to be seen in the future for the investment 
to have provided strong value for consumers.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
As I discuss in greater detail later in this paper, significant costs were incurred in shifting 
Ontario’s supply mix to greener sources of electricity, implementing conservation 
programs over the years, and developing a smart grid. This significant investment has 
resulted in a more environmentally-friendly electricity supply industry in Ontario and has 
greatly reduced greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation. The 
province generates it electricity from cleaner energy sources, average electricity use 
has declined and consumption has started shifting, albeit modestly, from on-peak to off-
peak times.  
                                                          
253 Ibid: 381-382. 
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The changes to Ontario’s generation supply mix, investment in conservation programs, 
and investment in the development of a smart grid largely arose out of post-
restructuring policy decisions of government. The government’s policy framework to 
promote environmental sustainability of Ontario’s electricity sector is not directly tied to 
the restructuring. It is likely that the government would still have undertaken these 
policies (or at least, similar policies), even if the electricity sector was never 
restructured.  
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8. Electricity Pricing Analysis  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In this section, I will analyze the “all-in” electricity prices and the distribution prices from 
1983 to 2012. As described in Chapter 5 on methodology, two comparative analysis 
frameworks for understanding the changes in electricity prices before and after 
restructuring are used.  
The first comparative analysis framework uses the period from 1983-1997 to reflect the 
pre-restructuring era and 1998-2012 to reflect the post-restructuring era. This timeframe 
reflects the 15 years immediately before and after restructuring.  
The second comparative analysis framework uses the period from 1991-1997 to reflect 
the pre-restructuring period and 2006-2012 to reflect the post-restructuring period. This 
timeframe reflects the 7 years before restructuring and a 7 year period after 
restructuring (where actual electricity pricing data is available).  
After the pricing data has been set out, I will provide the results of the statistical 
analysis.  
 
8.2 “All-in” Electricity Price Analysis  
 
Figure 20 sets out the “all-in” electricity price over the period 1983 to 2012 on both a 
nominal and inflation-adjusted basis. It shows that the “all-in” price for electricity (which 
includes commodity, transmission, distribution and regulatory charges) rose from 1983 
until about 1993 when prices start to fall until 1997 (when the pre-restructuring dataset 
ends). This decline in electricity prices, seen in the graph, is due to the price freeze on 
Ontario Hydro’s rates which was in place from 1993 to 1998. From 2006, when the post-
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restructuring dataset begins, until 2012 prices rose more rapidly than in the pre-
restructuring period on a real basis.254    
Figure 20 - "All-in" Electricity Price (1983-2012)255 
 
Using the first comparative analysis framework, Figure 21 highlights the key changes to 
the “all-in” electricity price. 
                                                          
254 Note that the following price restrictions are implicitly captured in the pricing information from 1998-
2005:  
 
• 1998- May 2002 – Transition period pricing limitations on OPG’s generated output.  
• May 2002-March 2005 - Restrictions were put in place on the price paid to OPG for electricity. 
This reflects a partial commodity freeze (prices were effectively capped for a portion of generated 
output); and 
• May 2002 (retroactive adjustment)-2004 – A price cap was put in place on the HOEP price (4.3 
cents / kWh for low volume customers) and transmission and distribution rates were also 
restricted. This effectively resulted in a full freeze on electricity prices during the noted period.  
 
255 Derived from Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1997, Ontario Hydro Annual Reports, 1990-
1999, Independent Electricity System Operator 18-month Outlook Tables, May 2013 & February 2014, 
Independent Electricity System Operator Monthly Market Reports, 2006-2012, and Ontario Energy Board, 
Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012.  
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Figure 21 - Changes to “All-in” Electricity Prices (1983-2012)256 
"All-in" Electricity Prices (1983-1997 & 1998-2012) – Key Changes 
Nominal   
 Nominal 1983 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 4.78% 
Nominal 1998 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 4.10% 
Nominal 1983 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 4.41% 
Nominal 1983 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 90.42% 
Nominal 1998 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 68.51% 
Nominal 1983 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 232.64% 
  Real (GDP IPI FDD) 
 Real 1983 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 1.77% 
Real 1998 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 1.92% 
Real 1983 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 1.83% 
Real 1983 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 27.95% 
Real 1998 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 29.51% 
Real 1983 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 67.84% 
 
During the pre-restructuring period relevant to this analysis framework (1983-1997), 
electricity prices increased, on average, by 4.78% each year on a nominal basis. While, 
in the post-restructuring period (1998-2012) electricity prices increased, on average, by 
4.10% on a nominal basis.  On a real basis, electricity prices increased, on average, by 
1.77% each year in the pre-restructuring period. While, in the post-restructuring period 
electricity prices increased, on average, by 1.92%. In aggregate, on a nominal basis, 
electricity prices increased by over 230% from 1983 to 2012. On an inflation-adjusted 
basis electricity prices increased by about 68% during the 1983-2012 timeframe. 
Using the second comparative analysis framework, Figure 22 sets out the key changes 
to the “all-in” electricity price.   
 
 
                                                          
256 Ibid.  
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Figure 22 - Changes to “All-in” Electricity Prices (1991-2012)257 
"All-in" Electricity Prices (1991-1997 & 2006-2012) – Key Changes 
Nominal   
 Nominal 1991 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 2.44% 
Nominal 2006 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 4.72% 
Nominal 1991 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 3.60% 
Nominal 1991 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 14.83% 
Nominal 2006 – 2012 Total Increase over Period 31.65% 
Nominal 1991 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 100.60% 
  Real (GDP IPI FDD) 
 Real 1991 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 0.87% 
Real 2006 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 2.80% 
Real 1991 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 1.59% 
Real 1991 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 4.75% 
Real 2006 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 17.78% 
Real 1991 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 37.41% 
 
During the pre-restructuring period relevant to this analysis framework (1991-1997), 
electricity prices increased, on average, by 2.44% each year on a nominal basis. While, 
in the post-restructuring period (2006-2012) electricity prices increased, on average, by 
4.72% on a nominal basis.  On a real basis, electricity prices increased, on average, by 
0.87% each year in the pre-restructuring period. While, in the post-restructuring period 
electricity prices increased, on average, by 2.8%. In aggregate, on a nominal basis, 
electricity prices increased by over 1 00% from 1991 to 2012. On an inflation-adjusted 
basis electricity prices increased by about 37.4% from 1991-2012. This is comprised of 
an approximate 5% increase from 1991-1997 and an approximate 17.8% increase from 
2006-2012. 
Overall, during the 2006-2012 period (where actual pricing information is available), the 
“all-in” price for electricity was increasing quite rapidly (nominal price increases of 
4.72% and real price increases of 2.8%). The analysis reveals that under both 
comparative analysis frameworks, the “all-in” electricity prices increased more rapidly in 
                                                          
257 Ibid.  
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the post-restructuring period on a real basis. In the second analysis framework, 
electricity prices also increased more rapidly on a nominal basis. The reasons for the 
“all-in” electricity price increasing more substantially in the post-restructuring period is 
discussed later in this paper.  
 
8.3 Distribution Price Analysis   
 
Figure 23 shows distribution prices over the period 1983 to 2012 on both a nominal and 
inflation-adjusted basis.  Distribution prices rose from 1983 until about 1993 then prices 
start to fall until 1997 when the pre-restructuring dataset ends. This decline in electricity 
prices, seen in the graph, is due to the price freeze on Ontario Hydro’s rates (including 
MEU distribution rates) which was in place from 1993 to 1998. From 2006, when the 
post-restructuring dataset begins, until 2012 distribution rates rose more rapidly than in 
the pre-restructuring period. 258  
Figure 23 - Distribution Price (1983-2012)259 
 
                                                          
258 Note that the following price restrictions are implicitly captured in the pricing information from 2002-
2004:  May 2002 (retroactive adjustment)-2004 – Distribution rates were restricted.   
 
259 Derived from Ontario Hydro Statistical Handbooks, 1983-1997 and Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of 
Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012. 
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Using the first comparative analysis framework, Figure 24 demonstrates the key 
changes to the distribution price. 
Figure 24 - Changes to Distribution Prices (1983-2012)260 
Distribution Prices (1983-1997 & 1998-2012) – Key Changes 
Nominal   
 Nominal 1983 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 5.50% 
Nominal 1998 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 7.51% 
Nominal 1983 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 6.47% 
Nominal 1983 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 89.85% 
Nominal 1998 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 120.18% 
Nominal 1983- 2012 Total Increase over Period 359.27% 
  Real (GDP IPI FDD) 
 Real 1983 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 1.64% 
Real 1998 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 4.75% 
Real 1983 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 3.38% 
Real 1983 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 27.56% 
Real 1998 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 70.46% 
Real 1983 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 131.73% 
 
During the pre-restructuring period relevant to this analysis framework (1983-1997), 
distribution prices increased, on average, by 5.5% each year on a nominal basis. While, 
in the post-restructuring period (1998-2012) electricity prices increased, on average, by 
7.51% on a nominal basis.  On a real basis, distribution prices increased, on average, 
by 1.64% each year in the pre-restructuring period. While, in the post-restructuring 
period electricity prices increased, on average, by 4.75%. In aggregate, on a nominal 
basis, electricity prices increased by 359% from 1983 to 2012. On an inflation-adjusted 
basis electricity prices increased by about 132% during the 1983-2012 timeframe.  
Using the second comparative analysis framework, Figure 25 highlights the key 
changes to the “all-in” electricity price. 
 
                                                          
260 Ibid.  
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Figure 25 - Changes to Distribution Prices (1991-2012)261 
Distribution Prices (1991-1997 & 2006-2012) – Key Changes 
Nominal   
 Nominal 1991 - 1997 Average Annual Increase 0.20% 
Nominal 2006-2012 Average Annual Increase 4.89% 
Nominal 1991 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 5.29% 
Nominal 1991 - 1997 Total Increase over Period 0.29% 
Nominal 2006-2012 Total Increase over Period 26.54% 
Nominal 1991 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 142.61% 
  Real (GDP IPI FDD) 
 Real 1991 - 1997 Average Annual Increase -1.33% 
Real 2006-2012 Average Annual Increase 2.13% 
Real 1991 - 2012 Average Annual Increase 2.97% 
Real 1991 - 1997 Total Increase over Period -8.52% 
Real 2006-2012 Total Increase over Period 13.22% 
Real 1991 - 2012 Total Increase over Period 66.18% 
 
During the pre-restructuring period relevant to this analysis framework (1991-1997), 
distribution prices increased, on average, by 0.2% each year on a nominal basis. While, 
in the post-restructuring period (2006-2012) distribution prices increased, on average, 
by 4.89% on a nominal basis.  On a real basis, distribution prices decreased, on 
average, by 1.33% each year in the pre-restructuring period. While, in the post-
restructuring period distribution prices increased, on average, by 2.13%. In aggregate, 
on a nominal basis, distribution prices increased by about 143% from 1991 to 2012. On 
an inflation-adjusted basis, distribution prices increased by about 66% from 1991-2012.  
Overall, under both comparative analysis frameworks, distribution prices increased 
more rapidly in the post-restructuring period on both a nominal and real basis. The 
reason why distribution rates increased more substantially in the post-restructuring 
period is discussed later in this paper.  
 
                                                          
261 Ibid.  
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8.4 Statistical Analysis Results  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the regression analysis, as set out below, utilized the 
nominal “all-in” electricity prices for the period 1983-2012.  
I generated two sets of dummy variables to analyze the impact that the restructuring 
had on electricity prices: 
(a) First, I created a restructuring dummy indicator variable to come into effect after 
2006.  This variable reflects the start of the post-restructuring period (where 
actual data is available). A restructuring / time interaction variable was also 
generated. As the restructuring dummy indicator variable is set to come into 
effect in the post-2006 period, the statistical models used understand the post-
restructuring period to have begun in 2006. As such, the restructuring dummy 
indicator variable is capturing the impact of both the restructuring and post-
restructuring changes (as the post-restructuring period actually began in 1998).  
(b) Second, I generated the gap dummy indicator variable to come into effect in 
1998 and run until 2006 to reflect the pricing data that is not based on actual 
electricity prices. A gap / time interaction variable was also generated.  
In addition to the dummy indicator variables, time and TDD were also used as 
independent variables in the regressions performed to analyze the impact that the 
restructuring had on electricity prices.  
An ordinary least squares regression was first used to determine whether the 
restructuring, and post-restructuring changes, was correlated with electricity prices. The 
regression was run with price set as the dependent variable and the dummy indicator 
variables, time and TDD set as the independent variables. The results of the regression 
are set out in Figure 26 below. 
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Figure 26 - Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results (Full Model) 
 
The results highlight that the restructuring dummy variables both have a p-value of 0. 
The conclusion, at this point, is that the restructuring and post-restructuring policy 
changes, as reflected by the restructuring dummy variables, is significantly correlated 
with the “all-in” price for electricity. In addition, the TDD variable has a p-value of 0.043, 
which means, using an ordinary least squares regression, weather is also correlated to 
the “all-in” electricity price. 
After running the regression, I needed to consider whether the time-series of electricity 
prices exhibited autocorrelation problems. I used the Durbin Watson Test to check for 
autocorrelation problems. The Durbin Watson Test provided a D-stat of 1.150527. The 
significance bounds for a dataset with 30 observations and 6 regressors are set at dL = 
0.812 and dU = 1.707. Therefore, the results of the Durbin Watson test were 
inconclusive as the D-stat fell within the upper and lower bands of the test.  
Given that the data being analyzed is a time-series of electricity prices it is highly 
probable that an autocorrelation problem exists. I first used the Prais-Winsten estimator 
was first utilized to try to overcome the expected autocorrelation problems in the 
dataset. The results of this regression are set out in Figure 27 below.  
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Figure 27 - Prais-Winsten Regression Results (Full Model) 
 
The Prais-Winsten regression highlights that the restructuring, and post-restructuring 
changes, as reflected by the dummy variables, are correlated to the “all-in” electricity 
price but weather is not.  However, the Durbin-Watson statistic associated with the 
transformed model still reflects an inconclusive result as to whether there is an 
autocorrelation problem in the pricing data (as the D-stat of 1.450117 for the 
transformed model still falls within the upper and lower significance bands). Therefore, 
the Prais-Winsten estimator was unable to conclusively resolve the potential 
autocorrelation problem. As the Prais-Winsten deals with serial correlation of type 
AR(1), it is still possible that higher-order auto-regressive problems exist in the dataset.  
The ARIMA model allows more extensive parameters to be set in the model, which can 
potentially deal with higher-order auto-regressive problems. Therefore, I used the 
ARIMA model to possibly generate a more relevant regression for the dataset. It is 
important to note that an ARIMA regression can only be applied to stationary data. In 
the ARIMA model the following parameters can be set:  
• The number of autoregressive terms;  
• The number of non-seasonal differences; and  
• The number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation.  
122 
 
I ran a number of tests on the data, based on the autocorrelation function and the partial 
autocorrelation functions, to determine the appropriate parameters to set for the ARIMA 
model. The test results highlighted that the number of autoregressive terms associated 
with the electricity price data underpinning the regression analysis should be set at 3, 
the number of non-seasonal differences should be set at 1 (this means that the 
regression is applied to the difference in electricity prices, year-over-year, as opposed to 
the actual pricing information262), and the number of lagged forecast errors in the 
predication equation should be set at 1. Overall, the test results highlighted that the 
ARIMA (3,1,1) model best fit the dataset.  
The ARIMAX(3,1,1) regression was run on the full model (i.e. all the dummy variables 
and TDD) with the dependent variable being the year-over-year difference in electricity 
prices. The results of this regression are set out in Figure 28.  
Figure 28 - ARIMAX (3,1,1) Regression Results (Full Model) 
 
                                                          
262 Setting the number of non-seasonal differences at 1 ensured that the pricing information was 
stationary and allowed the ARIMA regression to operate correctly.  
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The results highlight that the restructuring, and post-restructuring changes, as reflected 
by the dummy variables, are correlated to the difference in price of electricity (p-values 
of 0.062 and 0.057 respectively).263 The coefficient associated with the restructuring 
interaction variable is positive, which means that the restructuring, and post-
restructuring changes, are positively correlated with the increases in electricity prices 
over time.  In addition, the final AR term has a p-value of 0.003, which means that the 
3rd AR term is significantly different from zero. This supports the conclusion that the 
number of autoregressive terms have been properly set at 3. In this ARIMAX 
regression, none of the other variables seem to be correlated with the difference in price 
of electricity.  
Overall, the results of the ARIMAX regression highlight that the restructuring, and post-
restructuring changes in the electricity sector, are positively correlated to the rapid 
increase in electricity prices that occurred during the post-2006 period.  
 
8.5 Conclusion  
 
When comparing the pre- and post- restructuring periods, it is clear that, on a real basis, 
the “all-in” electricity price has increased more rapidly in the post-restructuring period 
under both of the comparative frameworks used in this paper. On a nominal basis, 
electricity prices increased more rapidly in the post-restructuring period when utilizing 
the second comparative framework (1991-1997 vs. 2006-2012).  
Distribution prices have also increased more rapidly, on both a real and nominal basis, 
in the post-restructuring period (under both comparative analysis frameworks).  
Based on the above analysis, it is fair to conclude that the “all-in” electricity prices and 
distribution prices have been rising more rapidly in the post-restructuring period when 
compared to the pre-restructuring period (especially when the analysis focuses on 
electricity prices during the more recent years – 2006-2012). The regression analysis 
                                                          
263 Given the small number of observations in the dataset, p-values of less than 0.1 consistent with a 10% 
significance level are considered significantly correlated to the “all-in” electricity price. 
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confirms that the restructuring, and other post-restructuring changes, are positively 
correlated to the sharp rate increases observed in the post-restructuring period.    
In the next section, I will discuss the specific changes to Ontario’s electricity sector 
resulting from the restructuring, and other post-restructuring policies, that could be 
responsible for the rapid increase in electricity prices over the post-restructuring period.   
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9. Price Drivers and the Impact on Electricity Consumers  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 8, I established that electricity prices are rising more rapidly in the post-
restructuring period on a real basis (under both comparative analysis frameworks) and 
also on a nominal basis using the second comparative analysis framework (i.e. 1991-
1997 vs. 2006-2012). The statistical analysis demonstrates that that the restructuring, 
and post-restructuring changes in the sector, are positively correlated to the rapid 
increase in electricity prices post-2006. 
In this section, I will discuss the specific price drivers which may have caused, or 
conversely, helped to mitigate the rate increases that occurred over the post-
restructuring period. Each price driver that has impacted the price of electricity during 
the post-restructuring period, is linked to the cause of the price driver (i.e. restructuring-
related policies, post-restructuring policies, or other factors not directly related to 
electricity sector policy decisions). In addition, each price driver is analyzed from the 
consumer perspective to determine whether it has benefitted ratepayers.   
After the restructuring, electricity consumers began to pay for the components of 
electricity service (commodity, transmission, and distribution) separately. I have 
categorized the price drivers by component of electricity service. 
I will analyze the commodity-related price drivers first. The commodity-related price 
drivers include: supply mix changes; premiums paid for renewable generation; and 
higher prices paid for output from legacy and new generators. 
Analysis of the transmission-related price drivers (i.e. increased capital and operational 
costs of Hydro One) will follow.  
Third, I will analyze the distribution-related price drivers. The distribution-related price 
drivers include: returns paid to the LDCs; transition costs incurred at the beginning of 
the post-restructuring period; increasing operational costs of the LDCs; mergers of the 
LDCs; smart grid implementation; and renewable generation connection costs.  
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Finally, I will analyze the price drivers that cannot be assigned exclusively to one of the 
above components. These “full-sector” price drivers include: IESO operation costs; OPA 
administrative costs; OEB regulatory costs; conservation and demand management 
spending; investment catch-up associated with previous price freezes; Ontario Hydro 
stranded debt repayments; and reductions to the cost of debt financing.   
 
9.2 Commodity-related Price Drivers  
 
9.2.1 Commodity Prices  
 
As shown in Figure 13 in Chapter 6, the total commodity price (Weighted Average 
Hourly Ontario Electricity Price and global adjustment) has been increasing since 2005. 
The total commodity price in 2005 was 6.44 cents / kWh. In 2012, the total commodity 
price was 7.38 cents / kWh. This reflects an increase of almost 15%.  
Figures 29 and 30 depict the RPP tiered and RPP ToU prices over the restructuring 
period. 
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Figure 29 - Weighted Average RPP - Tiered Price264 265 
 
Figure 30 - Weighted Average RPP - ToU Price266 267 
 
                                                          
264 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, 2014c.  
 
265 The tiered price reflected in the graph is a volume weighted average of the two tiered prices in effect in 
the relevant period.  
 
266 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, 2014c and Ontario Energy Board, 2013a.  
 
267 The ToU price reflected in the graph is a volume weighted average of the three ToU prices in effect in 
the relevant period. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Ap
r-
05
De
c-
05
Au
g-
06
Ap
r-
07
De
c-
07
Au
g-
08
Ap
r-
09
De
c-
09
Au
g-
10
Ap
r-
11
De
c-
11
Au
g-
12
Weighted Average RPP
- Tiered (Cents / kWh)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
M
ay
-0
6
De
c-
06
Ju
l-0
7
Fe
b-
08
Se
p-
08
Ap
r-
09
N
ov
-0
9
Ju
n-
10
Ja
n-
11
Au
g-
11
M
ar
-1
2
O
ct
-1
2
Weighted Average RPP
- ToU Price (cents /
kWh)
128 
 
Given that the RPP rates (both tiered and ToU) are designed to recover the total cost of 
the commodity over time, the charts confirm that the price of the electricity commodity 
has been increasing over the restructuring period. A number of changes in Ontario’s 
electricity sector impacted the commodity price. These changes are discussed below.  
 
9.2.2 Supply Mix Changes  
 
As discussed previously, over the restructuring period Ontario’s supply mix shifted 
towards more environmentally-friendly sources of electricity generation. Figure 15 in 
Chapter 6 provides Ontario’s generated output by source. It illustrates that coal-fired 
generation has been largely phased-out in 2012 while the utilization of natural gas-fired 
generation and renewable generators has increased significantly. 
The historical supply mix of Ontario Hydro, which largely consisted of hydro-electric, 
nuclear and coal generation, provided consumers with relatively low-cost electricity.  
The new sources of supply which have been utilized to replace coal (largely natural gas, 
nuclear and renewable generation) have higher generation costs.  
Figure 31, below, provides an estimated range of costs associated with generating 
electricity from a number of different sources. Natural gas-fired generation, nuclear 
generation and all renewable generation sources are shown to have higher generation 
costs than coal-fired generation. This means that as coal-fired generation was replaced 
by these higher cost sources of electricity, the average cost of generation increased in 
Ontario. As such, commodity rates increased to produce revenues sufficient to cover 
the increased average cost of generation.   
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Figure 31 - Generation Costs by Source268 
 
The shift in Ontario’s supply mix arose out of post-restructuring policy decisions of the 
provincial government. Through the June 2006 Minister Directive and the Green Energy 
Act, the government provided policy direction to the OPA regarding its plans to phase-
out coal-fired generation and to incorporate renewable generation into Ontario’s supply 
mix.269 This price driver is entirely related to government policy which was implemented 
during the post-restructuring period.  
From a consumer’s perspective, the shift in Ontario’s generation supply mix has 
provided environmental benefits (including reduced greenhouse-gas emissions270) 
because more generated output is now sourced from cleaner energy technologies. 
However, the trade-off for these environmental benefits is increased commodity prices. 
                                                          
268 Canadian Electricity Association, 2006: 24.  
 
269 Dwight Duncan, 2006: 1-2 and Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013a.   
 
270 Ontario Power Authority, 2012: 9.  
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The shift in Ontario’s supply mix is partially responsible for the increase in the 
commodity price paid by Ontario’s electricity consumers.  
 
9.2.3 Renewable Generation Procurement Programs  
  
There have been a number of processes for the procurement of renewable generation 
in Ontario over the years. These procurement processes largely fall into three main 
types: competitive (i.e. request for proposals), non-competitive (i.e. negotiated prices), 
and standard offer (i.e. fixed price contracts).  
At different times during the mid-2000s, the OPA requested proposals for renewable 
generation capacity. This occurred under what was known as the Renewable Energy 
Supply Program. Under the Renewable Energy Supply Program, private generators 
would submit confidential bids to the OPA and the OPA would select the renewable 
generation projects that best fit the province’s requirements (based on price, location, 
etc.).  
In 2006, the OPA launched the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program, which 
allowed prospective renewable generators to attain fixed price and term contracts from 
the OPA for the supply of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. The 
purpose of the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program was to allow small scale 
renewable generators to more easily access OPA contracts.  
In 2009, after the enactment of the Green Energy Act, the OPA launched two updated 
standard offer programs: the Feed-in Tariff Program (“FIT”) and the MicroFIT 
program.271 The FIT programs replaced the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program 
and offered higher prices for generated output from renewable sources.  
Additionally, in 2010, the government privately negotiated a contract with a consortium 
of companies to develop wind and solar generation in the province.272 
                                                          
271 The FIT program is designed for proposed projects that are larger than 10kW and the MicroFIT 
program is for projects that are smaller than 10kW.   
 
272 Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 102-108.  
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The prices paid for renewable generation by the OPA, under the various programs, are 
set out in Figure 32. 
Figure 32 - Prices Paid for Renewable Generation under OPA Contracts (cents / 
kWh)273 
 
Procurement programs, which include payment premiums, are necessary to facilitate 
the development of renewable generation capacity in Ontario as renewable sources of 
supply are generally not competitive on a cost basis with more traditional sources of 
supply. However, Ontario’s FIT program includes some of the highest prices paid for 
renewable generation in the world.  Figure 33 compares the renewable generation 
payments made under the FIT program to the procurement programs of other 
jurisdictions. Under the FIT program, the OPA pays renewable generators the highest 
prices for generated output, from a number of generation sources, when compared 
against certain jurisdictions in the US, Europe, Asia and Australia. These high premiums 
have attracted significant interest in developing renewable generation projects in the 
province.  
 
 
                                                          
273 Ibid: 103.  
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Figure 33 - Comparison of Ontario FIT Prices to Other Jurisdictions (cents / 
kWh)274 
 
The Renewable Energy Supply, Renewable Energy Standard Offer and FIT programs 
have all been very successful at procuring renewable capacity. Under all the above 
noted procurement frameworks, renewable generation capacity targets were met in 
extremely short timeframes.275 This leads to the conclusion that reduced payments 
could have been made for renewable generation under the OPA’s procurement 
frameworks and the associated targets could have still been achieved. As such, 
renewable generation has increased the average electricity generation cost in Ontario 
by more than was necessary to attract renewable generation projects. These higher 
than necessary costs are passed onto consumers in the form of higher commodity 
rates. The generous incentive payments provided to renewable generators are partially 
                                                          
274 Ibid: 106. 
  
275 Ibid: 103-104.  
 
133 
 
responsible for the increases in commodity rates experienced in the 2006-2012 
period.276   
The incremental costs that arose from the renewable generation procurement programs 
are caused by the post-restructuring policy decisions of government. During the post-
restructuring period consumers, while accruing benefits from an environmental 
perspective, have been paying incremental costs associated with renewable generation 
procurement frameworks which are arguably too generous to prospective generators.277  
 
9.2.4 Higher Payments for Generated Output from Legacy and New Generators  
 
Prior to the electricity sector restructuring, Ontario Hydro collected, through its rates, 
revenues sufficient to cover the costs of generation. After the restructuring, total 
payments to both legacy and new generators were at levels higher than costs (and 
included a return for the shareholders).  
Over the period 1990-1996, output from Ontario Hydro’s nuclear generators cost 
approximately 4.8 cents / kWh on average and output from its hydroelectric facilities 
cost on average approximately 1.05 cents / kWh.278  
                                                          
276 It is important to note, that consumers, in 2012 (and prior), were not being exposed to the full impact of 
the high premiums paid for renewable generation in commodity rates as there was not a significant 
amount of renewable generation capacity online and supplying electricity to the grid at that time. As noted 
previously, generated output from renewable sources in 2012 comprised approximately 4% of Ontario’s 
total electricity output. In the future, as more of the renewable generation capacity, contracted by the 
OPA, comes online and begins providing electricity to the grid, the average cost for electricity generation 
will continue to increase and commodity rates will increase accordingly.  
277 Dewees, in 2013, provided a sophisticated quantitative cost-benefit analysis of renewable generation 
in Ontario. In his paper, the financial cost of renewable generation (under the Ontario’s FIT program) is 
compared with the cost savings associated with the displacement of fossil-fuel generation (coal and 
natural gas) and the avoided harm related to air pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Dewees concludes that some dispatchable sources of renewable generation (biogas, biomass, etc.) 
result in savings that meet (or exceed) the FIT prices paid for these types of renewable generation. In 
contrast, wind and solar generation do not result in savings that justify the prices paid under the FIT 
program. Overall, Dewees concludes that “Ontario’s Feed-in-Tariff program costs more than necessary to 
achieve its environmental goals.”  
 
The above is sourced from: Dewees, 2013.  
 
278 Ontario Hydro, Annual Reports, 1991-1997.  
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As noted previously, OPG was established after the restructuring to own and operate 
Ontario Hydro’s legacy generation assets (with the exception of those assets which 
were divested under the Market Power Mitigation Agreement. Payments to OPG related 
to generated output from its prescribed assets (which are its baseload hydro and 
nuclear assets) were first set by the government and are now regulated by the OEB. 
Currently, OPG’s payments are set based on a calculation of its revenue requirement 
which effectively encompasses the entire cost of operating OPG’s prescribed assets 
(including the cost of capital, which has a return on equity component).279   
Payments to OPG for generated output from its prescribed assets have increased over 
the years. From market opening until March 2005, electricity generated from OPG’s 
prescribed assets was paid for at the HOEP (the average wholesale market price over 
that period was approximately 5.5 cent / kWh).280 OPG, however, was required to make 
rebates to consumers pursuant to the Market Power Mitigation Agreement281 until April 
1, 2005 when the government eliminated the rebate.  
Beginning in 2005, the government set the payments that would be made to OPG for its 
generated output from its prescribed assets. The price was set at 4.95 cents / kWh for 
its nuclear output and 3.3 cents / kWh for its hydroelectric output.282 
Effective April 1, 2008, the OEB reset the payments that would be made to OPG for 
output from its prescribed assets. The price paid for electricity generated from OPG’s 
nuclear assets was set at approximately 5.5 cents / kWh (including rate riders related to 
the disposition of deferral / variance account balances) and at 3.7 cents / kWh from its 
hydroelectric assets.283  
                                                          
279 Ontario Energy Board, 2008a: 1-7.  
 
280 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014d. 
 
281 As noted previously, under the Market Power Mitigation Agreement, OPG was required to pay a rebate 
to consumers on 90% of its domestic output when the wholesale market price exceeded 3.8 cent / kWh. 
 
282 Ontario Energy Board, 2008a: 2. 
 
283 Ontario Energy Board, 2008b: 5.  
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Effective March 1, 2011, the OEB again reset the payments that would be made to OPG 
for output from its prescribed assets. The price paid for electricity generated from OPG’s 
nuclear assets and hydroelectric assets was set at approximately 5.6 cents / kWh 
(including rate riders related to the disposition of deferral / variance account balances) 
and 3.4 cents / kW respectively.284 The price changes that occurred in 2008 and 2011, 
as approved by the OEB in its EB-2007-0905 and EB-2010-0008 Decisions, were based 
on changes to OPG’s revenue requirement. OPG’s revenue requirement changed due 
to the underlying costs associated with producing electricity from OPG’s prescribed 
assets (capital expenditures, operation expenses, maintenance expenses, 
administrative expenses, taxes, and changes to the capital parameters – debt rates and 
return on equity).  
The above illustrates that, after restructuring, the payments made for generated 
electricity from OPG’s prescribed assets were higher than prior to the restructuring. The 
payments made to OPG in the post-restructuring period also include a return on equity 
component.285 These higher payments made to OPG for its prescribed assets (as 
compared to during the pre-restructuring period) are applying pressure on commodity 
rates.  
The assets that were leased / sold by OPG (Bruce nuclear facility and the Mississagi 
hydroelectric assets), under the Market Power Mitigation Agreement, are also paid 
higher prices for their generated output then prior to the sector restructuring. Before the 
electricity sector restructuring, generated output from the Bruce nuclear facilities was 
paid at a price likely lower than Ontario Hydro’s average nuclear generation cost of 4.8 
cents / kWh.286 From market opening until 2005, Bruce’s generation was paid at the 
                                                          
284 Ontario Energy Board, 2011c: 4-5.  
 
285 It is important to note that the returns earned by OPG are streamed to the Ontario Electricity Financial 
Corporation to pay down Ontario Hydro’s stranded debt. The issue of whether the dividends paid to 
OPG’s shareholder are applying pressure on electricity prices is discussed in sub-section 9.5.7. 
 
286 4.8 cents / kWh was the average cost of nuclear output for the 1990 – 1995 period. After 1995, the 
average cost of nuclear generation increased as there were significant future liabilities (which were to be 
incurred over the 1997-2001 period) associated with the Nuclear Asset Optimization Plan (“NAOP”) 
charged to operations beginning in 1996. The accounting treatment applied to the costs arising from the 
NAOP distorted the cost of nuclear generation cited in the annual reports for the years 1996 to 1998. 
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wholesale market price (which during the May 2002 –2005 period averaged 
approximately 5.5 cents / kWh).287  In 2005, under the Bruce Power Refurbishment 
Implementation Agreement (which was an agreement between Bruce Power and the 
OPA), electricity generated was priced at approximately 5.7 cents / kWh from the Bruce 
A nuclear facilities and at approximately 4.5 cents / kWh from the Bruce B nuclear 
facilities. The agreement also established certain pricing adjustments for inflation and 
cost overruns related to the refurbishment activities.288 There were a number of 
amendments to the agreement over the years (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013) which 
changed certain terms of the contract (including pricing arrangements).289 As of April 
2013, Bruce Power received 6.8 cents / kWh for electricity produced from its Bruce A 
facilities and 5.2 cents / kWh for electricity produced from its Bruce B facilities.290    
The payments made to Bruce Power for its generated output during the post-
restructuring period are higher than its costs (including lease payments and the 
downpayment amount paid to OPG amortized over the term of the contract). Therefore, 
Bruce Power is earning a return for its shareholder. The increased payment to Bruce 
Power for its nuclear output is applying upwards pressure on commodity rates in 
Ontario.  
Although the contracts related to the Mississagi hydroelectric facilitates are confidential, 
it is likely a similar story as the Bruce nuclear facilities. Pre-restructuring, when these 
assets were owned by Ontario Hydro, the generated electricity was priced at cost. After 
the restructuring, the payments for the generated electricity from the Mississagi 
hydroelectric facilities were priced subject to a confidential 20-year power purchase 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Therefore, the 1990 – 1995 average cost figure better reflects the actual costs associated with output 
from the Bruce nuclear station. 
 
The above is sourced from: Ontario Hydro, Annual Reports, 1994 and 1998.   
 
287 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014d. 
 
288 Bruce Power, 2005: 43.  
 
289 Ontario Power Authority, 2014h.  
 
290 Ontario Power Authority, 2014i and Ontario Power Authority, 2014j.  
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agreement.291 The prices paid for the generated electricity must include a return for the 
shareholder (otherwise no investor would have been interested in purchasing the 
assets). The higher prices that are likely being paid for generation from the Mississagi 
assets are also exerting pressure on commodity rates.  
In addition, the OPA’s contracts for electricity supply from new generation facilities, 
which came online after the restructuring, include above cost payments for generated 
output. In order to attract investment towards the development of generation capacity, in 
the post-restructuring era, it is necessary to pay a return to shareholders. In regard to 
renewable generators, as discussed previously, shareholders are being paid significant 
premiums for output from renewable sources under the OPA’s procurement programs. 
Also, payments for output from new natural gas and hydroelectric facilities include a 
profit component for shareholders.292 293      
Overall, commodity rates are increasing during the post-restructuring period in part 
because the shareholders of legacy and new generators are being paid amounts 
associated with generated output that are above costs. The payment to generators in 
excess of costs is a direct outcome of the electricity sector restructuring. The dividends 
accruing to the private shareholders that own the Bruce Nuclear assets and the 
Mississagi hydroelectric assets provide no value to consumers, as these same assets 
provided generated output to the system at cost prior to the restructuring. Shareholder 
dividends were only required to allow OPG to attract the investment necessary to divest 
itself of these generation assets in accordance with the Market Power Mitigation 
Agreement.  
In regard to the new generation assets contracted by the OPA, if the sector had never 
restructured, Ontario Hydro could have developed these same assets and designed 
                                                          
291 Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners, 2002b.  
 
292 These OPA contracts are confidential so it is not possible to determine the amount of profit being 
earned by the shareholders.  
 
293 A list of the OPA’s current generation contracts is available at: Ontario Power Authority, 2014g.  
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rates to recover only the costs associated with the generated output (similar to the rates 
that were paid for all its generated output prior to the restructuring).  
The ability to earn a profit on generated output only became necessary in order to 
attract private investment into Ontario’s electricity generation sector. In a sector that 
remained vertically integrated, no payments in excess of actual costs would have been 
required to attract the requisite capital investment.  
The remainder of the commodity rate increases that are caused by higher prices being 
paid for generated output from legacy generators is related to real cost pressures 
(increasing costs for the inputs of generation – labour and materials). These real cost 
pressures are associated with inflation (which results in higher costs for the inputs of 
generation) and would have applied pressure on commodity rates even if the sector had 
never been restructured.    
 
9.3 Transmission-related Price Drivers  
 
9.3.1 Transmission Prices  
 
Prior to the electricity sector restructuring, electricity rates were bundled. Therefore, it is 
not possible to isolate the rates paid for transmission service in the pre-restructuring 
period. After market opening, transmission rates were unbundled from other service 
rates. As such, there is transmission pricing information available for the 2002-2012 
period. However, there is no way to compare transmission prices as between the pre- 
and post- restructuring period.  
Figure 34 highlights the uniform transmission rates applicable over the 2002-2012 
period. The uniform transmission rates are designed to recover the revenue 
requirements (which include a return for the transmitter’s shareholder) for all of the 
transmitters in Ontario (Hydro One, Great Lakes Power, Canadian Niagara Power, and 
Five Nations Energy).294   
                                                          
294 Ontario Energy Board, 2007: 1.  
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Figure 34 - Ontario Uniform Transmission Rates (2002-2012)295 
 
The graph above illustrates that the uniform transmission rates remained flat at $5.15 / 
kW / Month from 2002 until 2006. From 2007-2008, the uniform transmission rates fell 
to $4.51 / kW / Month. In 2010, uniform transmission rates rose to a level slightly higher 
than in 2002 ($5.16 / kW / Month) and reached $6.23 / kW / Month in 2012.  
Over the 2002-2012 period, uniform transmission rates increased by almost 21%. When 
looking at year-to-year volatility, transmission rates applied no price pressure until 2009 
when the rates began to the rise above the 2002 level. Therefore, the “all-in” electricity 
price was impacted by changes in transmission prices in the later years of the post-
restructuring period being analyzed in this paper.    
 
9.3.2 Hydro One Revenue Requirement (2011 & 2012)  
 
There were very large increases in uniform transmission rates in both 2011 and 2012. 
The vast majority of these increases were due to changes in the revenue requirement of 
Hydro One. Hydro One is the dominant transmitter in the province, owning 97% of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
295 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, Uniform Transmission Rate Decisions and Rate Orders, 2002-
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transmission assets.296 Therefore, the uniform transmission rates almost entirely 
recover the revenue requirement of Hydro One.  
Over the 2011 and 2012 period, Hydro One’s revenue requirement increased 
significantly. In 2010, Hydro One’s transmission-related revenue requirement was 
approximately $1.22 billion.297 In 2011 and 2012, the OEB approved revenue 
requirements for Hydro One of approximately $1.3 billion and $1.63 billion 
respectively.298 This resulted in a significant increase in the uniform transmission rates.   
Figure 35 disaggregates Hydro One’s total transmission-related revenue requirement 
for 2010, 2011 and 2012. The causes of the increase in Hydro One’s transmission 
overall transmission-related revenue requirement are discussed below.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
296 Hydro One Networks, 2013. 
 
297 Ontario Energy Board, 2010c: 3.   
 
298 Ontario Energy Board, 2011e: Appendix A, 1.  
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Figure 35 - Hydro One Transmission – Revenue Requirement by Component 
(2010, 2011 & 2012)299 
(millions) 2010 2011 2012 
OM&A $426.2 $418.8 $627.1 
Depreciation $281.3 $301.8 $330.8 
Return on Debt $253.5 $257.5 $287.1 
Return on Equity  $256.3 $303.5 $352.1 
Income Tax  $40.0 $64.0 $60.6 
Base Revenue 
Requirement $1,257.3 $1,345.6 $1,657.6 
External Revenue  $(18.0) $(33.7) $(28.7) 
Export Revenue Credit $(12.0) $(16.0) $(16.0) 
Other Cost Charge-
related Revenues $(20.3) $(7.4) - 
Low Voltage Switch 
Gear Costs $10.8 $11.1 $13.9 
OEB Approved 
Revenue Requirement 
(net of other revenues 
and costs) 
$1,217.7 $1,299.5 $1,626.8 
 
Firstly, the OEB approved a revenue requirement related to Hydro One’s OM&A 
expenses of $418.8 million in 2011 and $627.1 million in 2012. This reflects a modest 
decrease in 2011 and a substantial increase in 2012 when compared to the 2010 
approved revenue requirement of $426.2 million. The OEB’s Decision with Reasons in 
EB-2010-0002 notes that the substantial increase in OM&A expenditures in 2012 is 
largely related to certain accounting changes required under International Financial 
Reporting Standards.300  
The OEB approved a revenue requirement related to Hydro One’s depreciation expense 
of $301.8 million in 2011 and $330.8 million in 2010. This reflects an increase in both 
                                                          
299 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, 2011e and Ontario Energy Board, 2010d. 
 
300 Ontario Energy Board, 2010e: 64. 
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2011 and 2012 when compared to the 2010 approved revenue requirement of $281.3 
million. The increased depreciation expense is largely driven by increased capital 
expenditures over the 2008-2010 period related to system expansion, which was 
undertaken to address load growth and give access to new generation facilities.301  
The OEB also approved a return on rate base (i.e. return on debt and equity) of $561 
million in 2011 and $639.2 million in 2012. This reflects an increase in both 2011 and 
2012 when compared to the 2010 approved revenue requirement of $509.8 million. This 
increase was driven by an increase in Hydro One’s rate base from $7.64 billion in 2010 
to $8.38 billion in 2011 and $9.13 billion in 2012 as well as changes to the cost of 
capital parameters.302 Approved rate base increased significantly over the 2010 to 2012 
period due to significant capital spending during the period (on sustainment, 
development, and operational capital projects).303   
Overall, the increased revenue requirement of Hydro One, which was caused by the 
items discussed above, had the effect of increasing the uniform transmission rates in 
2011 and 2012. It is important to note that, with the exception of returns being paid to 
Hydro One’s shareholder,304 the increases in uniform transmission rates, in the later 
years of the restructuring period, are caused by real cost pressures (capital expansion / 
replacement needs, accounting rule changes, higher costs for materials and labour, 
etc.) and are not directly associated with the restructuring (or post-restructuring policy 
changes). The cost pressures discussed above would likely have impacted the price for 
electricity even if the sector had never restructured.  
 
                                                          
301 Ontario Energy Board, 2010f: 3. 
 
302 It is important to note that while the return on debt figures have increased over the 2010-2012 period, 
the interest rates associated with Hydro One’s debt have decreased. The reason that the overall return on 
debt has increased over a period where interest rates have declined is that Hydro One’s rate base has 
increased significantly over the period. 
  
303 Ontario Energy Board, 2010g: 1.  
 
304 Similar to OPG, the returns earned by Hydro One are streamed to the Ontario Electricity Financial 
Corporation to pay down Ontario Hydro’s stranded debt. The issue of whether the net income streamed to 
Hydro One’s shareholder is applying pressure on electricity prices is discussed in sub-section 9.5.7. 
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9.4 Distribution-related Price Drivers  
 
9.4.1 Distribution Prices  
 
As highlighted in Figure 23 in Chapter 8, distribution prices have been increasing over 
the post-restructuring period. From 1998-2012, distribution rates increased by over 
120% on a nominal basis and increased by over 70% on an inflation-adjusted basis.  
A number of changes in Ontario’s electricity sector impacted the rates for distribution 
service. These changes are discussed below.  
 
9.4.2 LDC Returns  
 
After the restructuring, through the Energy Competition Act, the MEUs were required to 
transform into for-profit companies under the Business Corporations Act, 1990. This 
meant that the MEUs (which after restructuring became known as LDCs) became 
eligible to earn a return on equity.305 The returns earned by the LDCs are paid as 
dividends to their shareholders.  
Figure 36 sets out the actual average return on equity earned by the LDCs in the 
province and the total profits earned by the LDCs over the 2006-2012 period. 
                                                          
305 Electricity Distributors Association, 2006: 22.  
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Figure 36 - Average Actual RoE & Total Profits (2006-2012) 306 
 
As highlighted in the above chart, the total profit earned by the LDCs has risen from 
approximately $403 million in 2006 to more than $580 million in 2012. Over that period, 
LDCs’ shareholders (primarily municipalities and some private shareholders) earned 
approximately $3.12 billion in profit. Returns were earned by LDCs throughout the entire 
post-restructuring period (1998-2012) and therefore the total net income earned by 
LDCs, over the post-restructuring period, would be significantly higher than the amounts 
set out above.307  The average actual return on equity earned by the distributors was 
8.4% over the 2006-2012 period.  
Any returns earned by the MEUs, prior to the sector restructuring, were treated as 
retained earnings. Therefore, the revenues in excess of costs stayed in the utility and 
were directed towards utility capital projects. After the restructuring, profits were 
                                                          
306 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook of Electricity Distributors, 2006-2012.  
 
307 There is no return on equity information available for the 1999-2005 period. However, returns were 
being paid to the LDCs’ shareholders over this period.  
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streamed to shareholders and the shareholders could choose to take the profits out of 
the utility business. This applies upwards pressure on distribution prices in the post-
restructuring period as there are significant payments being made to the LDCs’ 
shareholders (municipalities and private owners) in the post-restructuring period.   
The dividend payments to LDC shareholders’ are entirely associated with the 
restructuring and the requirement that MEUs convert to a for-profit business structure. 
This business structure transformation was a precursor to privatization. After the MEUs 
converted into corporations, they became eligible to be sold by the municipal owner to 
private commercial interests.308 A small number of municipalities did elect to sell their 
distribution business to private owners (for example, FortisOntario Inc. purchased LDCs 
that operate in Algoma District, Fort Erie and Port Colbourne309) but the vast majority of 
LDCs continue to be owned by municipalities. Overall, the privatization of the MEUs did 
not occur to any real extent.310  
In the absence of LDC privatization, the necessity of shareholder dividends comes into 
question. Essentially, the electricity sector restructuring made LDC shareholders’, 
primarily municipalities, eligible to earn a return related to a monopoly business where 
no dividends had ever been previously paid and, in fact, had never been required to 
attract the requisite capital investment to ensure the rationale expansion and 
maintenance of distribution systems across the province. Since these return payments 
were not necessary before restructuring, there is no reason to believe that they are 
necessary after the restructuring (the nature of the underlying distribution systems has 
not changed; only the business structure has been altered). Therefore, the returns 
                                                          
308 Winfield, 2012: 135.  
 
309 FortisOntario, 2014.  
 
310 There are a number of reasons that privatization of MEUs did not occur but it is largely associated with 
provincial taxation policies associated with the sale of distribution companies to private commercial 
interests. 
 
Above is sourced from: C.D. Howe Institute, 2013a: 15-17. 
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earned by LDCs amount to economic rent (or windfall profits) which provide consumers 
no direct benefit.311     
 
9.4.3 Market Opening – Distributor Transition Costs  
 
During the lead-up to market opening (May 2002) and in the period immediately after, 
distributors incurred significant costs in transitioning to the newly structured market. The 
OEB established a Transition Costs Deferral Account312 which was designed to track 
the one-time transition costs that were associated with modifying a distributor’s 
operationally capabilities to prepare for new activities associated with the restructured 
electricity market.313  
The costs recorded in the account, and eventually recovered from electricity consumers, 
primarily related to the one-time IT upgrades required to facilitate the entry of retailers to 
the market (i.e. allowing for distributors and retailers to share customer information for 
billing and account settlement purposes) and allow for the billing of electricity services 
on an unbundled basis to all customers.  
The Transition Costs Deferral Account included approximately $178 million related to 
the transitional costs incurred by all of the LDCs in the province.314 The $178 million in 
costs were recovered through distribution rates beginning in April 1, 2004.315   
The transition costs incurred by LDCs due to the restructuring applied pressure on 
distribution rates beginning in 2004 until such time that these costs were fully recovered 
from ratepayers. Given that the transition costs were largely incurred to facilitate the 
                                                          
311 There may be some indirect benefit in terms of downward pressure on municipal taxes when the LDC 
is owned by a municipality. However, this is difficult to quantify.  
 
312 Account No. 1570 
 
313 Ontario Energy Board, 2004a: 55.  
 
314 There are other transition-related costs recorded in other accounts including the Retail Cost Variance 
Accounts (Account Nos. 1518 and 1548). However, the amounts booked in these accounts seem to be 
much less material than those recorded in the Transition Costs Deferral Account.  
 
315 Ontario Energy Board, 2004b.  
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operation of a retail electricity market in Ontario, electricity consumers received very 
little benefit from the distributors’ investment. As discussed in sub-section 6.3, retail 
contracts typically result in consumers paying higher commodity prices and 
experiencing larger commodity price variances than RPP customers. Overall, 
consumers receive little value from the option of signing a retail contract and therefore 
the above noted distributor-related transition costs impacted consumers negatively by 
applying pressure on distribution rates.  
 
9.4.4 Distributor – Operations, Maintenance, and Administration Expenses  
 
Overall, the OM&A expenses of the LDCs have increased significantly over the 1991 to 
2012 period as shown in Figure 37, below.  In 1991, the OM&A costs were 
approximately $189 per customer. In 1997, immediately prior to the restructuring, these 
expenses were about $180 per customer. Therefore, over the 1991-1997 period, 
distribution-related OM&A expenses on a per customer basis decreased by about $9 on 
a nominal basis and by approximately $33 on an inflation-adjusted basis.  
Figure 37 - Average Distributor OM&A per Customer (1990-2012)316 
 
                                                          
316 Derived from Ontario Hydro, Statistical Handbooks, 1990-1997 and Ontario Energy Board, Yearbook 
of Distributors, 2006-2012.  
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However, by 2006, in the first year after the restructuring where actual OM&A expense 
data is available, the average OM&A costs per customer were $235. By 2012, 
distributors’ average OM&A costs had risen to almost $310 per customer. Over the 
2006-2012 period, distributor-related OM&A expenses increased by about $74 on a 
nominal basis and by approximately $46 on an inflation-adjusted basis.  
The increased OM&A expenses in the post-restructuring period result from two broad 
categories of expense drivers: 
• General cost pressure - A significant portion of the OM&A expense increases 
experienced over the post-restructuring period is related to maintenance 
programs (for distribution infrastructure, operational control systems, vehicle and 
equipment fleets, and offices), staffing (maintenance, operations, administration 
and customer support), IT programs (billing, system control and customer 
support), and a number of other costs that have increased over time.317 The 
above OM&A expense drivers can be viewed as amounting to real cost 
pressures and are not directly associated with the restructuring (or post-
restructuring policy changes).  
• Retailer-related OM&A expenses – Some amount of the incremental OM&A 
expenses that occurred in the post-restructuring period are associated with the 
ongoing cost of allowing customers the option of purchasing their electricity from 
retailers (mostly operational and administrative costs associated with retailer 
billing and settlement).318 These retailer-related OM&A expenses are directly 
associated with the electricity sector restructuring.  
Distributor-related OM&A expenses were much higher in the post-restructuring period 
then in the pre-restructuring period and rose more rapidly during the post-restructuring 
                                                          
317 This reflects a sample of some of the OM&A cost items that have been rising during the post-
restructuring period. These cost items have been canvassed from a sampling of LDC Cost of Service 
applications filed with the Ontario Energy Board during the post-restructuring period.  
 
318 In the previous section, the one-time costs of facilitating a retail electricity market were discussed 
(largely the initial IT upgrades necessary for billing and retail settlement). The distributor OM&A expenses 
discussed here are associated with the ongoing costs of facilitating a retail electricity market.  
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period (at least over the 2006-2012 period where actual information is available). 
Increasing OM&A expenses have exerted pressure on distribution rates in the post-
restructuring period. The majority of the OM&A expense increase experienced is related 
to real cost pressures. The distribution price increases associated with real cost 
pressures would have occurred, to some extent, regardless of whether the electricity 
sector was restructured. The remainder is associated with ongoing costs of facilitating 
retail choice for electricity consumers in Ontario (this cost item is directly tied to the 
electricity sector restructuring) which, as discussed previously, provides little value as 
retail contracts typically do not provide the benefits that they purport to deliver.   
 
9.4.5 Distributor Mergers  
 
The number of distributors operating in the province reduced from over 300 in the pre-
restructuring period to 77 currently. The Government’s White Paper noted that the 
government expected that mergers of the distributors would achieve economic 
efficiencies. As discussed previously in sub-section 4.14, a significant number of LDC 
mergers occurred due to municipal policy (i.e. as municipalities amalgamated so did 
their respective electricity utilities).319  
There is some evidence that speaks to cost savings arising from LDC mergers. The 
Ontario Ministry of Energy established the “Ontario Distribution Sector Review Panel” 
(or the “Review Panel”) in 2012. The Review Panel was established to provide expert 
advice to the government on how to best improve efficiencies in the sector with the aim 
of reducing the financial cost of distribution services. The Review Panel released its 
report and recommendations in 2012. 320  
The report noted that although a number of distributor mergers have occurred in the 
province, there are still a very large number of small distributors.321 The Review Panel’s 
                                                          
319 C.D. Howe Institute, 2013a: 5. 
 
320 Ontario Distribution Sector Review Panel, 2012: 1.  
 
321 In 2011, the median-sized LDC in Ontario served less than 20,000 customers while the average-sized 
LDC served about 65,000 customers.  
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report included some comparative analysis of costs associated with distributors of 
varying sizes.  
The report found that OM&A expenses are typically higher, on a per customer basis, for 
small LDC’s. The analysis shows that small LDCs (defined as having less than 12,500 
customers) have OM&A costs that are approximately 75% higher than large LDCs 
(defined as having between 100,000 – 500,000 customers).322  Relatedly, the report 
notes that there is a declining OM&A cost curve as more customers are added to the 
utility.323 The report also noted that financing costs are typically higher for small LDCs 
when compared to large LDCs.  
The report provided some examples where mergers led to reduced distribution costs for 
customers: 
• Veridian Connections was created through the consolidation of the utilities in 
Pickering, Ajax and Clarington in 1999. Veridian Connections experienced 13% 
savings in OM&A expenses in the first 3-years of operation. In 2005, Veridian 
purchased Scugog and Gravenhurst Hydro. The OM&A cost related to the new 
combined utility decreased by 11% (in 2006 (the year after the acquisition).  
• In 2005, Chatham-Kent Hydro purchased Middlesex Power Distribution. This 
purchase resulted in annual administrative cost savings of approximately 
$450,000. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
322 The Review Panel’s report mentions that part of the cost difference between small and large utilities is 
driven by the fact that small distributors have approximately 2.2 employees per 1000 customers, while 
large distributors have approximately 1.7 employees per 1000 customers.  
 
323 A C.D. Howe Report argues that mergers likely drive cost savings up to a utility size of about 100,000 
customers before diseconomies of scale become present.  
 
The above is sourced from: C.D. Howe, 2013a: 9-10.  
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• In 2004, Powerstream was created through a merger of Markham and Vaughan 
Hydro and the acquisition of Richmond Hill Hydro. This merger resulted in about 
$6.9 million in annual savings.324  
The Review Panel’s report concluded by recommending that the 77 existing LDCs be 
consolidated into 8 to 12 large regional distributors “that are large enough to deliver 
improved efficiency and enhanced customer focus, while at the same time maintaining 
connections with local communities”.325 326 
Overall, the analysis undertaken by the Review Panel highlights that increasing the 
number of customers served by a distributor typically results in OM&A cost savings and 
reduced financing costs. A small sampling of some mergers that occurred in the late 
1990s and mid-2000s confirms that cost savings can result from distributors merging. 
Therefore, the distributor mergers that occurred in Ontario have applied downward 
pressure on distribution prices over the restructuring period. The OM&A costs discussed 
in sub-section 9.4.4 would likely have been even higher, in the post-restructuring period, 
if it were not for the distribution mergers that have occurred in Ontario. LDC mergers 
have been beneficial to electricity consumers.  
 
9.4.6 Smart Grid Implementation  
 
As discussed previously in section 7.4, significant investment has been made to 
implement a smart grid in Ontario. The government formally set out its plan for a smart 
grid in Ontario in the Green Energy Act.327  
At the end of 2014, the total amount spent on smart grid implementation was almost $2 
billion. Approximately $1.8 billion of the total amount represent the costs associated with 
                                                          
324 Ontario Distribution Sector Review Panel, 2012: 10-14, 23-24. 
 
325 Ibid: 29.  
 
326 The Review Panel’s recommendations exclude the First Nations’ utilities, the non-rate regulated 
utilities, and Hydro One Remote Communities from its proposal for mass consolidation.   
 
327 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013a.   
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the LDCs installation of smart meters (and related smart grid enabling improvements) 
and the stranding of existing metering assets. In addition, another $160 million had 
been spent by the end of 2014 on the Smart Metering Entity.328 329  
The costs of smart grid implementation are primarily recovered through distribution 
rates (since the IESO was designated the role of Smart Meter Entity its costs are 
recovered through regulatory charges). Ratepayers have been paying charges 
associated with smart grid costs in their distribution rates since 2006.330 The costs of 
smart grid development have applied upwards pressure on distribution rates since 2006 
(when customers began to pay the costs associated with smart grid implementation).  
Studies indicate that the investment appears, at this early stage, to be resulting in a 
modest reduction in peak demand. Based on the preliminary analysis, the development 
of a smart grid (specifically, smart meters) in Ontario, and the related implementation of 
a ToU pricing structure, resulted in a modest shift in residential consumption from on-
peak and mid-peak hours to off-peak times in the summer. In the winter, the province 
has seen an overall reduction in residential demand at all times of the day and week.  
Consumers benefit from reduced peak demand in terms of avoided / deferred 
investment in incremental generation and transmission capacity. In addition, off-peak 
demand is typically supplied by lower emitting sources of electricity (i.e. baseload 
hydroelectric and nuclear) than on-peak demand which is largely supplied by natural-
gas fired generators.331 This provides an environmental benefit to electricity consumers 
in Ontario.    
                                                          
328 Auditor General of Ontario, 2014: 376. 
 
329 It is important to note that not all of the $2 billion in smart grid-related spending are included in the 
electricity prices discussed later in the paper as some of these costs were incurred after 2012. For 
example, in regard to the costs associated with the Smart Metering Entity, only $100 million of those 
costs had been incurred by the end of 2012.  
 
330 Ontario Energy Board, 2011f: 10. 
 
331 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2014.  
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However, given the almost $2 billion investment in smart grid infrastructure, more 
substantial peak demand savings will need to occur in the future for the investment to 
be said to be providing a large benefit to consumers. 
 
9.4.7 Renewable Generation Connection Costs  
 
After the enactment of the Green Energy Act, in 2009, the OEB established certain rules 
regarding connection cost responsibility associated with new renewable generation. The 
cost responsibility associated with renewable generation connection is based on the 
type of investment required to connect the generator to the distributor’s system. The 
cost of the connection assets332 are the responsibility of the generator. While a portion 
of expansion costs333 (up to a cap of $90,000 per MW of renewable generation 
capacity) and all renewable enabling improvement costs334 are the responsibility of the 
distributor.335  
Since 2010, distributors have begun incurring costs associated with renewable 
generation connection. For example, Enersource Hydro Mississauga Inc. (“Enersource”) 
spent approximately $60,000 in 2010 and $200,000 in 2011 on projects which facilitate 
the connection of renewable generators to its distribution system.  Enersource 
forecasted annual spending related to renewable generation connection, on average, of 
$220,000 over the 2012-2016 period.336  
                                                          
332 Connection assets refer to the “the portion of the distribution system used to connect a customer to the 
existing main distribution system, and consists of the assets between the point of connection on a 
distributor’s main distribution system and the ownership demarcation point with that customer.” 
 
333 Expansion costs refer to the costs associated with expanding the distribution system to facilitate the 
connection of renewable generation assets. These expansion projects include: building new distribution 
lines to serve the connecting generator, upgrading from single-phase to three-phase lines, converting 
lines to operate at a higher voltage, upgrading transform stations, etc.). 
 
334 Renewable enabling improvement refers to making upgrades to distribution system to enable the 
system to accommodate generation from renewable generators.  
 
The information set out in the above footnotes is sourced from: Ontario Energy Board, 2014f. 
 
335 Ontario Energy Board, 2014f.  
 
336 Ontario Energy Board, 2012f: 226.  
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The Enersource example cited above is a common theme in the more recent Cost of 
Service applications of Ontario LDCs. It is fair to conclude that, to date, there has been 
modest spending by distributors associated with renewable generation connection. This 
category of spending is expected to increase in the near future as more renewable 
generators request to be connected to distribution systems.  
Overall, renewable generation connection costs have applied pressure on distribution 
rates in the post-2010 period and will continue to impact rates going forward. 
Consumers benefit from the LDC investment in connecting renewable generators in 
terms of a more environmentally-friendly electricity system that relies more heavily on 
sustainable and clean sources of electricity supply.   
 
9.5 Full-Sector Price Drivers    
 
9.5.1 Independent Electricity System Operator: Service Payments and 
Administrative Costs  
 
Prior to the sector restructuring, Ontario Hydro performed the system operation 
functions for Ontario’s electricity sector. It is not possible to unbundle Ontario Hydro’s 
system control costs from its other costs. Therefore, there is no information available 
that sets out, with certainty, the costs incurred during the pre-restructuring period 
associated with system operation of Ontario’s electricity system. However, the following 
facts notionally support the argument that Ontario Hydro provided system operation 
services at a lower cost than the IESO (who became responsible for the operation of 
Ontario’s electricity system after the restructuring).  
Firstly, the IESO pays generators a premium to provide certain ‘ancillary’ services to the 
system including: Black Start, Regulation Service, Reactive Support & Voltage Control, 
and Reliability Must-Run Service. In 2013, the IESO paid a total of $95 million to 
generators for the provision of the noted ancillary services.337  
                                                          
337 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014g.  
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Secondly, the IESO operates an Operating Reserve Market. The purpose of the 
Operating Reserve Market is to ensure that incremental electricity supply is available 
should an unexpected shutdown of other contracted generators occur.  Generators that 
are selected by the IESO to provide operating reserve capacity to the system receive 
standby payments from the IESO (even if the capacity is not called upon to provide 
generated output to the grid).338   
Finally, the IESO’s administrative costs are likely higher than the system operation-
related administrative costs incurred by Ontario Hydro as the electricity system became 
more complicated to operate after the restructuring (dispatch, payment and settlement 
complexities). The IESO’s total administrative costs in 2012, excluding the Smart Meter 
Entity related costs which are discussed earlier in the paper, were approximately $117 
million.339  
The costs incurred by the IESO, as described above, are recovered through the 
Wholesale Market Service Charge. Figure 38 illustrates that the charge was set at 0.49 
cents / kWh in 2006 and rose to a maximum of 0.61 cents / kWh in 2009. It then fell to 
0.50 cents / kWh in 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
338 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014h.  
 
339 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2013d: 31.  
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Figure 38 - Wholesale Market Service Charge (2006-2012)340 
 
Prior to restructuring, ancillary services and operating reserve capacity were provided 
by Ontario Hydro’s own generation assets and were therefore priced at cost (with no 
premium being paid for these services). In addition, it is likely that the administrative 
costs of the IESO are higher than the administrative costs incurred by Ontario Hydro to 
provide system operation services. As such, the premium payments for ancillary 
services and operating reserve capacity and the probable incremental administrative 
costs incurred by the IESO (above the costs that would have been incurred by Ontario 
Hydro) are responsible for some of the overall electricity price increase experienced in 
the post-restructuring period.  
 
9.5.2 Ontario Power Authority: Administrative Costs  
 
The Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 established the OPA and mandated it to function 
as the system planner, facilitate contracting for generation capacity, and design and 
implement conservation programs. OPA’s administrative costs in 2012 were 
                                                          
340 Derived from Independent Electricity System Operator, Monthly Monitoring Reports, 2006-2012.  
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approximately $59 million. These costs are recovered through the Wholesale Market 
Service Charge.341  
Prior to the restructuring, Ontario Hydro was responsible for those same functions. 
Ontario Hydro developed long term plans for Ontario’s electricity system, facilitated 
contracting with the NUGs, and ran its own conservation programs. 
It is not possible to unbundle Ontario Hydro’s system planning costs from its other 
costs. Therefore, there is no way to say with certainty that the system planning costs 
during the post-restructuring period are higher than those incurred during the pre-
restructuring period. However, for the following reasons, it is likely that Ontario Hydro 
provided the system planning functions at a lower cost than the OPA. 
While Ontario Hydro had a number of NUG contracts to manage and did run energy 
efficiency programs throughout the 1990s, these projects were of a smaller scale than 
those being managed by the OPA. The OPA, in 2012, had nearly 16,000 generation 
contracts under its management (mostly small-scale renewable contracts) which 
amounts to approximately 22,500 MW of generation capacity (including capacity both in 
commercial operation and under development).342 Ontario Hydro, prior to its 
unbundling, managed 2000MW of contracted NUG capacity. In addition, the OPA offers 
a more comprehensive suite of conservation programs than were offered by Ontario 
Hydro.343 This is a result of the greater emphasis that the provincial government has 
placed on conservation activities since 2005 (when the Third-Tranche Conservation 
activities began).  
It is important to note, however, that the actual system planning function (i.e. developing 
long-term plans to meet forecasted electricity demand with proper consideration of 
                                                          
341 Ontario Power Authority, 2013b: 14. 
 
342 Ibid: 8.  
 
343 In Ontario Hydro’s 1990 and 1994 Annual Reports, a small number of conservation initiatives targeted 
at residential, commercial and industrial consumers are mentioned. The OPA, over the years, has 
designed and offered a larger number of more robust conservation programs.  
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supply mix options and transmission constraints) is not materially more complicated in 
the post-restructuring period.  
Overall, the OPA has a more extensive workload related to generation contracting and 
conservation programming than Ontario Hydro had prior to the restructuring. Therefore, 
it is likely that the costs incurred by the OPA are higher than those incurred by Ontario 
Hydro to perform similar functions.  
 
9.5.3 Ontario Energy Board: Administrative Costs  
 
Prior to the restructuring, Ontario Hydro set: (a) the rates for the customers that it 
served directly; (b) the wholesale electricity rate (commodity and transmission); and (c) 
the rates charged for distribution services provided by the MEUs.344 345 Ontario Hydro 
had a small team of regulatory staff which set the wholesale electricity rate and the 
rates for all the MEUs in the province (including its retail distribution business).346 
Ontario Hydro also made decisions regarding capital expansion and did not require 
approval to implement its capital plans (building generation, transmission and 
distribution infrastructure).   
After the restructuring, through revisions to the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, the 
OEB’s mandate was expanded to include the regulation of the monopoly functions of 
the electricity sector. It is fair to say that the majority of the OEB’s resources are now 
devoted to regulating the electricity sector including processing rate and leave to 
construct applications, licencing, compliance, policy development and communication 
                                                          
344 Ontario Hydro would file rate applications with the Ontario Energy Board. The OEB would review the 
filed applications and provide recommendations. However, Ontario Hydro required no approvals from the 
OEB to change its rates. 
 
345 Daniels and Treblicock, 1996: 3-4. 
 
346 William Harper’s Curriculum Vitae found on the webpage associated with his consulting practice 
(Econalysis Consulting Services) highlights that from 1987 – 1989, he managed a team of 8 people in 
Ontario Hydro’s Rates department. There may have been some support staff in other groups involved in 
rate setting at Ontario Hydro. As such, a fair estimate would be that less than 15 people were involved in 
the rate setting process at Ontario Hydro.  
 
The referenced CV is sourced from: Econalysis, 2014: 4.  
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with customers. The regulatory apparatus at the OEB is much larger than it was at 
Ontario Hydro since the OEB’s regulatory work has a wider scope (for example, the 
OEB’s rate-setting process is much more intensive and the new retail electricity market 
must also be regulated). Accordingly, the costs of regulating Ontario’s electricity sector 
are almost certainly higher in the post-restructuring period than before the restructuring.  
For the 2011- 2012 fiscal year, the OEB’s total administrative costs were approximately 
$34 million.347 348 The regulator’s costs are recovered from the regulated entities 
operating in the electricity sector (electricity and natural gas distributors, electricity 
transmitters, as well as OPG, OPA and the IESO).349 These costs are passed onto 
electricity consumers.  
  
9.5.4 IESO, OPA & Ontario Energy Board: Cost Summary  
 
The nature of the restructured sector requires that there be organizations responsible 
for operating the system, developing system plans and economic regulation to ensure 
that the sector develops and operates in a cost-effective and efficient manner. As such, 
the IESO, OPA, and OEB play a vital role in Ontario’s electricity sector (and are 
accountable for tasks that were previously managed by Ontario Hydro). The fact that 
three organizations are accountable for the functions that were previously performed by 
a single entity (Ontario Hydro) results in a duplication of back office functions (finance, 
legal, human resources, etc.). This is part of the reason that the costs associated with 
system operation, system planning and regulation are higher in the post-restructuring 
period. But it is not the only reason; the other reasons have already been discussed in 
the preceding sections.  
Overall, the costs associated with operating the IESO, OPA and OEB are likely applying 
pressure on electricity prices in the post-restructuring period as Ontario Hydro 
                                                          
347 Ontario Energy Board, 2013e: 15.   
 
348 Note that the $34 million in administrative costs includes the costs associated with regulating the 
natural gas sector as well as the electricity sector.  
 
349 Ontario Energy Board, 2014h: 3.  
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performed the functions that are now executed by these organizations at a lower total 
cost. Some portion of these incremental costs would have been avoided if the sector 
was never restructured but it is not possible to calculate the total avoided cost. 
 
9.5.5 Conservation and Demand Management Spending  
 
As discussed in section 7.3, significant investment in CDM programs has occurred over 
the post-restructuring period. This is a direct result of the post-restructuring policy of the 
provincial government (specifically, the Minster of Energy’s 2004 approval of third-
tranche CDM and the CDM Target directive under the Green Energy Act). In total, there 
has been a direct investment in CDM by LDCs of about $394 million during the 2005-
2012 period.350  
There have also been costs incurred to provide incentive payments and lost revenue 
adjustment payments to the LDCs related to their conservation activities. Therefore, the 
total investment in CDM is likely materially higher than the $394 million figure cited 
above.  
The costs associated with the third-tranche CDM programs (including incentive 
payments and LRAM payments) were recovered entirely though distribution rates.351   
The costs associated with the CDM programs implemented after the Third-Tranche 
CDM programs concluded are recovered through the Global Adjustment Mechanism 
(with the exception of the incentive and LRAM payments which are still recovered 
through distribution rates).352  
Conservation programs have been applying pressure on electricity rates since 2005 
when Third-Tranche CDM programs were first implemented. However, while CDM 
programs cause rates to increase on $/kWh basis, these programs result in reduced 
                                                          
350 Ontario Energy Board, 2009b: 1, Ontario Energy Board, 2012d: 8, and Ontario Energy Board, 2013b: 
8.  
 
351 Ontario Energy Board, 2009b: 3. 
 
352 Independent Electricity System Operator, 2014a.  
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overall consumption (which reduces the total electricity bill for consumers). The total bill 
savings associated with reduced consumption more than offsets the distribution rate 
increases associated with CDM program. As estimated by the Ministry of Energy, for 
every $1 spent on conservation, Ontario has avoided $2 in costs to the electricity 
system.353 Had these costs not been avoided, they would have been collected from 
ratepayers.  
Overall, consumers are benefitting from investment in conservation programs through 
an overall reduction of their electricity bill. Consumers are also deriving environmental 
benefits from conservation programs in terms of reduced emissions associated with a 
reduction in electricity demand.  
 
9.5.6 Investment Catch-Up  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there were certain electricity pricing restrictions in place over 
the 1993-2005 period.354 Some of the pricing restrictions were in place due to 
government policy decisions made prior to the restructuring, while the others (i.e. those 
occurring post-1998) are directly associated with restructuring and post-restructuring 
policies of government.  
When prices are restricted, the revenues received by utilities are constrained. A 
common outcome of constrained revenues is a temporary reduction of discretionary 
capital spending. The price restrictions, at different times, impacted generation, 
transmission and distribution service providers.  
It is likely that as a result of the pre- and post-restructuring price restrictions utilities 
reduced capital spending. Once the price restrictions were removed, investment catch-
up occurred meaning utilities undertook capital projects that were previously deferred. 
Investment catch-up can be viewed as necessary incremental spending to address the 
reduced spending that occurred during the period where electricity prices were 
                                                          
353 Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2013c: 1-2. 
 
354 The pricing restrictions that were in place over the noted period are set out in sub-section 5.2. 
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artificially held at levels below what is necessary to continue the maintenance and 
proper development of the electricity system.   
There is no way to quantify the impact that investment catch-up had on electricity prices 
during the post-restructuring period. However, it almost certainly did occur to some 
extent and thus applied pressure on electricity prices during the post-2005 period (once 
the price restrictions were lifted).  
From the consumers’ perspective, investment catch-up resulted in increased electricity 
rates over the post-restructuring period. However, over the time period where the price 
freezes were in effects, consumers accrued financial benefits associated with the 
artificially restrained electricity prices.   
 
9.5.7 Ontario Hydro Stranded Debt Repayment: Payments-in-Lieu of Taxes, 
Return Payments of OPG and Hydro One, and the Debt Retirement Charge  
  
The Ministry of Finance determined that Ontario Hydro’s stranded debt, which would 
arise due to the sector restructuring and the related disaggregation of Ontario Hydro, 
was approximately $20.9 billion. Revenue streams that would be used to service the 
stranded debt of Ontario Hydro were created by the Electricity Act, 1998. 
The government collects funds to stream to the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation 
to pay down the legacy debt of Ontario Hydro through the following mechanisms 
(previously described in Chapter 5), which are all paid for by consumers in their 
electricity rates: (a) payments in lieu of taxes355; (b) return payments of OPG and Hydro 
One356; and (c) the Debt Retirement Charge357.358 Since 2000, approximately $23.6 
                                                          
355 As noted previously, after the restructuring OPG, Hydro One and the LDCs began to make payments 
in lieu of taxes to the government. Payments in lieu of taxes are equivalent to corporate income, property 
and capital taxes paid by private corporations.  
 
356 After restructuring, OPG and Hydro One began to earn a return on equity related to their regulated 
assets. This return is paid to the provincial government and the amount above the interest costs 
associated with the government’s investment in the utilities is streamed to the Ontario Electricity Financial 
Corporation to pay down the stranded debt of Ontario Hydro. Before the restructuring, Hydro One did not 
earn a return on the equity portion of its capital structure. Any net earnings were treated as retained 
earnings and used to fund capital projects.  
 
163 
 
billion in payments have been made to the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation to 
service Ontario Hydro’s debt. The total payment is depicted, broken down by revenue 
stream, in Figure 39, below.  
Figure 39 - Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation Revenues by Mechanism 
(2000-2012)359 
  
There are significant interest costs associated with the stranded debt of Ontario Hydro. 
In 2012 alone, these interest costs totaled about $1.6 billion.360  After financing 
payments, the debt has been reduced from $20.9 billion (at restructuring) to $12.3 
billion (as of March 31, 2012).361 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
357 Consumers are directly applied a 0.7 cent / kWh charge on their electricity consumption which is 
known as the debt retirement charge. The money collected from this direct charge is also streamed to the 
Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation to pay down what is known as the residual stranded debt of 
Ontario Hydro.  
 
358 Auditor General of Ontario, 2011: 122-123.  
 
359 Derived from Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, Annual Reports, 2000-2012.  
 
360 Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, Annual Report, 2012: 12.  
 
361 Ibid.  
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Debt repayments could be viewed as a price driver in the post-restructuring era as the 
amounts collected are paid by ratepayers through electricity charges. However, prior to 
the restructuring, some portion of the bundled electricity rate would have been designed 
to recover amounts from ratepayers to service the debt of Ontario Hydro. On that basis, 
the debt repayments should only truly be viewed as a price driver if the amounts that 
are being collected from ratepayers for debt repayment purposes are in excess of, or 
are being collected more rapidly when compared to, what was being collected by 
Ontario Hydro in its bundled electricity rates. Since it is not possible to know whether 
the sum of the amounts collected from ratepayers for debt repayments in the post-
restructuring period is greater than, or accelerated compared to, what would have been 
collected by Ontario Hydro, it is uncertain whether debt repayments are applying 
pressure on electricity prices in the post-restructuring era. 
 
9.5.8 Cost of Debt Financing  
 
Prevailing macroeconomic conditions, which are not associated with the electricity 
sector restructuring, have resulted in a low interest rate environment in Canada over the 
post-restructuring period. The Bank of Canada Prime Rate, on average, has been 
significantly lower during the post-restructuring period than it was during the pre-
restructuring period. After the global financial crisis in 2008, interest rates fell to a record 
low of 2.25% in April 2009.362  Figure 40 depicts the Bank of Canada Prime Rate from 
1983-2012.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
362 Trading Economics, 2014.  
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Figure 40 - Bank of Canada Prime Rate (1983-2012) (%)363 
  
While the Bank of Canada Prime Rate provides a strong indicator of general borrowing 
costs, a better indicator of the cost of debt for Ontario utilities is the deemed debt rates 
calculated by the OEB. The OEB has set out generic debt rates for use by the LDCs in 
their Cost of Service applications since May 2000.364 The deemed debt rates 
established by the regulator can be considered a proxy for a market-based interest rate 
that would be applicable to a utility operating in Ontario and therefore provide a 
reasonable estimate of the interest rates experienced by the distributors over the years.  
 
 
 
                                                          
363 Ibid.  
 
364 Over the 2000-2006 period, the deemed debt rates set by the Board were considered reflective of the 
actual debt costs of the distributor and were used as an input in the rate setting process. The Board’s 
policy evolved after 2006 and the Board began to more commonly utilize the actual embedded cost of 
debt in the rate setting process. Currently, the deemed debt rate is used as a proxy for a market-based 
interest rate and it acts as a ceiling for debt associated with affiliates, variable rate debt instruments, and 
in instances where the distributor has no actual debt. The actual cost of debt is used in the rate setting 
process when appropriate.   
 
The above is sourced from: Ontario Energy Board, 2009c: 50-58.  
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Figure 41 - Deemed Debt Rates for LDCs (2000-2012)365 366 
 
Figure 41 shows that the deemed weighted average cost of debt stays flat at almost 7% 
from 2000 to 2006. The weighted average cost of debt falls to about 6% in 2006 and 
increases to 7.2% in 2009. By May 2012, the weighted average cost of debt falls to 
4.25%. This graph shows that the cost of debt, as reflected by the proxy debt rate 
calculated by the OEB, has decreased significantly over the post-restructuring period.  
With regard to OPG, in 2008 when the OEB began to set the payment amounts 
associated with OPG’s output, the OEB approved a weighted average cost of debt of 
5.76%. For 2009, the weighted average cost of debt approved was 5.89%.367 For 2011 
                                                          
365 Derived from Ontario Energy Board, Cost of Capital Parameters Decisions and Cost of Capital 
Parameter Update Letters. 
 
366 Note the following related to Figure 41: 
 
• For the 2000-2008 period, the Board had established 4 separate deemed long-term debt rates 
which coincided with the size of a distributor’s rate base. The information provided in the graph 
reflects a simple average of the deemed long-term debt rates.  
• Also, regarding the 2000-2008 period, there was no deemed short-term debt rate. As such the 
weighted average cost of debt for that period is equal to the deemed long-term debt rate.  
• For the 2008-2012 period, the Board added a deemed short-term debt rate to its cost of capital 
parameters. In the weighted average cost of debt calculation for the 2008-2012 period, 
approximately 93% of the debt is deemed long-term and approximately 7% is deemed short-term.  
 
367 Ontario Energy Board, 2008b: Appendix A, 4b and 5a.  
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and 2012 the weighted average cost of debt approved was 5.44% and 5.50% 
respectively.368 Regarding Hydro One, the weighted average cost of debt approved by 
the OEB was 5.35% and 5.39% in 2011 and 2012 respectively.369  
Due to the market conditions and the related low interest rate environment, the cost of 
debt, associated with capital projects undertaken during the post-restructuring period by 
Ontario electric utilities, has decreased significantly over the post-restructuring period 
(and is lower than it was during the pre-restructuring period given the relatively high 
interest rate environment experienced in the 1980s and 1990s as highlighted by the 
historical Bank of Canada Prime Rate).  
Overall, the reduction in the cost of borrowing for new capital projects, experienced over 
the post-restructuring period, is providing some rate relief on electricity prices. Given 
that this reduction is associated with general market conditions, this cost reduction 
would have occurred irrespective of the electricity sector restructuring. Nonetheless, the 
reduced cost of debt applicable to the electricity utilities benefits consumers by applying 
downwards pressure on electricity rates.  
 
9.6 Conclusion  
 
I set out the major factors that have impacted electricity prices over the post-
restructuring period and the cause of each (i.e. restructuring-related policies, post-
restructuring policies or real cost pressure) in this chapter. In addition, I discussed the 
consumer impact associated with each price driver was discussed.   
Electricity prices have been impacted by real cost pressures over the post-restructuring 
period. The price for the electricity commodity, transmission service and distribution 
service were all impacted, to some extent, by rising input costs. These are offset to 
some extent by the reduced cost of debt applicable to the sector over the post-
restructuring period. The inflationary pressure associated with general economic 
                                                          
368 Ontario Energy Board, 2011c: Appendix A, 4b and 5b.  
 
369 Ontario Energy Board, 2011d: 1.  
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conditions would have impacted electricity rates irrespective of the sector restructuring. I 
discussed these price drivers in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
regarding why electricity prices have risen more rapidly in the post-restructuring period.  
The factors impacting electricity prices that are directly associated with either the 
restructuring or post-restructuring related policies of government, however, are of the 
most interest in terms of answering the primary research question of this thesis.370  
There were a number of price drivers that arose directly out of the restructuring-related 
policies of government.  Many of these factors have applied significant upwards 
pressure on electricity rates during the post-restructuring period and have provided little 
benefit to consumers. These factors include: 
• Shareholder returns paid to the private owners of the generation assets (the 
Bruce nuclear and Mississagi hydroelectric facilities) sold by OPG to private 
interests and to new private generators that are contracted by the OPA; 
• Shareholder returns paid to the owners, which are largely municipalities, of the 
LDCs; and 
• Costs incurred by LDCs to facilitate the operation of a retail electricity market 
(both one-time transition costs incurred at the time of market opening and 
ongoing OM&A costs). 
The costs associated with operation of the IESO, OPA and the OEB also arose directly 
out of the electricity sector restructuring and have applied upwards pressure on 
electricity rates. These incremental costs could have been avoided if the sector had 
never been restructured since Ontario Hydro performed the same functions at a lower 
total cost.  
                                                          
370 As discussed at the outset of this paper, the primary purpose of the analysis completed in this paper is 
to answer the question: from an economic and environmental perspective, how have Ontario’s electricity 
consumers been impacted by changes resulting from the restructuring and post-restructuring policies of 
government? 
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Investment catch-up has also applied upwards pressure on electricity prices during the 
post-restructuring period. Investment catch-up is associated with price restrictions that 
were in place during the 1993-2005 period (spanning both the pre- and post- 
restructuring periods). Therefore, investment catch-up is not entirely associated with 
restructuring-related government policies (but some of the price limitations that were 
implemented by government occurred directly as a result of the restructuring).  
Investment catch-up can be viewed as necessary spending that occurred to address 
reduced capital expenditures that occurred during the prior periods where electricity 
prices were restricted.371  
A final factor that arose out of the restructuring was the repayment of Ontario Hydro’s 
stranded debt. It is unknown whether the amounts collected for debt repayment are 
driving electricity price increases in the post-restructuring period.  
In regard to the issue of distributor mergers, although the government noted that it 
expected that mergers would achieve economic efficiencies, the mergers that occurred 
were not truly associated with the restructuring policies of government. LDC mergers 
largely occurred due to municipal policy. While not directly related, the majority of the 
LDC mergers did occur around the same time that the sector was restructured and 
resulted in downwards pressure on distribution rates.  
A number of the factors impacting electricity prices that were caused by the 
restructuring-related policies of government were associated with facilitating a 
competitive market for electricity supply in Ontario. Electricity consumers, to do this day, 
continue to pay costs associated with a competitive market design when competitive 
market forces have never, except for a brief period immediately after market opening, 
truly been given the opportunity to exert control over electricity prices in Ontario.  
There were also a number of price drivers that arose out of government policies that 
were implemented in the post-restructuring period. These price drivers include:  
                                                          
371 Investment catch-up has increased the price of electricity for consumers of the post-2005 period. 
However, consumers benefitted in terms of reduced electricity prices during the time periods that the price 
restrictions were in place.  
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• Supply mix changes; 
• Renewable generation procurement programs; 
• CDM programs; 
• Smart grid implementation; and  
• Renewable generation connection.  
All of the above price drivers have applied upwards pressure on electricity rates over 
the later years of the post-restructuring period. However, the conservation programs 
offered to consumers have reduced average use, which offsets, to some extent, the 
overall price increases on a total bill basis.   
The implementation of supply mix changes (i.e. the phase-out of coal and the inclusion 
of renewable generation sources) and the overall modernization of Ontario’s electricity 
sector has been quite expensive. However, the spending has resulted in an 
improvement in the environmental performance of Ontario’s electricity sector which 
benefits all the citizens of Ontario.    
The price drivers that arose from the post-restructuring policies of government should 
be considered separate, analytically, from the price drivers that arose from the 
restructuring-related policies as they would have likely been implemented irrespective of 
the sector restructuring. 
Overall, there have been a large number of items that have caused electricity rate 
increases during the post-restructuring period. A portion of the overall rate increase was 
caused by the restructuring-related government policies designed to facilitate 
competition in Ontario’s electricity sector while another portion was caused by the post-
restructuring government policies designed to make the electricity sector more 
environmentally sustainable.  For the most part, the price drivers associated with the 
sector restructuring have provided little benefit to electricity consumers. While the price 
drivers associated with post-restructuring policies of government have made progress 
towards achieving environmental goals, which are beneficial to citizens. However, the 
progress made towards “greening” the electricity sector has come at a significant 
financial cost.  
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A summary of the price drivers is attached as Appendix A to this paper.  
In the next section, I will summarize the key information provided in my thesis paper and 
I will set out the final conclusions.  
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Part C 
 
10. Conclusion  
 
Ontario’s electricity sector underwent a fundamental transformation beginning in 1998 
with the release of the Energy Competition Act. Over the years, the sector transitioned 
from a traditional monopoly model to the current “hybrid model”.  
Similar to some of the work cited in the literature review (i.e. Swift and Stewart, 2002 
and Winfield, 2012), my paper provides a detailed understanding of the rationales, 
objectives and process of Ontario’s electricity sector restructuring.  
Under the Harris government, the electricity sector became a target of reform due to the 
perception that Ontario Hydro operated poorly during the early 1990s and the 
government’s ideological belief that the private sector operates more efficiently than the 
public sector. The main goals of the restructuring were to reduce electricity prices 
through the introduction of competitive market forces and offer customers choice in 
retail electricity supply.372  
The sector moved from the traditional monopoly model to its current structure in two 
steps. First, a fully competitive electricity market opened in May 2002 (based on the 
framework established by the Energy Competition Act). The competitive market, in its 
original form, only operated until December 2002. In response to the consumer outcry 
associated with rising electricity prices after market opening, the government enacted 
the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004, which established the “hybrid model” for 
Ontario’s electricity sector. The “hybrid model” was designed to include both competitive 
and regulated characteristics.  
A number of other changes occurred during the post-restructuring period. The most 
significant of these changes include: the establishment of the OPA; the enactment of 
Green Energy Act; and distribution company mergers.  
                                                          
372 The government also sought to enhance the safety and reliability of the electricity grid, improve the 
efficiency of electricity distribution through amalgamations, and reduce Ontario Hydro’s legacy debt. 
173 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of electricity prices in the pre- and post-
restructuring periods, I utilized two comparative analysis frameworks (1983-1997 vs. 
1998-2012 and 1991-1997 vs. 2006-2012) to study both the “all-in” electricity price and 
the distribution price.  
The pricing analysis that I performed in this paper was hindered, to some extent, by a 
lack of data available for the 1998-2005 period. Ontario Hydro stopped reporting 
electricity pricing information in 1997 and the OEB did not begin its reporting of 
electricity prices until 2006. The lack of publically-available pricing information for a 
period of 8 years is a concern as it makes policy analysis significantly more difficult. The 
government should have appointed a team responsible for gathering and reporting the 
same information that was reported by Ontario Hydro prior to the restructuring. This 
would have ensured that important pricing information was continuously available, 
which would have maintained public transparency and provided the government with 
the necessary information to allow it to evaluate whether its policy decisions were 
resulting in the intended outcomes. This issue teaches an important lesson for policy 
implementation that occurs in Ontario, and elsewhere, in the future. If crucial information 
is not recorded during a transition phase, the ability to evaluate policy outcomes is 
greatly diminished. In all cases, data gathering and recording functions must be 
maintained in order to allow for comprehensive evaluation.  
The analysis that I undertook in this paper reveals that the “all-in” electricity price has 
increased more rapidly in the post-restructuring period. In addition, distribution prices 
have increased more rapidly in the post-restructuring period. The regression analysis 
confirms that the restructuring, and other post-restructuring changes, are positively 
correlated to the sharp increases in electricity rates observed over the post-restructuring 
period. 
These findings arise from pricing analysis that was not previously completed and 
available in the academic literature. The “all-in” electricity pricing time series used was 
developed solely for this paper. The developed pricing dataset uses an average price 
for electricity (as opposed to more commonly available pricing data that is applicable to 
a specific class of customers). The methodology used to develop the pricing information 
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avoids certain pricing distortions that could potentially arise in the cost allocation 
process, which allows for a more effective analysis of electricity pricing over time. In 
addition, the regression analysis performed on the “all-in” electricity pricing dataset, 
which confirms the correlation between government policies and the changes 
experienced in electricity prices over time, was not previously available in the academic 
literature.  
The results of the pricing analysis beg the question: why did electricity prices increase 
more rapidly in the post-restructuring period? To answer this, I analyzed all of the major 
price drivers that impacted electricity prices over the post-restructuring period.  
I have also answered the question: from an economic and environmental perspective, 
how have Ontario’s electricity consumers been impacted by changes resulting from the 
restructuring and post-restructuring policies of government? This question was 
answered by analyzing, through both an economic and environmental lens, the price 
drivers that caused the rapid increase in electricity prices experienced over the post-
restructuring period to determine the impact that they had on consumers.  
Electricity prices have been impacted by real cost pressures over the post-restructuring 
period. The price for the electricity commodity, transmission service and distribution 
service were all impacted, to some extent, by inflationary pressure on the inputs of 
production related to the provision of electricity service. This inflationary pressure was 
offset by reduced debt financing costs applicable to electric utilities in Ontario over the 
post-restructuring period. These real cost pressures would have impacted electricity 
rates regardless of the sector restructuring. 
However, a number of the price drivers impacting electricity rates are directly related to 
the sector restructuring.  
The Harris Government believed that it would be able to reduce electricity prices for 
consumers by introducing competition into the sector (and by allowing private 
companies to enter the electricity market). In practice, a true free market system for 
electricity generation was in place for less than a year. While the “hybrid model” that is 
in place today does include a market system for wholesale electricity supply, the 
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competitive aspect of the pool market has been diluted by the government’s decisions 
to procure new generation capacity almost entirely under long-term fixed price contracts 
and to subject OPG’s prescribed generation assets to rate regulation by the OEB. The 
decisions that government made after the restructuring effectively moved the province 
away from a competitive market for electricity supply.  
Although the government moved away from competition in generation, the costs 
associated with the competitive market structure established by the restructuring 
policies of government were still being paid by electricity consumers over the post-
restructuring period. The market structure established by the sector restructuring 
requires the payment of shareholder dividends to the new owners of Ontario Hydro’s 
legacy assets (i.e. Bruce nuclear and Mississagi hydroelectric facilities) and to the 
owners of new generation facilities that provide power to the grid subject to long-term 
power purchase contracts with the OPA. The payment of shareholder returns related to 
generated output only became necessary, after the restructuring, in order to attract 
private investment into Ontario’s electricity generation sector. If the sector had never 
restructured, no payments in excess of actual costs would have been required to attract 
the requisite capital investment in generation capacity (as no shareholder returns were 
required by Ontario Hydro – or more accurately, the provincial government which was 
Ontario Hydro’s shareholder - prior to the restructuring).  
In addition, the IESO pays premiums to generators for the provision of certain ancillary 
services and reserve capacity. Prior to the restructuring, these services were provided 
at cost by Ontario Hydro. 
The focus, in recent years, when studying electricity prices in Ontario, has been on the 
cost pressure applied by the post-restructuring policies of government which were 
designed to improve Ontario’s electricity sector’s environmental performance. This 
analysis typically ignores the fact that costs associated with facilitating a competitive 
market structure are also applying significant upwards pressure on electricity prices in 
the post-restructuring period. These are costs that could have been avoided if the sector 
had never been restructured. Electricity consumers were negatively impacted by the 
competitive market facilitation costs as any benefit that may have arose from 
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competitive market forces were lost when the government essentially abandoned 
competition for wholesale electricity supply.  
Another set of price drivers arising from the electricity sector restructuring are 
associated with the government’s objective to introduce customer choice in retail 
supply. Customers, after the restructuring, were given the option of purchasing their 
electricity from retailers under fixed-price and fixed-term contracts. Significant costs 
were incurred to facilitate retailer access to the market (both one-time transition costs 
and ongoing OM&A expenses). As discussed previously, the retail option provides little 
benefit to consumers since typically consumers that elect to have their electricity 
supplied by a retailer pay a higher price for the electricity commodity and enjoy less 
price stability than those customers that purchase their electricity from their LDC (and 
therefore pay the RPP price). 
In addition, the restructuring required municipalities to transform their electric utilities 
into for-profit companies. This was a prelude to privatization. However, very few Ontario 
municipalities elected to sell their distribution businesses to private interests. The 
transformation undertaken to allow for the privatization of the MEUs created a structure 
whereby the distribution companies became eligible to earn a shareholder return (or a 
return on equity). Shareholder returns were never necessary prior to the restructuring to 
attract investment in distribution. Dividend payments to the shareholders of the LDCs 
have applied upwards pressure on distribution prices over the post-restructuring period 
and provide no benefit to consumers.  
The restructuring also required the creation of the IESO (system operation) and the 
OPA (system planning), and the expansion of the OEB’s mandate to include the 
regulation of the electricity sector. Ontario Hydro provided the same functions as these 
organizations at a lower cost. This is another reason that electricity rates have risen 
more rapidly over the post-restructuring period (when compared to the pre-restructuring 
period). In general, when a large-scale publically-owned monopoly business responsible 
for a wide-range of operational functions is disaggregated, incremental costs will almost 
certainly arise as a number of smaller new companies / agencies are established to 
take over the responsibilities previously held by the larger company. The incremental 
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costs that arise are, at least partially, caused by a duplication of back office functions. A 
government seeking reform by unbundling a publically-owned monopoly business must 
be careful to weigh the additional costs that will, almost certainly, arise from the 
unbundling against the forecasted benefits.   
Other price drivers that impacted electricity prices are associated with the government’s 
post-restructuring policy direction which sought to make Ontario’s electricity sector more 
environmentally sustainable. The government through policy directives issued during 
the post-restructuring period and the enactment of the Green Energy Act, sought to 
“green” Ontario’s supply mix (through the phase out of coal-fired generation and the 
procurement of renewable supply), reduce electricity demand through conservation 
programs and reduce peak electricity demand through the implementation of a smart 
grid (and related ToU pricing). The government has been quite successful at achieving 
these environmental goals (which have achieved a significant reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions). While these post-restructuring policies have benefitted consumers from 
an environmental perspective, significant costs have been incurred which have applied 
pressure on electricity rates over the post-restructuring period. It is likely, given the 
global trend towards increased reliance on renewable generation, that many of the 
government’s environmental policies would have occurred irrespective of the sector 
restructuring. As such, the post-restructuring policies of government that have impacted 
the price of electricity should be viewed as, analytically, distinct from the restructuring-
related polices of government. 
In my paper, the results are clear that, on a qualitative basis, the government’s post-
restructuring policies were beneficial to consumers as they did make Ontario’s electricity 
sector more environmentally-friendly. However, a detailed quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis could be useful to determine whether the environmental benefits accrued truly 
outweigh the financial costs incurred to achieve these benefits. This type of study is yet 
to be completed in a manner that considers all of the post-restructuring environmental 
policies of government.373  
                                                          
373 Dewees, 2013, did provide a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of renewable generation in Ontario. 
However, it did not evaluate policies associated with conservation and smart grid implementation.  
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There were also several price drivers that were not solely related to either the 
restructuring or post-restructuring policies of government. For example, incremental 
capital spending (investment catch-up) that occurred after various price freezes were 
lifted applied price pressure on electricity rates in the post-2006 period. The price 
freezes are attributable to both pre-restructuring and restructuring policies of 
government. Another example are the distribution mergers that occurred after the 
restructuring. These mergers occurred largely due to municipal policy and applied 
downward pressure on electricity prices over the post-restructuring period.  
The specific conclusions set out above with regard to the reasons that electricity prices 
rose more rapidly in the post-restructuring period, and how consumers have been 
impacted by these changes, are a result of the detailed price driver analysis that I 
completed for this paper. As mentioned in the literature review, Dewees, 2012, did 
provide some analysis of the major price drivers that have impacted electricity prices in 
Ontario over the post-restructuring period. However, the number of price drivers 
considered (and the level of detail included in the analysis of each specific price driver) 
in this paper is well beyond what was previously available. The detailed nature of my 
analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the reasons why electricity prices 
rose more rapidly in the post-restructuring period and offers a well-considered 
evaluation of the impact that these price drivers had on electricity consumers in Ontario. 
The nuanced understanding of the impacts that the government’s pre- and post-
restructuring policies had on consumers provided by this paper fills a gap in the existing 
literature.   
In general, analysis of electricity prices over extended timeframes is extremely 
complicated to perform. It is not possible to say with certainty whether the prices paid 
for electricity today are higher than they would have been if the sector was never 
restructured (this is the “unsolvable counterfactual problem” cited in the limitations 
section of the paper). The most effective way to address the counterfactual problem is 
to complete a comparative analysis of Ontario’s electricity sector with the electricity 
sectors of other jurisdictions that have also undergone sector reform to determine 
whether the results experienced in Ontario are similar to those experienced in these 
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other jurisdictions. This is another area where additional work should be completed in 
the future.   
Although my paper does not, directly or indirectly (through comparative analysis), 
address the counterfactual problem, the analysis that I have undertaken in this paper 
demonstrates that electricity prices have increased more rapidly over the post-
restructuring period (when compared to the pre-restructuring period).  
My analysis also sets out the reasons that prices rose more rapidly in the post-
restructuring period and discusses how the changes to the sector, resulting from the 
restructuring and post-restructuring policies of government, have impacted electricity 
consumers.  
Essentially, the restructuring policies of government sought to reduce electricity prices 
through competitive market forces (and the privatization of electricity infrastructure).The 
government, after market opening, moved away from a free market system for electricity 
supply and very little privatization occurred (particularly related to the distribution assets 
held by municipalities). However, the competitive market structure established by the 
restructuring, which requires the payment of shareholder returns, continued to exist. 
Therefore, consumers have been paying, through their electricity rates, the costs 
associated with a market structure that was designed to allow for competition even 
though, in practice, competition does not exist in the sector. This has negatively 
impacted consumers through upwards pressure in electricity rates. In addition, the 
restructuring policies of government have increased the price for electricity service as 
significant costs were incurred to provide customer’s options for retail electricity supply. 
Retail contracts, as noted previously, are typically not beneficial to consumers.  
Overall, while the restructuring policies of government have generally impacted 
consumers negatively, the post-restructuring policies of government have largely 
provided consumers benefits in terms of a cleaner generation supply mix and reduced 
demand for electricity (however, these environmental benefits have come at the cost of 
increased electricity rates). 
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Appendix A - Summary of Price Drivers 
 
The major factors that impacted electricity prices over the post-restructuring period were 
discussed in the Chapter 9. These factors, or price drivers, were categorized on the 
basis of causation and analyzed from both an environmental and economic perspective 
to determine whether consumers have benefitted. The following table summarizes the 
information set out in the noted chapter. 
Price Driver Section Causation Consumer Impact 
Commodity-related Price Drivers 
Supply Mix Changes 9.2.2 Post-
Restructuring 
Government 
Policies  
Environmental benefit arises due to a 
cleaner supply mix. This 
environmental benefit comes at the 
cost of increased commodity prices.  
Renewable 
Generation 
Procurement 
Programs 
9.2.3 Post-
Restructuring 
Government 
Policies 
Necessary to attract renewable 
generation projects (which achieves 
environmental goals). However, 
generous program design is causing 
unnecessary incremental pressure on 
commodity prices.  
Higher Payments for 
Generated Output 
from Legacy 
Generators and New 
Generators  
9.2.4 Restructuring & 
Real Cost 
Pressure 
 
 
Above cost payments made to the 
private companies that purchased the 
Bruce and Mississagi assets and to 
the shareholders of new generation 
facilities in the post-restructuring 
period are resulting in increased 
commodity prices. These return 
payments provide no benefit to 
consumers and could have been 
avoided if the sector was never 
restructured.  
 
The underlying costs of the generated 
output from legacy generators that 
were online prior to the restructuring 
are increasing due to general 
economic conditions (i.e. the inputs to 
generation are more expensive). This 
applies pressure on commodity prices 
However, rate increases associated 
with underlying cost pressure would 
have occurred irrespective of the 
sector restructuring.  
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Price Driver Section Causation Consumer Impact 
Transmission-related Price Drivers 
Hydro One Revenue 
Requirement 
Increase 
9.3.2 Real Cost 
Pressure  
The increases in transmission rates 
are caused by real cost pressures 
experienced by Hydro One (capital 
expansion / replacement needs, 
higher costs for materials and labour) 
and would likely have impacted the 
price for electricity even if the sector 
had never restructured. These cost 
pressures are increasing the overall 
price of electricity for consumers.  
Distribution-related Price Drivers 
LDC Returns  9.4.2 Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
Above cost payments for generated 
output applied pressure on distribution 
rates over the post-restructuring 
period. The payment, by ratepayers, 
of a shareholder return provides no 
direct benefit to consumers as the 
necessary capital investment in 
distribution assets was available prior 
to the corporatization of the MEUs.    
Distributor Transition 
Costs   
9.4.3 Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
Transition costs incurred by 
distributors associated with market 
opening (and more specifically, the 
facilitation of a retail electricity market) 
resulted in pressure on distribution 
rates after 2004.  
 
Retail choice in electricity supply 
provides little value to consumers as 
the retail option typically results in the 
consumer paying a higher price for the 
electricity commodity and 
experiencing greater rate instability.   
Distributor OM&A 
Expenses 
9.4.4 Real Cost 
Pressure & 
Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
The majority of the increase in 
distributor OM&A expenses is 
associated with inflationary impacts 
which have operated to increase the 
costs of providing distribution service 
(materials, labour, IT support, etc.). 
These increased costs would have 
likely occurred irrespective of the 
sector restructuring.  
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Price Driver Section Causation Consumer Impact 
The remainder of the increase in 
OM&A expenses is associated with 
the ongoing costs of facilitating a retail 
electricity market. Retail choice in 
electricity supply provides little value 
to consumers.  
 
Increased OM&A costs incurred by 
distributors applied pressure on the 
distribution rates applied to electricity 
consumers in the post-restructuring 
period. 
Distributor Mergers  9.4.5 Municipal Policy 
& Hydro One 
Acquisitions 
LDC mergers provided benefits to 
consumers in the form of reduced 
OM&A expenses (compared to the 
level of OM&A costs that would have 
been present in the sector if the 
number of LDCs did not decrease) 
which applies downwards pressure on 
distribution rates.  
Smart Grid 
Implementation 
9.4.6 Post-
Restructuring 
Government 
Policies  
The costs associated with smart grid 
implementation applied pressure on 
distribution rates in the post-
restructuring period. However, 
consumers are receiving modest 
benefits from the smart grid spending 
in terms of deferred avoided / deferred 
investment in incremental generation 
and transmission capacity and 
reduced emissions associated with 
electricity generation. However, given 
the substantial investment in smart 
grid infrastructure, a larger reduction 
in peak demand will need to occur in 
the future in order to justify the 
investment.  
Renewable 
Generation 
Connection Costs 
9.4.7 Post-
Restructuring 
Government 
Policies  
The costs associated with the 
connection of renewable generators 
by LDCs applied pressure on 
distribution rates in the post-
restructuring period. Consumers 
benefit from this investment by LDCs 
as it allows renewable generators to 
be added to Ontario’s supply mix 
which achieves environmental goals.  
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Price Driver Section Causation Consumer Impact 
Full-Sector Price Drivers 
IESO Service 
Payments and 
Administrative Costs  
9.5.1 and 
9.5.4 
Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
The above cost payments made for 
certain ancillary and operating reserve 
services along with the administrative 
costs of the IESO (which are likely 
higher than those incurred by Ontario 
Hydro to provide the system operation 
function) have applied pressure on 
electricity rates over the restructuring 
period. This has increased the price of 
electricity service for consumers.  
 
While an independent system 
operator is necessary in the context of 
the restructured electricity sector, 
some portion of the incremental costs 
associated with system operation 
could have been avoided if the sector 
had never been restructured.  
OPA Administrative 
Costs  
9.5.2 and 
9.5.4 
Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
The higher costs incurred by the OPA 
to provide the system planning 
function has applied pressure on 
electricity rates over the post-
restructuring period. This has 
increased the price of electricity 
service for consumers.  
 
The OPA provides a necessary 
service in the context of the 
restructured electricity sector. 
However, some portion of the 
incremental costs associated with 
system planning could have been 
avoided if the sector was never 
restructured.  
OEB Administrative 
Costs  
9.5.3 and 
9.5.4 
Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies 
The higher costs incurred by the OEB 
to provide regulatory oversight in the 
electricity sector has applied pressure 
on electricity rates over the post-
restructuring period. This has 
increased the price of electricity 
service for consumers. 
 
The OEB provides a necessary 
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Price Driver Section Causation Consumer Impact 
service in the context of the 
restructured electricity sector. 
However, some portion of the 
incremental costs associated with the 
OEB’s operations could have been 
avoided if the sector was never 
restructured. 
CDM Spending  9.5.5 Post-
Restructuring 
Government 
Policies  
While CDM spending applied upwards 
pressure on electricity rates over the 
post-restructuring period, consumers 
are benefitting in terms of reduced 
total electricity bills (as average 
consumption has declined). 
Environmental benefits are also 
achieved through reduced emissions 
associated with reduced electricity 
demand.  
Investment Catch-up 9.5.6 Pre-
Restructuring 
and 
Restructuring 
related 
Government 
Policies 
Due to the varying price restrictions 
that were in place over the 1993-2005 
period, utilities reduced discretionary 
capital spending. Once the price 
limitations were removed, investment 
catch-up occurred which applied 
upwards pressure on electricity rates. 
Investment catch-up can be viewed as 
necessary spending to address the 
reduced capital expenditures that 
occurred during the prior periods 
where electricity prices were 
restricted. 
 
Investment catch-up has increased 
the price of electricity for consumers 
over the post-2005 period. However, 
consumers accrued financial benefits 
in terms of lower electricity prices 
during the time periods that the price 
freezes were in effect.  
Ontario Hydro 
Stranded Debt 
Repayment 
9.5.7 Restructuring-
related 
Government 
Policies  
Amounts are collected from 
ratepayers through a number of 
mechanisms to service the legacy 
debt of Ontario Hydro (payments in 
lieu of taxes, returns payments of 
OPG and Hydro One, and the DRC). 
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If the sector had never restructured, 
some portion of the bundled electricity 
rate would have been designed to 
recover the costs associated with 
Ontario Hydro’s debt.  
 
It is uncertain whether the amounts 
collected for debt repayment purposes 
in the post-restructuring period are 
greater than, or accelerated compared 
to, what would have been collected by 
Ontario Hydro for the same purpose. 
As such, it is uncertain whether debt 
repayments are applying pressure on 
electricity prices in the post-
restructuring era.  
Cost of Debt 9.5.8 Real Cost 
Pressure 
The cost of debt in the post-
restructuring is significantly lower in 
the post-restructuring than it was 
during the pre-restructuring period. 
The reduction in the cost of debt 
would have occurred irrespective of 
the electricity sector restructuring.  
 
The reduction in the cost of debt 
applicable to Ontario’s electricity 
utilities is applying downwards 
pressure on electricity rates during the 
post-restructuring period which is 
beneficial to consumers.  
 
 
 
 
